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CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

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CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

CURRENT TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Dixon, Wirth, Warner, Thurmond, Wallop, and Mack.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel.

Professional staff members present: Robert G. Bell, Richard E. Combs, Jr., and John J. Hamre.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Claire M. Kelly, special assistant; Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, George W. Lauffer, John E. Mansfield, Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Barbara L. Braucht, Elizabeth Ann Harlow, Julie W. Kemp, Cindy Pearson, and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator Levin; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; Jefferson B. Seabright, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Lee E. Whittaker, assistant to Senator Wallop; Samuel D. Adcock, assistant to Senator Lott; Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats; Saul H. Singer, assistant to Senator Mack; and Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith.

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. Our committee meets this afternoon to receive testimony on broad trends in the Soviet Union.

For over 40 years, the United States defense establishment has been shaped essentially in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. We assessed change in the Soviet Union last year and we also looked at the Warsaw Pact extensively last year in an attempt to determine the impact of these changes on our national security interests.

A lot has happened since then. Today's hearings will help us to update last year's assessment and make changes in our own minds where necessary.

We will hear today from a panel of very distinguished academic experts: Dr. Gail Lapidus, Professor of Political Science at Berkeley; Dr. Stephen Meyer, Professor of Political Science at MIT; Dr. and Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, retired, Adjutant Professor of Political Science at Yale, and Director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute, and a very familiar face before this committee. Bill, we welcome you back. And we will hear from Dr. Richard Pipes of Harvard, who I understand is coming from the airport. Dr. Pipes' flight today has unfortunately been delayed. I think he will be with us soon.

Today's hearings follow testimony the committee received last week from Secretary Cheney and General Powell on the changing threat, the revised military strategy and the resultant defense budget that has been proposed by the administration.

The committee also received testimony last week from CIA Director Webster and DIA Director Soyster in closed session on the international threat environment, including the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We hope to have that testimony available for public release, at least that part of it that can be declassified, as soon as possible.

Today, we will focus on the overall developments and trends currently underway in the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow afternoon, at 2 o'clock, the committee will receive testimony from a panel of outside experts focusing on developments and trends in Eastern Europe. The committee plans to hold subsequent hearings on more specific aspects of the Soviet and Eastern European scene as we proceed through the year.

We greatly appreciate the panelists joining us today. I know that some of you have had to rearrange your schedules. I know that it is not convenient to come at this time for some of you and we appreciate very much your being here.

What I would like to do this afternoon is have all of the panelists give their opening statements, and then we will have some questions and, hopefully, some stimulating exchanges between the differing views, if we have different views here today. At this time, I would like to submit for the record the opening remarks of Senator Alan J. Dixon.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have with us today such a distinguished panel consisting of Lieutenant General Odom, Drs. Richard Pipes, Gail Lapidus, and Stephen Meyer to examine the current trends in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, I was pleased when President Gorbachev announced his plans for perestroyka and glasnost within the Soviet Union, as well as by the turn of events with the cooling of the cold war. I also welcomed the proposed military force reductions in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the announced formal dissolution of the military bloc to the Warsaw Pact, all of which will combine to allow the United States to significantly reduce its military presence in Europe.

I am concerned, however, by the continued use of Soviet force within the Baltic republics. I am also concerned by the incessant Soviet military modernization programs, especially those of a strategic nature, particularly in light of their shattered economy and their requests for aid. Finally, I am concerned about reported Soviet

non-compliance with the letter and spirit of the CFE Treaty, an event which certainly will delay proceeding with force reductions in Europe, as well as the completion of a START Treaty. I look forward to the testimony of this distinguished panel on the current trends in the Soviet Union.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. I will call on Senator Warner, my colleague, to make any remarks he would like to make.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join you in expressing on behalf of this committee and indeed the whole Senate our profound respect and gratitude for your taking time from your important responsibilities to provide us with this insight.

We are witnessing today hopefully one of the final hours or days of this frightful conflict in the Gulf being fought over Biblical lands. I remember the phrase which I believe is, "This, too, shall pass." And when that situation hopefully is resolved, bringing about a greater stability in that region, once again we will turn back to the Soviet Union, which is a situation that persists year in and year out.

There is no other nation in the world whose affairs have a more profound or more lasting impact on the daily lives of every American than the Soviet Union. We have witnessed here in these past few years, primarily during the years of President Gorbachev, dramatic changes, and now, within the past year, what appears to be strong currents to go back. It is from you that we hope to learn more about where those currents will flow in going back.

As we develop our budget annually, $300 billion, give or take a billion here or a billion there, it is the Soviet military threat which has the largest single influence. That budget is tied directly to the threats against this Nation and our allies.

We try assiduously not to have one dollar more of the taxpayers' money spent than necessary to deter those threats this year, next year, and as far as we can see into the future. So, again, your testimony will have an impact on the largest single budget that comes through the Congress, other than health and Social Security and so forth.

Thank you very much for joining us.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

I understand that we will start today with General Odom and then move directly, as seated, to Dr. Lapidus and then Dr. Meyer, and we will come back to Dr. Pipes when he arrives.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would observe another member here seeking recognition.

Chairman NUNN. Yes. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my statement follow that of Senator Warner in the record.

Chairman NUNN. Certainly, without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our distinguished panel. I especially want to recognize General Odom, who is called upon frequently by this committee to share his insight on world affairs and on the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is highly appropriate to hold this series of hearings on what is happening in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Although we all cele-

brated the move toward political and economic reform initiated by President Gorbachev, it is obvious that there are segments of Soviet society opposed to these reforms.

The key questions to be addressed by this committee are, to what extent are these forces gaining power, and what influence do they have on Gorbachev? If the traditionalists and pro-military factions gain greater influence within the Soviet Government, there will be serious implications on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We are already seeing the adverse impact these traditionalist groups are having on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the START talks.

Mr. Chairman, the prospect of a Soviet Union in turmoil is not a pleasant thought. We must be prepared for all eventualities. These hearings are a first step to ensure we are not caught by surprise.

Chairman NUNN. General Odom.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM (RET.), ADJUTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, YALE UNIVERSITY, AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE

General ODOM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure for me to be here once again before you and the members of the committee and to be addressing an issue so critical for our security policy, one that has perhaps received too little attention because the war with Iraq has pushed it into the shadows somewhat, though necessarily.

The dynamics of Soviet political and military developments still, as Senator Warner said, bear very heavily on our security even though the Cold War is over.

Now, drawing only on the main points of my written statement, I shall direct my oral remarks to the major trends, changes and continuities of Soviet politics, emphasizing what I think is the key role of the Soviet military. Then, based on that assessment, I will make a few short remarks about future prospects and implications for U.S. policy and military policy in particular.

Now, both media reporting and scholarly analysis in my view have given us a flawed view of the structure of change in Soviet politics. We have been left with an image of a basic shift to democratic elections, reasonably free ones, which have allowed a spectrum of political parties to form, ranging from liberal to reactionary. Their representatives have been elected to the Congress of Peoples Deputies and to the Supreme Soviet in reasonably free and competitive elections.

A similar, but somewhat narrower, range of political diversity has characterized the upper levels of the Communist Party.

Now, this change from the old Politburo/Central Committee dominated dictatorship has yielded a diffusion of power among competing groups. Gorbachev has steered carefully between the liberals and the conservatives, slowly moving the system toward basic reform, toward liberal democracy and a market economy.

The battle for reform in this analysis is being fought between elite political groupings in Moscow, liberal and conservative.

Now, if the analysis is correct, it follows that we should side with the liberals. If they win, we can expect the demise of the old command economy and the dominance of the Communist Party.

So what is wrong with such an image? For a time I think it had a grain of truth. In fact, in Soviet foreign policy, I think it's been

fairly accurate. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, especially She-vardnadze—and I give him more credit than Gorbachev in this regard—have steered Soviet foreign policy on a remarkably liberal course. The image is highly flawed, however, when we look at domestic politics.

Political power has, indeed, become much more diffuse; but the shift in the power has not been to the competing political groups in Moscow, except in a limited degree. The major shift has been to the republics, to the republican governments and to the national and popular front movements in those republics.

The truly significant shift in this direction has not even been in the Baltics or the Caucasus. Rather, it has been in the Russian Republic. It is one thing for Lithuania to try to secede from the Soviet Union; it is quite another for Russia to resist Soviet rule.

When Boris Yeltsin became Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet and a short time later dramatically left the Communist Party and paid a tribute to the Russian church, he altered the very structure of Soviet politics. I think it is fair to say that it is now "Saint Boris of Holy Russia" versus "Comrade Gorbachev of the Soviet Union."

Now, the alignment after that was no longer, if it ever was even before, primarily between conservatives and liberals in Moscow. It was between Moscow and the republics. The battle is no longer over reform. It is over national autonomy versus Soviet imperial rule.

The new structure of diffused power has made the military and the police far more critical to the outcome. The republics have been remarkably successful in weakening the military. They attacked it as a foreign occupier. They have encouraged their youth to resist military conscription quite successfully. Several republics have unofficial militias and military formations. While Russian youth have not resisted conscription in the large numbers of some minority republics, Yeltsin has appealed to the discontented junior officers in their family against the senior ranks and the generals.

More important, he has begun to make some inroads into the general officer ranks.

Colonel General Kobets, an active duty Deputy Chief of the General Staff, only a few weeks ago became his shadow minister of defense; and retired Colonel General Volkogonov has become his military adviser, analogous to Marshal Akhromeyev for Gorbachev. And Yeltsin has floated the idea of an independent Russian army and Russian KGB, as opposed to Soviet.

Now, the republics have also gained some ground on the economic front in defining economic sovereignty, a term that Moscow allowed some definitional activity to be committed to. Actually, a commission was formed to write the principles of economic sovereignty. Through this struggle, they gained somewhat more control over firms and activities on their own territory.

The many small political parties in Moscow were unable to gain the lead from this diffusion of power because they have no control over property and they have very little money. Also, they have virtually no regional structure or organization. The republics, on the other hand, have resources—not all they want, but enough to challenge Moscow rule.

Now, Gorbachev has had to decide between reform or saving the empire. He has clearly chosen empire. To save it, he has to fall back on the military and police.

Throughout 1990, he slowly shifted his position, trying to stem the deterioration in the military in building more MVD divisions, special police units, and stiffening the KGB's ranks.

On the economic front, I am not sure he ever really intended to have a market economy. I'm not sure he understood what one was, or what one is. But the economic reform measures, modest though they are, have upset the central planning coordination, particularly in the military/industrial sector. The so-called military/industrial conversion program, initially intended to turn that sector to production of a flood of consumer goods, has been reversed and become somewhat of a Trojan Horse for military/industrial bureaucrats to gain a much larger control over the non-military sector and make very successful demands for larger ruble investments in their own retooling.

The economic reformers have come to realize that, without the virtual destruction of the old VPK, or military/industrial commission and its underpinning apparatus, no genuine reform of the economy is likely to be successful.

They seem to be losing the battle to destroy it.

Now to the continuities in the Soviet system, since I have spoken about changes. As Gorbachev attempts to defeat these secessionist movements in the republics, we are beginning to see that the key institutions of the old system, although weakened, are far from gone. In my view, the most important is the command economy. It is virtually unchanged. Only 1 percent of all the economic activity in 1990 was from the cooperatives. The rest of the GNP, the other 99 percent, was in the command directed sector of the economy.

So that structure is still around, only somewhat more inefficient.

The censorship is coming back. GLAVLIT, that old apparatus, thought to be in its final death throes, seems to be alive if not all that healthy. The party apparatus still controls most of the resources at the center and at local levels. And the political controls in the military and police, after a very strong campaign last spring and summer to disestablish them, are being revitalized.

Although many new laws have been passed, promising protection to individuals, groups, and other things, the courts are far from independent and able to enforce the new laws, except in a few cases.

Thus the promise of a pluralistic political development seems far from realization.

Now who will win in the struggle between the center and the republics? I have no clear idea.

Sometimes I think it appears that the republics are going to carry the day. The resistance to the crackdown in Lithuania, not only in that republic but also in Moscow, where Yeltsin sided with Lithuania and where several media leaders refused to follow the Moscow line, where demonstrations were held, was strong enough to cause Gorbachev to vacillate.

On the other side, at the same time, restoration of many of the old control mechanisms—censorship, trumped up arrests, counter demonstrations—suggest that the forces for maintaining the empire are also strong.

Some observers have long expected a military coup against Gorbachev. I see no prospect of that. The military leaders and the party are fused together politically in a way that makes a coup an irrelevant idea.

As the radical reformer, Major Lopatin, replied when he was here in the United States last fall, when several Americans asked him in private about the prospects of a coup, he shrugged his shoulders and said, "Why should they make a coup against themselves?"

I think that captures the essence of the situation.

The line military commanders, far from attacking the party, have become the most orthodox Communist voices. For example, Colonel General Makashov, at the Russian Communist Party conference last spring, expressed their view emotionally when he shouted at Gorbachev: "We Army Communists will not surrender ideologically."

A key point here is that Marxism-Leninism, with its concept of international class struggle, gives the military the biggest threat possible against which to size Soviet forces. When Gorbachev introduced "human-kind interests" as more important than "class struggle" and insisted on cooperation with the imperialist West, he took away that big threat.

The implications were not lost on the military. Its senior generals sided with the party conservatives who, today, occasionally reassert the old, ideological line on the importance of international class struggle.

You can imagine, if the Defense Department comes over here and you tell them there is no more Soviet threat, they will really have a difficult time in convincing you that they need a large budget. When Gorbachev said there won't be the previous emphasis on international class struggle, I think it was an even more devastating diminution of the Soviet defense requirements in the Soviet Union.

Now, what are the implications for U.S. policy? I think they are fairly clear. The central front in Europe is gone. The Soviet economy can still produce a lot of new weapons, but it cannot keep pace in a qualitative arms race. I emphasize "qualitative" because I think we do need to stay in the qualitative competition.

For the next decade, therefore, I think, while a large military in the Soviet Union will remain, it is unlikely to propose a serious threat to most U.S. interests.

We will require, however, modern strategic forces adequate for deterrence, but probably not as large in the past. I can imagine giving up a leg of the Triad without excessive risk.

The Soviet Navy in principle can still come out and be a problem. But we will probably not need nearly the same quantity of Naval forces to check it. Qualitative factors are likely to be more important.

In Europe, I think we will need a residual ground and air presence to hedge against a wide range of uncertainties in East Europe and the Soviet Union. But one heavy U.S. corps and its close air support should suffice; that is, forces less than half the present level.

Now, in the political domain, the big question is whether or not we should support the secessionist republics. I believe we should support some of them. Those who argue we must support Gorbachev in maintaining the union so he can eventually carry out liberal reforms apparently misunderstand the requisites for liberalism and liberal reforms as much as Gorbachev does.

There are no liberal empires that I know of. A breakup of the Soviet Union, therefore, is a precondition for liberal reform, not an obstacle to it. It won't insure reform. But it will certainly make reform possible in some of the secessionist republics.

Now, it would be a mistake to support self-determination to the extreme for every autonomous region throughout the whole Soviet Union. We don't have to. We can take a case-by-case approach.

The legal basis for the independence of the Baltic Republics was implied by the Soviet Government itself, when it declared that the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact was invalid. Thus, we have an extremely strong argument for supporting their secession.

The other republics are more ambiguous. Even for Moldavia, which was included in the Soviet Union under the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the status quo ante there would be a return to Romanian rule.

We do not know if the Moldavians desire that.

Now, the Ukraine, Transcaucasus and Central Asia are complicated issues. Much depends on Russia in this regard.

If Russia secedes, then I think it will be hard to argue against determination for everybody else.

Now, Professor Pipes, who is a witness here today, is I think the most illustrious historian of how all these republics came under Soviet rule in the first place. I am sure he can elaborate much more definitively on some of these points that I have merely raised in passing here about self-determination.

I would be very interested to hear his ideas on the subject because of his knowledge of it.

What action should we take? On the Baltics, I think we should be more vocal and less ambiguous about our support. We could establish *de facto* embassies there, following the pattern we now have in Taiwan, an arrangement we made to deal with the situation, where we did not want to maintain formal recognition.

I believe the Congress should invite Boris Yeltsin to Washington and ask him to clarify his four-point plan for achieving self-determination in the Soviet Union

Rather than simply condemning him from here, I think it might be helpful if we gave him a chance to explain his plan in considerable detail so we can better judge it and decide whether to support it.

With those remarks, I will close. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Odom follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM (RET.)

CHANGE IN THE U.S.S.R.: ITS NATURE AND IMPLICATIONS

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to appear once more before this committee, particularly because of subject of the hearing. Change is occurring in the Soviet Union that bears centrally on our security. To

overlook it or misread it could be a costly error. I see this hearing as a most important step in making sure that we do not overlook it, notwithstanding the understandable fixation we now have with Iraq. We witnesses, of course, face the challenge not to misread it. If we merely address the right questions and issues without interpreting them definitively, perhaps that will stir a wider public debate about them that will uncover much more of the truth.

While I will speak about the larger questions of political development in the Soviet Union, the military question will hold a central place in my remarks. Signs of deep political decay and instability thrust the military into this position. Machiavelli, when he wrote his illustrious treatise, The Prince, was concerned with unstable governments. That prompted him also to put the military in a central place. His words are instructive in this regard:

"The principal foundation which all states have are good laws and powerful armies. Since there can be no good laws where there are not strong armies, I shall set aside any discussion of laws and proceed to speak of armies."

We could do worse than follow this approach in analyzing political change in the U.S.S.R. By dealing first with the dynamics of political and economic change in the Soviet Union, I hope to show why the military factor is so critical.

What Kind of change? What Continuities?

I am struck by a basic mistake in the focus of much of Western analysis of Soviet politics. It is unfair to some journalists and scholars, but to sharpen the point, let me slightly caricature the image of change many of them present.

It seems to me that they encourage us to believe that the decay, even breakdown, of parts of the Soviet system is giving way to the forces of pluralism and liberal democracy. At the same time, they insist that Gorbachev has made considerable progress in moving the Soviet economy toward a market system.

This impression comes from the reasonably free elections for the Congress of People's Deputies and the indirect election of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. The elections gave seats in these two legislative bodies to people of several political persuasions, not just Communists. We see a long list of new opposition political parties, legislative groups, and political organizations. Some are on the side of liberalism—the Democratic Union, the Popular Front, Constitutional Democrats, Social Democrats, and others. Some are on the political right—Intermovement, Soyuz, Pamyat, and others.

Most of these groups have articulate and attractive spokesmen who not only dominate the floor of the Supreme Soviet proceedings but also fill the pages of newspapers and journals with remarkably critical and searching articles. They use television for the same purposes.

Not surprisingly, we hear a lot about these people and their political and economic ideas. The liberal wing is more articulate, and it has advanced programs that, if implemented successfully, would appear to transform the Soviet Union into a liberal democracy with a market economy.

All of this is not only encouraging in light of our own political views, but it is also enormously entertaining. That means it is news worthy. Therefore we hear a lot about it.

At the same time, we hear a lot about the deterioration of the old political and economic institutions. They seem to be breaking down, permitting a diffusion of power to these new groups. When the liberal groups are challenged by the conservative circles in debate and by repressive administrative measures, we hear about that as well. We conclude that the dynamics of Soviet politics will be determined largely by this highly visible political struggle. If the liberals win, the prospects for liberal reform are good. If the conservatives win, the outlook is bad. Gorbachev is seen as trying to manage this competition for the larger purpose of liberal reform.

Is this a valid picture of the central dynamics of change in the Soviet system? I believe it is a seriously flawed image. Let me explain.

Undoubtedly political power is increasingly diffuse in the Soviet Union. It is not true, however, that the diffusion has shifted significant power to these political groups in Moscow. They have remarkably little power. They lack money. They have no property to speak of. And they lack a regional institutional structure that can collect resources and articulate mass interests. Very noisy and very visible, they nonetheless remain extremely weak.

They have played an important role in changing public opinion. In particular, they have undercut many of the ideologically defined images held by the public. They have destroyed a lot of people's faith in Marxism-Leninism. They have pointed the finger of blame for stagnation at incumbent party bureaucrats. Gorbachev encouraged them to do this, and after an initial hesitation, they took up the task with

great energy. In other words, while remaining weak themselves, they have helped weaken the party and many state institutions, including the military. Their strong identification with democracy, coupled with their inability to change things, however, has begun to give democracy a bad name in the minds of many impoverished Soviet citizens who care less and less about lofty ideals and more about how to get food and clothing and about how to stop crime and violence.

The diffusion of power passed these political groups by. Where has the power moved? In many ways it has simply evaporated through the decline of mass responsiveness to the official institutions. But it has not all evaporated. Much of it has shifted to the national republics. The republican governments, where they have taken up the local nationalist cause, have asserted it against Moscow's rule. Compared to the new political parties, these disaffected republican governments and popular fronts have large resources at their disposal, and they struggle daily to wrest more away from the center.

Not surprisingly, some of them have begun building their own military formations. Some are armed. Some are not. Some are fully under republican control. Local groups in the republics also agitate against Soviet military conscription with surprising success. In the spring of 1990, the call-up only received a country-wide response of 26 percent, and it was less than 20 percent in several republics. The call-up was repeated in June and July to get the figure above 90 percent. The fall draft of 1990 continued to have massive no-shows, especially in the Baltic and Transcaucasian republics.

The republican governments made considerable progress against the center in a struggle over defining "economic sovereignty." They were able to challenge the center on control of local firms, on taxation, and a number of other resource issues.

Finally, almost all of the republics have passed some form of resolution or declaration asserting political sovereignty as well. While they have not been able to implement them effectively, they have not been shy about their desires and intentions.

Judging the importance of these shifts in power is difficult; we could overestimate them. The Baltic republics' struggle to secede from the Soviet Union suggest that the shifts are great. But I am more impressed with the degree of autonomy, if not outright political sovereignty, being sought by the Russian republic. It is one thing for a few small republics to try to break away from Soviet control. It is far more serious when Russia tries to break away.

Boris Yeltsin, of course, has championed these separatist tendencies in Russia. It is no exaggeration to say that the entire structure of Soviet politics changed when Yeltsin was elected to the Chairmanship of the Russian Supreme Soviet and a short time later dramatically walked out of the Communist party at the 28th Party Congress. He was soon identifying himself with the Russian Church, the oldest Russian ethnic institution.

To put it in slogan form, the new structure of Soviet politics became "Saint Boris of Holy Russia" versus "Comrade Gorbachev of the Soviet Union." Not only is Yeltsin leading Russia against the Soviet Union. He is supporting the secessionist movements in the Baltic region. Gorbachev has been forced to declare openly that he will not surrender two things: the Soviet Union and socialism. The lines are clearly drawn.

The degree of the strength of these new centers of power was evident after the recent crackdown effort in Lithuania and Latvia. The resistance there combined with Yeltsin's support seems to have caused Gorbachev to hesitate to pursue the crackdown vigorously. The articulate Moscow liberal intelligentsia, it must be admitted, also resisted by publicly condemning the crackdown, something they would have feared to do a year or so earlier. But as a political force, they are not Gorbachev's major problem. Yeltsin is. And so are several other republican leaders. It is no longer idle to speculate about the demise of the Soviet Union, although it may be too early to predict it.

To sum up on change in the Soviet Union, it is most evident in the erosion of central control over the republics. Change has not been toward political pluralism as reflected by competitive elections and a sharing of power with the Supreme Soviet. The new legislature has miserably failed to control the state budget and to constrain the state administrative apparatus. In contrast, some of the republican governments have increased their control at the expense of Moscow, so much so that their secession from the Soviet Union is more than a trivial probability.

What about continuities? For both change and continuity, we must have a reference point to measure it. The best criterion for this purpose is the old totalitarian model. Its six defining characteristics—the ideology, the party, media control, a command economy, and party control of the police and military—give us empirical

referents in the old system. To what extent can we say that each has eroded or retained continuity?

The ideology has been seriously undercut, especially by Gorbachev's revisions, but also by mass disenchantment. Proponents of orthodoxy, especially in the military senior ranks, are still to be found. Granted, it has changed, but it has not wholly vanished.

The party has suffered decay, especially through Gorbachev's creation of chaos and disorder in the Central Committee Secretariat and the Politburo. But the party still exists, and especially at the local level, its grip on resources is strong. Its ability to control and mobilize local institutions and social groups, however, has declined, and unless it can restore enough discipline to regain that power, its future is dim.

Terror, in its Stalinist form, ceased long ago. New and subtle forms of intimidation, however, persisted until the age of perestroika. Here we have seen great change.

The censorship system, judging by Western media reporting, was virtually destroyed. Curiously, in the words, of Mark Twain, reports of its death are greatly exaggerated. The GLAVLIT apparatus is alive, if not in the best of health. And it is undergoing revitalizing as editors and TV producers are being reined in of late.

The command economy may be in disorder, but it has surrendered virtually nothing to private enterprise. Only about 1 percent of the 1990 GNP came from private cooperatives. The command sector produced the rest. The continuity of the central planning system is perhaps the most significant of all. It prevents the diffusion of resources into private groups' hands. It insures that most of the power over resources remains in the hands of the state and party apparatus.

Finally, party controls over the military and police came under serious public challenge, peaking at the 28th Party Congress. Only cosmetic changes have been directed, however, and the party controls in the military are now being revitalized with slightly different labels and tasks. Continuity is winning out.

The remarkable thing about this review of the six features of the old system is the large degree of continuity and the small degree of change. While the old system remains sick, in danger of death, its body is still largely intact. It probably cannot be wholly restored to good health, but it has shown resilience very much at odds with the public impression of its near total destruction. After 6 years of perestroika, such little basic change in the structure of the old system ought to give us pause and create skepticism about the image we have been given in the media.

The Military Question

I have long and repeatedly argued that the role of the military in the Soviet Union is unique, unlike the military in most other states. To some degree it was also true of the Russian Empire. The tsars and the party leaders alike depended on military power for both expansion of territory and capacity to rule it. Armies are costly. The political leaders, therefore, bled their economy to maintain the police and the army. And they have always been reluctant to let private property and consumer demand drive economic development because that would compete with their preferences for buying great military power.

This military connection in the political system links the economy, the army, and rule over non-Russian peoples in a vicious circle. To weaken the army is to risk the loss of the empire. Yet to shift the economy toward consumer satisfaction is to weaken the army. This is the predicament for Gorbachev today.

He weakened the military in several ways. First, through ideological revisions, giving class struggle a very low priority, he took away the "threat" against which such a large military was justified. The entire capitalist world in the new definition of humankind interests is no longer an inexorable military threat. Second, he forced reductions which caused hardships for thousands of officers and their families. Third, he allowed a public campaign of complaints against the armed forces. It has gathered such force that the generals complain bitterly that the very foundation of the state is being put at risk unless it is stopped.

The results were predictable. When the army was not used to guarantee Communist party rule in East Europe, Soviet control was thrown off by those states. A similar kind of resistance to Moscow's rule soon emerged in the Baltics, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the Ukraine.

Many observers have expected a military coup against Gorbachev. It was thought that the generals would over throw the party leaders and try to hold the empire together. Instead, the most vocal military political resistance has been by regular officers, generals and colonels, within the party circles. As Colonel General Makashov put it sharply, "We army Communists will not surrender ideologically."

The military needs the party and the old ideology to justify Soviet rule. It cannot revolt against it. To the degree it can act as a corporate group, it acts to shore up the old system with all of its ideological and party trappings. When the radical reformer, Major Lopatin, was asked by some Americans if there would be a military coup, he laughed and replied, "Why should they make a coup against themselves?"

In that question he caught the essence of the party-military fusion in the Soviet Union. The party-military boundary is not a major fissure line as the system fragments. Rather the critical fissures are along nationality lines. Just look at the way the national republics are encouraging their youth to resist military conscription. And notice that several are trying to build their own armies. Even Yeltsin has floated the idea of a separate Russian army and KGB. And he recently appointed a shadow minister of defense, Colonel General Konstantin Kobets. Retired Colonel General Volkogonov has become his military a dvisor, analogous to Marshal Akhromeev's position with Gorbachev.

It should be no surprise that Gorbachev has fallen back on the military and the police as the national separatist movements grow. Just as the Soviet army and the KGB became the foundation of Communist party power in Eastern Europe, the Soviet military and the police are the last barriers defending the party's rule over the republics.

Thus the political battle in the Soviet Union has increasingly focused on the military connection. This battle has two major fronts.

First, there is the direct military front represented by the fight to resist conscription, to build national armies, to isolate and discredit the Soviet generals, and to force a systemic military reform program on the Ministry of Defense. Because the radical reformers lost their struggle for military reform in 1990, the critical battle on this front today is being waged by Yeltsin. He has long appealed to the disenchanted junior officers. Now he is trying to gain influence among the senior generals. If he can succeed there, he has strong prospects of overall success. He will have broken Gorbachev's last bastion of power.

Seconds there is a front against the Soviet military industrial sector. As the economic reformers have discovered, military industries so dominate the economy that basic reform is impossible without major changes in the military sector. The military industrial "conversion" program was apparently intended to produce a flood of consumer goods. The managers of military industry have responded by expanding their control over many firms in the consumer goods sector and by asking for billions of rubles to re-tool their military firms for consumer goods production. Thus what started as a scheme for cutting back the military industrial sector has turned out to be its expansion and re-tooling, not necessarily re-tooling for civil production, but apparently for more advanced production methods with high-technology that can also produce hi-tech military equipment.

On both fronts, the military and military industrial leaders seemed to be in retreat from 1988 through early 1990. More recently, the tide has turned. There have been some signs of tensions between the Ministry of Defense and the Military-Industrial Commission, but in the larger picture, they are bound to share common fears about the political and economic implications of the kind of perestroika Gorbachev's more radical supporters desire. And just as the conservative party circles have support from the line military commanders, the conservative bureaucrats in the command economy have strong support from their military-industrial counterparts.

In one regard, the tide has not so clearly turned. Many senior military figures object strongly to the use of army units for maintaining domestic order. Apparently they fear being blamed for the carnage, but they also realize that the state of morale among the lower ranks could lead their units to refuse to carry out domestic order missions.

We also see this concern reflected in the numerous efforts in the past year or so to create larger and more reliable MVD and KGB forces for repressive actions against the republics and mass demonstrations or strikes. The so-called "black berets," new divisions in the MVD, and Army airborne divisions under KGB operational control are examples.

Prospects for the Future

I believe you can see from the foregoing analysis that the structure of Soviet politics is now defined by the republics' challenge to the Moscow center, not by conservative and liberal factions in the Supreme Soviet and top party circles. And it should also be clear that the military, police, and military-industrial institutions are the real bastions on which Gorbachev has fallen back.

The future will be defined by how this struggle turns out. If the center wins, liberal reform over the next 5 or 10 years will be virtually ruled out. If the republics

win, and some of them secede effectively, liberal reforms will have a chance in the new sovereign states. Within the residual Soviet territories, certain liberal trends might well be sustained. At the same time, violence, disorders, and civil war are also likely to accompany the process.

The main point for considering future prospects is to understand that liberal reforms depend on a release of Moscow's imperial grip on some of the nationalities. The requisites for holding that grip preclude liberalization, both politically and economically. We simply have no examples of "liberal empires." The Soviet peoples must pass beyond the stage of empire before they can seriously contemplate liberal political development.

Implications for U.S. Policy

Whether or not the Soviet empire breaks up, a large military establishment will exist for the foreseeable future. The bulk of it is bound to be inherited by the residual Soviet Union or the Russian republic. While enough military industrial capacity will remain to sustain some degree of modernization, it certainly will not be able to compete effectively with U.S. modernization programs.

What can that residual Soviet military force do to threaten U.S. interests? The loss of East Germany and the Warsaw Pact states takes away the old central front threat, and it cannot be restored without a political reversal in East Europe. Soviet strategic nuclear forces could still threaten us, but the geopolitical context for using that threat against us is highly unfavorable. Soviet naval forces could physically threaten U.S. naval forces, but again, it is extremely difficult to imagine a context in which this could be in the Soviet or Russian republic's interest.

The military implications for the United States are fairly clear. A modern strategic deterrent force will be needed, but probably not on the scale of the past. Giving up one leg of the nuclear TRIAD would not be risky.

While the naval threat must be met, it will not need the quantitative levels of the past. Qualitative factors are much more important.

Our forces in Europe will not lose all their utility. They can be reduced at least by a half. Something like a corps with its supporting elements and close air support will be a prudent force to maintain during the next 5 or 10 years while we watch developments both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Instabilities there are entirely possible, and a U.S. ground presence can serve as reassurance for containing them. NATO, therefore, seems to me to have a useful role for the duration of the 1990s. Certainly it must change internally, and it can have much lower force levels, but it needs a solid military floor.

The political implications for U.S. policy are many, but the critical choice we face is how to approach the struggle for independence by some of the Soviet republics. Reasonable and informed people can disagree on which choice is best. Let me offer some thoughts about the implications of the alternatives.

If we champion Gorbachev's side in maintaining the present boundaries and authorities in the Soviet Union, denying sovereignty to the Baltic republics, for example, we should not deceive ourselves that we are also the champions of liberal reform in the Soviet Union. Some of my academic colleagues have made the argument that we must back Gorbachev in his crackdown so that he can later return to liberal reform. That is a fundamental misreading of the structure of Soviet politics, not to mention a misreading of the requisites for liberal reform.

If we champion self-determination, on the other hand, how far should we back it? Down to the last of scores of ethnic groups and territories in the Soviet Union? And are we willing to see the violence that the independence struggle will involve? We do not have champion self-determination to that extreme. We can set limits. The image of balkanization of the Soviet Union, sometimes thrown up as an argument against self-determination, is not persuasive. Moreover, civil war and violence are already occurring in some areas of the Soviet Union today. Thus, siding with Moscow against self-determination is not a way to help prevent the violence. It may even help cause it.

A more troublesome argument for opposing the breakup of the Soviet Union concerns what might happen to the Soviet military's weapons, especially nuclear weapons. It is a serious concern, but scenarios that involve their use against the West during the internal struggle are not very persuasive. Moreover, even Yeltsin and other nationalist leaders are striving for bilateral treaties among the republics that would rule out inter-republican strife.

On the whole, I come down on the side of supporting self-determination on a case-by-case basis. The case for the Baltics is cut and dried. The only legal basis for Soviet rule there is the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, a document now declared invalid

by the Soviet government itself. I do not see how we can do other than side with the Baltic republics in their demand for independence.

Moldavia, of course, came into the Soviet Union under the same treaty. But it was not independent beforehand. Thus in a strictly legal sense, to go back to the status quo ante, Moldavia would become Romanian territory. I do not know what the Moldavians want in this regard. Thus taking a position is not really possible.

The Georgian and Armenian situations are very ambiguous. Georgia repeatedly asked for Russian protection and annexation in the late 18th century, signing the first treaty with St. Petersburg in 1789. The picture is complicated by the events of 1919–1920 when the Mensheviks took power there and were overthrown by the Red Army.

The Ukraine is an infinitely complicated case. So is Belorussia. In Central Asia, it is not clear that all these republics would voluntarily leave the Soviet Union.

Professor Pipes, who wrote the definitive work on the formation of the Soviet Union and the assertion of Soviet control over all the republics, is a much better witness to explore these complexities. I only raise the issue and leave clarification to him.

Let me conclude by encouraging the administration and the Congress to pursue a number of paths for helping the Baltic states morally and politically. I do not advocate confrontational and aggressive policies toward Moscow in this regard, but I oppose a wholly passive policy. We can take a number of moderate steps. For example, we could state our position more unambiguously. We could explore setting up institutes in these three republics that essentially serve as embassies, parallel to the pattern we have in Taiwan. And we can endorse the actions that Norway and Denmark have taken in opposing Soviet rule in the Baltics.

Beyond these three cases, I would not advocate active policies before examining the details and working out a specific and appropriate diplomatic strategy. In this respect, I see the Russian republic as an urgent case to explore. We should give Boris Yeltsin official attention. It would be very useful, in my view, for the Congress to invite Yeltsin to Washington and give him a public forum in which to explain his own four point plan for new political arrangements among the republics and with Moscow. Depending on what he tells us, we will have a much clearer idea of what next U.S. actions make sense.

In summary, we can take sides against empire in the Soviet Union without pushing self-determination to the extreme. Not to support the very few clear-cut cases is wholly inconsistent with the anti-colonial policy the United States has pursued against all of the European empires since WW II.

Thank you for this chance to share my views with the committee.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, General Odom.

Dr. Pipes, we have already introduced you and we know you have had plane difficulties. We have decided just to proceed down to the other end of the table. We will let you be the clean-up hitter here today.

Dr. PIPES. Very good.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Lapidus is next, and we will reserve our questions until the end of the panel.

STATEMENT OF DR. GAIL LAPIDUS, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, CA.

Dr. LAPIDUS. I would like to express my appreciation to the Chair and to the members of the committee for convening these hearings in the midst of a crisis which has threatened to displace virtually every other issue from the political agenda. I think that at this meeting we are returning to the fundamental and long-term issues of American foreign policy, of which the evolution of the Soviet Union in the years ahead stands at the very center.

If I were briefly to try to describe the situation of the Soviet Union today, I would describe it in terms of four developments. First is a process of disintegration of the old values, the old authority, the old institutions which previously held the Soviet system together without, as yet, the emergence of any coherent and effective

new institutions, either at the all-union level or at the republic level, which are capable of taking its place and filling the void.

Second, I think we are seeing an enormous diffusion of power to new institutions: parliaments, new executive organs, new party and political organizations, and also to republics and to some extent to sub-republic levels. But this diffusion of power involves primarily a reduction in the ability of the center to assure compliance with its own authority. It does not necessarily mean that these new institutions or the new republic authorities necessarily have the ability to execute coherent programs and policies of their own. Up to this point, in my judgment, they still lack the key resources needed to exercise effective control over their territories.

What we are seeing in the Soviet Union is a process resembling decolonization, and the potential emergence of a whole wave of new nation-states, a wave comparable to the process of decolonization that we saw in the post-World War II period. The central authorities still have a very considerable aspiration to maintain the system, to maintain their control, but it is conceivable that the price of that control either now or in the future will exceed what the center is prepared to pay to maintain it.

Third, we are seeing a process of growing differentiation. As the republics gain a greater degree of autonomy, we're seeing a reassertion of their older, historical traditions, religious traditions, political and cultural patterns. The republics differ extraordinarily from each other in their evolution and in the patterns which are emerging. They differ in their capacities to organize an independent political life. They differ dramatically in their political orientations. They also differ considerably in their degree of integration and unity.

Quite a number of these republics are themselves multiethnic. They contain within themselves not only substantial minority groups, but also very substantial Russian settler communities.

What is going on is not merely a struggle between the center and the republics, but a three-tiered struggle, in which the center has allied itself in many cases with minorities and with the Russian settler communities inside the republics in an effort to undermine the growing claims and demands of the republic authorities.

Finally, we are also seeing a situation in which the Soviet Union is increasingly permeable to the outside world, permeable to ideas and information coming from outside, permeable to economic flows, and especially to the enormous power and influence of hard currency in a situation in which the ruble is rapidly losing value, permeable to the interest and the growing stake that parts of the Soviet elite have in maintaining contacts and openness to the outside world, whether for their own personal profit or for the sake of various institutional and national interests.

In these conditions the outside world, including the United States, has an unprecedented degree of influence over the internal Soviet scene.

Now let me make a few more concrete observations about the current situation in the Soviet Union as I see it.

We are now in the midst of a major attempt to reverse the entire process of reform as it has evolved over the past 5 years. We are watching the coming together of a conservative/reactionary coali-

tion that has long been opposed to the Gorbachev reforms, that has become increasingly alarmed by the growing economic collapse of the Soviet Union and, above all, by the challenges to the integrity of the Soviet state.

It is alarmed, as well, over the breakdown of authority and of law and order, and it is alarmed also by the new political thinking and its consequences for Soviet foreign policy, first and foremost the revolutions of Eastern Europe, which forced a major Soviet retreat, withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and, to some extent now also, Soviet behavior in the Persian Gulf.

This coalition draws its support and its membership from a number of key institutions. But I would argue that all of the key institutions in the Soviet political system are internally divided—the party, the military, the KGB, the central economic ministries, the military-industrial complex and even the Russian settler communities.

First, it draws its support from the conservative wing of the Communist Party, as opposed to the reform-oriented wing, which has been very deeply involved in and supportive of the Gorbachev reforms. The conservative wing of the party apparatus, which has been threatened by its loss of political monopoly, by the rise of political competition and alternative political parties, by the effort to expel it from a major role in Soviet life, and now by the efforts to seize control of its very extensive economic properties.

It draws support, second, from a part of the military establishment. The armed services, disturbed by the ideological challenge, as Bill Odom has pointed out, of the new political thinking, tremendously disturbed by the domestic challenges to its status and its prerogatives, challenges coming especially from the republic authorities, humiliated by the internal problems, the decline in its ability to conscript recruits and humiliated also by developments in Eastern Europe, Germany and the Persian Gulf.

A third element is the KGB, a KGB whose past history and past activities have been condemned in the course of the reforms, and many of whose actions have been reversed. Take as one powerful symbol the change in the treatment of Andrei Sakharov, from villain to national hero. Its scope of action has been constrained by the reforms, by the government's espousal of the idea of human rights and a law-bound state, and it has been uncomfortable with the growing penetration of Western influence into the Soviet Union.

Another element in this conservative coalition are segments of the central economic ministries, whose control over the economy would be threatened by radical economic reform, by marketization, by the creation of private property, and is already threatened by the growing effort of the republics to seize control over the resources and economic activities within their borders.

There is the military-industrial complex, infuriated by the clumsy pursuit of conversion, threatened in its priority access to key resources and expertise and skills, but, as I'll suggest, with very mixed motives in terms of the opening to the West, access to world markets, access to high technology from outside the Soviet Union.

Finally, there are the Russian settler communities, the, in effect, colonial settlements that exist in virtually all the republics, together with some of the indigenous minority groups, who are extremely concerned about the rise of national assertion within the republics and who believe that their own security and privileges are being threatened by these trends. They have made common cause with the center in the name of human rights and the protection of minority rights against the republic governments, and in some republics, as in Georgia and the Baltics, have joined with the center in an effort to destabilize the republic authorities.

Now this conservative coalition does not have at this point a very coherent, positive program. It is essentially anti-reformist, anti-secessionist, anti-marketization; an effort to exploit the very widespread sense of grievance against the process of reform to mobilize a movement against it. But this coalition is beset by major cleavages, cleavages that I think are bound to become more prominent as time goes on. These cleavages are already evident in the very inconsistent and incoherent handling of what might have been an extremely repressive crackdown in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Coupled with the rise of this conservative coalition, we are also seeing tremendous disarray and ineffectiveness on the part of the moderate and radical reformers. Previously, the criticisms of Gorbachev had come mainly from the radical wing of the reform movement. But over the past few months, Gorbachev has either dismissed or been abandoned by many of his key advisors among the more centrist and moderate reformers—Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Shatalin, the major architect, along with Abalkin and Petrokov of the economic reforms, Bakatin, the liberal Minister of the Interior. All of these people have now been replaced by extremely dubious figures of extremely conservative and traditional views, people of no particular competence and certainly no particular distinction.

At this point, the radicals, the democrats, lack a clear and feasible program. They are in complete disarray and, indeed, despair, still hoping for some form of center-left coalition, hopeful that some kind of united opposition might be formed to resist the growing pressures toward dictatorship and toward authoritarianism. But, so far, they have been able to mount very substantial popular demonstrations, but not a politically effective and organized political alternative.

Yeltsin has certainly emerged as a very important figure, as a symbol of resistance to all of these trends, and as a figure around whom many of the democrats have now tried to coalesce. But he himself has very major weaknesses, and does not constitute in several important respects a real alternative to Gorbachev. He carries immense authority as a result of his bitter struggle against the establishment, but he does not control any major levers of power—military, economic, administrative, foreign policy or any other. There is underway right now, as we can see, a massive campaign to discredit Yeltsin and to remove him from the political scene.

As we look at the evolution of Gorbachev, it is clear that Gorbachev is hostage to this conservative coalition, which has mounted extraordinary pressures in the last few months to force him to abandon the cause of reform and to shift course. But in my own view, Gorbachev is also a hostage to his own political values and

his own political limitations. His unwillingness and inability to contemplate a real devolution of power to democratic institutions, his inability to contemplate full marketization and the creation of private property, his inability to acquiesce in a process of decolonization, his continued commitment to the preservation of the integrity of the Soviet state and a strong central power, all of these I think contribute to the fact that Gorbachev himself was able to lead the process of reform only so far, but because increasingly alarmed himself as the process threatened to exceed the boundaries which he himself was prepared to contemplate.

At this point, Gorbachev may be seeking to moderate the scale of repression, to some extent to dissociate himself from it, to continue major elements of the foreign policies which he and Shevardnadze pursued with respect to the West. But he is also at this moment lending a fig leaf of legitimacy to what is becoming an increasingly authoritarian and repressive regime.

Looking ahead to the prospects, it seems to me that the Soviet Union will not be able to return to the *status quo ante.* The old values have been destroyed. The military may now be fighting for some kind of *raison d'etat,* but there are no longer any real illusions about the potential victory of communism and the achievement of some glorious communist future. I think that illusion has been destroyed.

Second, the old structures are partially disintegrating. All of the mechanisms which previously integrated the Soviet state—economic, military, political, ideological—are disintegrating. While I quite agree with Bill Odom that they have by no means lost their power, nonetheless whole new sets of arrangements have emerged outside their framework in the economy, in the military, in the political sphere, and it will be impossible to liquidate these completely and restore the old order.

The diffusion of powers, while it can be partially reversed, cannot be ended altogether. Finally, the Soviet population has become demonstrably more assertive and will never, I think, be restored to the kind of passivity and acquiescence that we have seen in the past.

So, while I do not wish to underestimate the continued existence of very powerful mechanisms of coercion and repression in the Soviet system and of the tremendous economic leverage still enjoyed by the center, it seems to me that this repression is likely to be mitigated by the diffusion of power, the lack of coherence, and, above all, by major internal cleavages within this conservative coalition, cleavages over Soviet foreign policy, cleavages over the opening to the West, cleavages over the role of the military, and the extent to which it should be involved in suppressing internal dissent and inter-ethnic conflict, and cleavages over economic strategies, over economic reform, economic modernization, and over how to deal with the ongoing resistance, however limited it may be, by the advocates of democratic and national movements.

There are several implications of this analysis for American policy. First, the kind of threat that was posed in the past by the combination of Soviet military capabilities and the political aspirations to which they were earlier harnessed have very significantly declined. The global aspirations of the Soviet Union have changed.

Its military capabilities are being significantly reduced, and the ability of the Soviet economy to sustain the kind of serious military competition with the West is simply no longer there.

Moreover, the growing focus on internal crisis and on internal demands is preoccupying the attention of most of the Soviet leadership and of Soviet institutions, and they, at this point, do not have the stomach for massive international engagements.

While we and the Soviets will continue to have somewhat divergent global interests, in terms of a threat assessment, the Soviet threat has very dramatically declined.

On the other hand, the political challenge of dealing with the Soviet Union in the years ahead will be greater than it has been in the past. The challenge of how to encourage the peaceful evolution of the Soviet Union toward a more democratic political order, toward an order in which there can be greater autonomy and greater individual freedom, is going to be an enormously complex problem.

We are no longer going to be dealing, we are no longer already dealing, with an extremely highly centralized system. We now have a growing number of actors with whom we will have to establish some form of relationships—republics, regions, political movements—all of which we are poorly informed about. As we move to diversify our ties and to diminish our exclusive focus on the central institutions of power and the central leadership, we will need to develop capabilities that simply do not now exist: in terms of our knowledge of the different republics, different political movements, different political orientations.

Moreover, I think we have tended to look at the problem of the republics in terms of a kind of domino theory, assuming that the Baltic republics are somehow the model for what will happen in the rest of the country as well.

It seems to me that the fundamental issue is not so much whether or not there will be a Union, but what kind of union it will be. It seems to me quite conceivable that some republics will consider it to be to their interest to remain within some looser confederal structure, while others, like the Baltic republics, will probably opt for complete independence.

In any case, this is a process that will take some years to develop. It will be an extremely complicated and difficult challenge for the United States to develop an appropriately differentiated set of policies.

Third, the United States has enormous influence over this process, as does the West in general, because the Soviets will not readily relinquish the opening to the West that was launched under Gorbachev. They have an enormous stake in having access to the world market, to technology, to various forms of technical assistance, personal and corrupt stakes as well as broader institutional and political stakes. The major challenge is to make effective use of the considerable influence that this process gives us.

Finally, in terms of the implications for American policy, I would emphasize the enormous importance that developments in Eastern Europe are going to have on the way in which the Soviets think about their own future. The success of political democratization and economic reform in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for

example, will have an enormous weight on how Soviet elites in various parts of the Soviet Union see their own futures. The emergence of authoritarian political regimes and the collapse of marketizing economic reforms in Eastern Europe would give enormous reinforcement to conservative forces in the Soviet Union while, conversely, the success of those efforts will enormously strengthen the forces of democracy and liberalization in the Soviet Union.

Therefore, while we may not be able to directly influence the Soviet scene, we will have an enormous indirect influence over its future development by the extent to which we support in a significant way the very hopeful trends in Eastern Europe.

Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Lapidus. Dr. Meyer.

STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN M. MEYER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, CAMBRIDGE, MA.

Dr. MEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My testimony this afternoon looks at the broad trends in the Soviet Union that have already been discussed and examines their impact on the Soviet military establishment. In particular, I want to discuss what I consider to be a new and troubling change in Soviet civil-military relations, that is, the politicization of the military establishment.

The argument that I am going to make is that in the 1990s, it is going to be the kinds of political, economic and social factors that have already been discussed that will determine Soviet military power and not the more narrow military technical or force aspects—force developments, that have been discussed in the past.

A little less than a year ago, I testified before the House Armed Services Committee on what I then called the "institutional crisis" of the Soviet military establishment. In that testimony, I argued that it was the confluence of the kinds of social, political, and economic factors that you have heard described already, plus some really poorly conceived and implemented Gorbachev regime policies that had produced a number of negative effects on the Soviet military establishment. Among them: a defensive military leadership that was both confused and despondent over its own future and the future of the Soviet Union as a superpower; a military leadership that felt alienated from both the center of political power in the Soviet Union and from the society at large. It had produced fundamental policy disputes that went across the services and greatly intensified inter-service rivalries in a way that had not been true in the Soviet Union for 30 years. It had produced a significant inter-generational conflict among the junior officers, the middle officers, and the senior officers in all the services. It had produced a precipitous decay in the morale among the junior command and in the discipline of the troops. And, finally it had produced significant tensions between the military establishment itself and the military industries.

I concluded in that testimony that unless the basic social, political and economic forces were addressed quickly, it was going to lead to a further decline in Soviet military power.

The fact is that today it is clear that those issues have not been addressed. If anything, they have gotten much worse. And, in fact, the Soviet leadership today is far more inept than we thought it was a year ago.

Let me give some examples of things that have happened, some indicators of the situation.

The draft call-up in the Soviet Union each successive half year is falling further and further behind requirements. The last half of 1990, the draft was more than 20 percent short of minimal requirements and, in fact, the Ministry of Defense is now considering lengthening the conscription term as a short-term way of fixing the problem.

In the past, the conscription shortfall took place mostly in the republics that were seeking independence: Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia. But what is happening now is it is becoming increasingly problematic in the Slavic republics, including in Russia.

Beyond that, the quality of the conscripts that do show up for the draft turns out to be dropping very, very rapidly. This correlates directly with growing discipline problems within the Soviet military establishment. Accidents are increasing among the troops because of the low education levels, and we hear more and more Soviet officers complaining that the troops are not capable of handling the equipment they already have, let alone the more complex and sophisticated equipment that is supposed to be coming down the line in the 1990s.

In the last 2 years, there has been a significant drop in the number of applicants applying to Soviet military academies and officer training programs. In fact, the ones who are applying are the least desirable. They have the least education, the fewest technical skills, they lack discipline and motivation. At the same time, tens of thousands of Soviet junior officers, the very best, smartest, most technically proficient junior officers, are applying for discharges from the military under very unfavorable conditions because they find service in the Soviet armed forces, both in terms of personal living standards and working conditions to be unacceptable.

This is a particularly severe problem for the Soviet military, because their junior officers handle the technical work that NCOs handle in our own services. And so, this, again, has an impact on the ability of the Soviet armed forces to handle technologically sophisticated equipment.

Weapons deliveries from defense industries are falling significantly behind schedule, even taking into consideration the planned cuts in the force sizes.

For example, Colonel General Achalov, who is now a Deputy Minister of Defense, recently complained that the airborne forces have yet to receive a single armored personnel carrier that had been ordered 3 years ago. He blamed this directly not on technical problems or on industrial bottlenecks, but he blamed it directly on the ineptness of the central political leadership in getting the economy working.

The air defense forces and the navy are reporting similar problems, not just in new equipment but in the repair and maintenance of old equipment as well.

Similar problems have been encountered in the military R&D sector, which is suffering greatly under the half-way economic reforms. Many of the best young scientists and engineers are leaving the military R&D establishment. They are suffering from severe program cutbacks, many in what I think are critical program areas.

It is also worth noting in some of the things that were already raised about the "war of laws" between the republic governments and the central government that many important military installations are being hobbled or shut down by local political action. For example, I remember testifying before this committee, I guess 2 years ago, there was a lot of concern about the Soviet long-range ballistic missile early warning radars, the radar at Krasnoyarsk and another at Mukuchevo. Both of those radar systems came under protest from local governments. The Krasnoyarsk radar was eventually agreed to be shut down as a result of American insistence that it was in violation. But the Mukuchevo radar has also been shut down. That was due totally to local governmental action. So that is two of these major radars that have been closed.

There are many examples of nuclear submarine decommissioning facilities, air defense radar facilities, being shut down forcefully by local governments, despite the protests of the Ministry of Defense.

Last, the last piece of evidence I would raise of the continuing problems the military is having is that the reform proposals which were put forth by the Ministry of Defense this past December are, in fact, far more radical than I would have expected that ministry to put forward. I think this is a direct recognition of the military leadership's sober understanding of the enduring nature of the crises that the Ministry of Defense faces and the country.

This summer I was in the Soviet Union twice, interviewing top Ministry of Defense and General Staff officials. Every single one of these people was of the opinion that the problems they face are long-term; that they are not easily solved; that the military institution cannot be separated or vaccinated against the larger problems that are facing Soviet society; and that they have to take that into account in their own defense planning.

From those conversations and from my examination of the problems they are facing, I think the implications for Soviet military power are clear. In the list that I have provided in my written testimony, which I am going to repeat, there is nothing in here that anyone in the top Soviet military leadership disagreed with at all when I discussed these issues with them.

First, the Soviet force structure is going to have to shrink considerably over the next decade. There is no alternative.

Now, the Soviet Chief of the General Staff has talked about 3 million men. My guess is that, in reality, it will probably shrink even more than that.

Reversing the trend of the past 20 years, the troops will become increasingly Russified. It is going to become more and more difficult to train and keep, and perhaps even less desirable to train and keep non-Russian troops in the military establishment.

The general conscription system will give way to a mixed volunteer and conscription system, and most of the senior military leadership now acknowledges that, over the long-term, they are going

to have to go to an all-paid volunteer force. But we are talking here about decades, rather than several years, as the reformers would like.

It is my view, and in talking with the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments, as well as people in the General Staff in charge of R&D, that the Soviet armed forces will not be able to absorb high technology weapons in the 1990s because of the personnel problems that they are having. But, frankly, I don't think it matters very much because I don't think Soviet defense industries are going to be able to deliver those weapons in any case.

And so, the quality of Soviet weaponry in the 1990s will fail to keep pace with military expectations or Western capabilities.

This is a direct result of the utter destruction of the Soviet economy and the breakdown of the major supply and distribution networks within the defense industries.

My last conclusion is that strategic nuclear power, in particular, and close-in conventional defense will be the foundation of Soviet defense policy in the 1990s. In the last 20 years, the Soviet military establishment worked very hard to develop a military posture based on forward deployed power projection of conventional forces. It has simply lost that ability because, in part, it has lost the geopolitical position. I mean, the Warsaw Pact no longer exists.

But the shrinking military itself, the need to draw the forces down, the economic problems, mean that the forces will have to be pulled back. And so, as one general said to me, it was a good thing that Reagan never accepted Gorbachev's Reykjavik proposal about eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, or the Soviet Union would be in a lot of trouble.

Let me now turn to the politicization of the Soviet military because this, I believe, is a new, important, and I think troubling, and perhaps dangerous, change in Soviet civil-military relations.

What I mean by "politicization" is the military's growing activism in Soviet domestic politics, and, in particular, its involvement in what were previously strictly civil policy areas—issues of political organization of the country and reform; issues of economic structure and performance; social policy, civil law and foreign policy.

I really cannot emphasize too strongly how much of a change this is from the past.

As Bill Odom described the military has always been integrated with the Communist Party, and one might think of that as politicization. But, in fact, the Communist Party has always had a dulling effect or a numbing effect on people who participated in that organization. It was a controlling mechanism. It channeled the political energies of the military.

What we are talking about here is something quite different. We are talking about the release of all those controlling mechanisms. We are talking about the military, as an institution, entering into domestic politics in a way that it has never done before.

It is far more complex than simple questions, like is Gorbachev sharing power with the generals, or is the military aligning with the conservatives.

Let me just outline a few of the features and their effects from this politicization process. I think it really does raise very impor-

tant questions about what we should expect from the Soviet Union in the decade ahead.

First, the military's involvement in domestic politics represents untrodden and highly uncertain ground. They have no idea where it will lead politically or professionally.

Second, the politicization that is taking place has infected the military establishment and affected the military establishment in a manner that greatly worsens the existing fractures among the troops, the junior and the middle commands, and the senior command.

It is wrong to think about the Soviet military establishment as a solid block that somehow shifted to the right. In fact, the politicization process is cutting that organization in many different directions. The troops, by and large, have been politicized by the explosion of republic sovereignty and independence movements. That is really the political issue that galvanizes the troops. They are in for 2 years and out, and that is all they can think about.

Second, the junior and middle officers have been politicized by the poor state of their living and working conditions. This is the thing they are most concerned about: their professional and personal status.

The senior command, as has already been described, has been politicized over something quite different. It has been politicized over the challenge posed by the independence-seeking republics to central authority. It has been politicized over the preservation of the union.

The senior military command was the last part of the military establishment to become actively involved in domestic politics. It was only when the collapse of the Soviet Union as a unified, central state seemed to be on the verge this past fall that the senior military leadership really began to become active.

As I said, the institutional controls, that is, the Communist Party, in particular, that formally regulated and channeled the limited political activity of the military has evaporated. What makes things worse is that the new institutions, under the new political order—glasnost and these fledgling, semi-democratic political bodies, like the legislatures—tend to accentuate the diverse, personal, and in some cases bizarre political agenda of the individuals within the officer corps.

So, consequently, in fact, what we hear and what we see is politicization has given great visibility to a few very strange, outspoken and mercurial military personalities, who neither possess influence in any significant way nor reflect mainstream military thinking on the kinds of issues they talk out about.

These are self-appointed political activists, in a way. But they serve a purpose.

They serve a purpose because, when someone like Colonel Alksnis or General Makashov get up and yell and scream in extreme right-wing language, then the rest of the military leadership seems quite moderate, compared to these guys, and their advice seems quite reasonable. And they are quite moderate compared to both the left in the military, which are typified by people like former Major Lopatin, or the right, like Colonel Alksnis or General Makashov.

What is interesting to me is that, still today, the majority of junior and senior officers in the Soviet military would prefer to see the military establishment maintain its professional ethos that eschews involvement in domestic politics, including domestic police actions. They do not want the military involved in this sort of thing.

But the fact is that political turmoil, the social turmoil and the economic turmoil that has engulfed the Soviet Union has pushed them into politics.

The last issue that I would raise here is the fact that the allegiance of the military establishment—and here I'm really talking about the senior command on the one hand, the junior command on the other, and then, if one has a third hand, the troops. The allegiance of the military establishment, as an institution, is increasingly uncertain. The military used to be aligned to the Communist Party. That is no longer true.

The implications for Soviet domestic politics and for defense decisionmaking, in particular, I think are manyfold.

First, we cannot talk about a military-political bloc as a single entity. The military is much more active in politics, but, in fact, it is less cohesive than the single label military establishment would make us think.

Second, as General Odom said, I think the prospects for a successful military-initiated coup are close to zero. The military leadership lacks the kind of unity of purpose and view that that would suggest, and there is no evidence that anyone in the military has a better idea of how to halt the decay of the Soviet Union than Gorbachev does; nor is there any legitimacy, or would there be any legitimacy, to such a government.

Far more problematic, though, is the question of how the military would respond if a civil challenge were posed to the current regime. What if a national salvation coalition emerged among the conservative forces that took power in the name of the presidency?

Right now, the military leadership, that is, Yazov, claims that the Soviet military establishment is loyal to the president of the country. But what if that president were removed, became incapacitated or his position was somehow nullified. Or, because of his ineptness, it looked like the union was really about to collapse and his office, therefore, nullified?

It is unclear how the military would react. But I can assure you that what it would not do is act as a unified body.

The senior military is probably more cohesive. But the middle command would split in different directions, and the troops would split in different directions.

That is why I also believe that the use of the armed forces for a union-wide political crackdown is really impossible. It is a prescription for disaster.

If the Soviet army *en masse* had to be used in all the major republics for political control, it would instigate civil war within the military itself. And the military knows this. The military understands this.

This is why you see top military leaders, including the head of the airborne forces, saying hey, we should not be using regular

military troops for this. Let the KGB and the internal police do that.

That is why, in fact, you saw in the crackdown of the Baltics that airborne forces, special airborne forces were used in that operation and general troops were kept away. The latter are simply not reliable, and the senior military command does not want to be put in that position because they understand it would destroy their own institution, as well as the country.

Fourth, as I said earlier, we don't know where this politicization process is going to lead, and neither does the Soviet military. What makes it dangerous is because there is no sense of what the Soviet government, of what the Soviet polity is going to look like over the next several years and thus what kinds of roles the military can play in this very new realm.

But let me turn to this issue of power sharing. I want to say, quite categorically, that Gorbachev is not sharing power with the marshals and the generals. This is utter nonsense.

The marshals and the generals have not forced themselves on him.

As General Odom described, Gorbachev, in fact, has sought them out. They are certainly more effective in influencing Gorbachev's policy now because he tends to agree with their view of how one holds the union together.

Gorbachev still makes all the strategic decisions of the state. That is why I wonder when Professor Lapidus says that Gorbachev is sort of a counterweight toward repression, Gorbachev is the repressive regime. Gorbachev is the man with the authority who authorized the troops to go into the Baltics. Gorbachev is the person who gave authorization to use force in the Baltics if it were necessary.

I think what happened, as has been described, is that over the last 1½ years, Gorbachev became increasingly disenchanted with the views he was getting from his reform minded colleagues and found himself more and more in concert with the kinds of hardline, authority-oriented advice he was getting from the military.

So, one of the things that has changed is now Gorbachev listens to the senior command in a way he didn't do even a year ago. That is an important change.

Last, I would mention the fact that the military has regained control over the defense and arms control agenda, which it lost some time around 1986 and 1987, and the Foreign Ministry has been pushed out.

That is why you have Foreign Ministry people running around talking about Gorbachev sharing power with the generals. They are sore. They are upset that they have been pushed out of the process.

What are the implications for defense policy?

I think certainly there is going to be a price to pay for the politicization of the military. On the one hand, the military, as an institution, is going to pay a price because it is going to be a less cohesive, less professional institution. I think that is going to hurt Soviet defense capabilities in the long-term.

On the other hand, the political system is going to pay a price because they are going to have to listen to the generals and the

marshals on a wider range of issues than they have ever had to do before.

You might raise the question at this point: does this mean there is a possibility that Gorbachev's new political thinking on security and defense could be reversed in this new environment? I think the answer is no, not in its major dimensions.

There has been an academic debate for years about whether Gorbachev was some kind of enlightened saint who somehow got the word that military power was bad and that the new thinking was a whole, new philosophical revolution, or whether Gorbachev was a pragmatic politician who saw very fundamental problems in his country that had to be changed.

The latter argument is the one that I've subscribed to all along, that the new thinking and the new military doctrine were, in fact, pragmatic and necessary reactions to real, pervasive, and enduring problems.

In this vein, the Soviet military leadership understands that there is no political stable order in place now that is capable of mobilizing the kinds of resources needed for a major military buildup, the way that occurred under the Brezhnev regime, and that it is unlikely that such a regime is going to appear for the next decade, even if an authoritarian coup occurred. The ability to reimpose that kind of order would take a decade if it could be done at all. Professor Lapidus has raised questions about whether that is even possible.

Glasnost and democratization have unleashed strong anti-military sentiments throughout Soviet society. The post-war consensus on military power first has been shattered, and I don't think it can be regained.

The economy, in a very objective sense, is in a shambles, and no one can put that thing together in a reasonable way in the next decade.

I had a lot of opportunities this summer to talk with members of the Military-Industrial Commission. They believe firmly that a market economy cannot work and that the Soviet Union must return to a centrally planned economic structure. And even if it did that tomorrow, however, they could not reconstitute defense industries for at least the next 10 years.

Last, Eastern Europe is no longer part of the socialist alliance. This is an objective factor which you simply cannot reverse.

So, the bottom line for me I think is very straight-forward, that all the dynamic change occurring aside, the objective constraints on the Soviet Union mean that, whatever regime comes into power, even if it were a purely military regime, there is little they can do to reverse the decline of Soviet military power in the next decade, and the best they can hope for is that they emerge at the end of the century in a position to begin to turn those trends around.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Meyer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY PROFESSOR STEPHEN M. MEYER, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

My testimony this afternoon examines several broad trends in Soviet politics, economics, and society today, and their impact on the Soviet military establishment. In particular I will discuss one new and troubling change in Soviet civil-military relations: the politicization of the Soviet military. I will argue that the evolution and exercise of Soviet military power in the 1990s will, for the most part, be determined by these "soft" factors, rather than military-technical developments.

A little less than 1 year ago I testified before the House Armed Services Committee on what I then called the "institutional crisis" of the Soviet military establishment. I argued that the confluence of social, economic, and political forces set loose in Soviet society, and some poorly conceived and implemented Gorbachev regime policies had produced:

—a defensive military leadership that was both confused and despondent over its own future and the future of the Soviet Union as a military superpower;
—a military leadership that felt alienated from both the center of political power in the Soviet Union and society at large;
—fundamental policy disputes that cut across service lines and aggravated inter-service rivalries;
—a significant inter-generational split between the junior and senior commands across all services;
—a precipitous decay in morale among the junior command and discipline among the troops; and
—significant tensions between the Ministry of Defense and the defense industries.

I concluded that the development and exercise of Soviet military power in the 1990s would be severely handicapped unless the driving forces underlying these problems were quickly negated—something that I argued was virtually impossible.

Today it is clear that they have not been effectively addressed. If anything, the political, economic, and social situation in the Soviet Union is far worse, and the political leadership appears more inept. The corresponding effects on the Soviet military establishment have been even more pronounced.

For example, each successive call-up for the draft is falling further behind requirements. For the last half of 1990 the shortfall approached 20 percent. While draft dodging has, until recently, been a phenomenon largely confined to the independence-seeking republics such as Armenia, Lithuania, and Georgia, it is now on the increase in slavic regions, including Russia.

Meanwhile, the quality of conscripts that do turn out is dropping precipitously. This correlates directly with growing discipline problems among the troops. Infractions of regulations and crime are increasing; the problems of organized violence against ethnic minorities have been well publicized. Accidents are increasing as a consequence of the lower education and aptitude of the conscripts. The equipment is too complex for them to handle.

There has been a significant drop in applicants to military academies and officer training programs. And those that do apply are the least desirable: they lack education, technical skills, discipline, and motivation. At the same time, tens of thousands of the Soviets' best junior officers have applied for discharges. This is a particularly severe problem since Soviet junior officers traditionally handle the technical work that in the American Armed Forces is done by NCOs.

Weapons deliveries are falling significantly behind schedule. For example, Colonel-General Achalov, former Chief of the Airborne Troops and now Deputy Minister of Defense, reported that the Airborne forces have yet to receive delivery of single new armored fighting vehicle, despite contract requirements.[1] The Air Defense Forces and the Navy are reporting similar delays in delivery of new equipment and, perhaps more importantly, the repair of equipment in the field. As the defense industry finance and manpower base continues to shrink over the next few years, things will not get better soon.

Similar problems are being encountered in the military R&D sector. Program funding and personnel morale and productivity are declining in an increasingly uncertain economic environment. Self-financing, cost-accounting, and conversion have

[1] It is worth noting that Achalov placed the blame for these problems squarely on the doorstep of inept political leadership and the disintegration of the union economy, not technical problems or local supply bottlenecks.

undermined the operating environment that made Soviet military research institutes and design bureaus perform well in the past. As a result, many of the best researchers are leaving for better pay in coops. Many of the best young scientists and engineers are steering clear of defense R&D establishments.

Operations at a number of military installations and test ranges have been curtailed—and others have been shut down—by local political action. For example,work on the BMEW-LPAR at Mukachevo (the sister radar to the more infamous Krasnoyarsk radar) has been suspended indefinitely. Several air defense sites have been shut down. Operations at a navy nuclear submarine decommissioning facility have been suspended. In all instances these actions have come about as the result of local concerns over health and environmental effects.

Reform proposals put forth by the Ministry of Defense are increasingly more "radical" in tone and detail. While the Ministry of Defense proposals do not satisfy the most ardent enthusiasts in the military reform movement they are nonetheless more severe than what one would expect from the military. This is a direct reflection of the military leadership's sober recognition of the enduring nature of the institutional and national crisis they are confronting.

The implications of this are clear:

—the Soviet force structure will have to shrink considerably over the next decade—there is no alternative;

—reversing the trend of the past 20 years, the troops will become increasingly "russified;"

—conscription will give way to a mixed "volunteer" and conscription system;

—the Soviet armed forces will not be able to absorb high technology weaponry;

—the quality of Soviet weapons (excluding strategic nuclear weapons) will fail to keep pace with military expectations or Western capabilities;

—strategic nuclear power and close-in conventional defense (rather than theater power-projection with forward-deployed forces) will be the foundation of Soviet defense and deterrence policy.

THE POLITICIZATION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY

The politicization of the military is a new, and perhaps the most important, indicator of the worsening situation in the Soviet Union. By "politicization" I mean the military's growing activism in Soviet domestic politics and, in particular, its involvement in what were previously strictly civil policy areas: political organization and reform, economic structure and performance, social policy, civil law, and foreign policy. It is a far more complex and pervasive phenomenon than is implied by the simple questions: Is Gorbachev sharing power the military? Or, is the military aligning with the conservatives?

I cannot emphasize too strongly that this is a startling and unprecedented development in Soviet civil-military relations.[2] Contrary to popular impressions, the Soviet military has not been active in domestic politics since the revolution of 1917. And its involvement today, as it was then, is a direct result of the disintegration of the old political order and the grand chaos that has followed.

Let me just outline some of the main features and effects of this politicization process:

—The military's involvement in domestic politics represents untrodden and highly uncertain ground. They have no idea where it will lead, politically or professionally.

—Politicization has infected and affected the military establishment in a manner that exacerbates existing fractures among the troops, the junior and middle commands, and the senior command.

—The troops have been politicized by the explosion of republic sovereignty/independence movements in the country.

—The junior and middle officers have been politicized by the poor state of their living and working conditions.

—The senior military leadership was politicized by the challenge to the Center posed by the republics, and it has made the preservation of the Union and strong central control its political agenda.

—The institutional controls that formerly regulated and channeled the limited political activity of officers have evaporated, while the institutions of the new political order—in particular, glasnost and the fledgling semi-democratic legisla-

[2] The causes and mechanisms of the politicization of the military are complex in structure and effect. For a discussion see the author's forthcoming article in *International Security*.

tures—accentuate and encourage diverse personal and political agendas within the officer corps.

—Politicization has given great visibility to a few outspoken and mercurial military officials who neither possess significant influence nor reflect mainstream thinking within the military establishment. These are people who have "self selected" themselves into politics.

—The majority of junior and senior officials still prefer to see the military establishment maintain its professional ethic eschewing involvement in domestic politics—including domestic "police" actions.

—The allegiance of the military establishment as an institution is increasingly uncertain.

The implications for Soviet politics are many-fold. First, one cannot talk about the military as a single, unified, political entity. There is no "military political bloc." The political agendas among the officer corps in general, and among the military deputies in various legislative and party bodies in particular, are too diverse.

Second, the prospects for a successful military-initiated coup are close to nil. The military leadership lacks the unity of purpose and perspective. Nor is there any evidence that anyone in uniform with authority has any better idea of how to halt the decay of the Soviet polity and economy.

Far more problematic is the question of what the military leadership would choose to do should a civilian challenge to the current regime arise. For now it continues to recognize its subordination to the Presidency. However, if the political stalemate between the Center and republics continues, the military leadership might implicitly or explicitly align with a new regime built around a "national salvation coalition" in concert with its oath to defend the Union.

Third, use of the armed forces for a union-wide political crackdown would be a prescription for disaster for both the country and the military as an institution. In the face of large-scale civil resistance (and certainly civil-war), the wholesale collapse of unit discipline, large-scale desertion, and probably inter-unit warfare could follow. This is why the crackdown in the Baltics was limited to KGB, MVD, and specially selected Airborne units.

Fourth, neither we nor they know where this politicization of military will lead. Today the high command seems to view its sudden involvement in domestic politics as an undesirable, but necessary duty—thrust upon it by extreme events. But over time the generals and marshals may grow accustomed to political activism. In particular, they may become fond of direct participation in leadership political, economic, and social policy-making, all of which ultimately affects their professional and institutional interests.

A fifth, but related issue, is the one of "power-sharing." Gorbachev is not sharing power with the marshals and generals.[3] He still makes all the strategic decisions for the Soviet state. But the intensification of the political crisis in the Soviet Union saw Gorbachev become increasingly disenchanted with the advice and counsel he has received from his reform-minded colleagues—Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Shatalin, etc. As the fate of the Union seemed to be following the path of the formerly socialist Eastern Europe, Gorbachev found the traditionalist counsel coming from the military and security leaderships to be in tune with his own thinking and instincts.

To be sure, the military has more influence today than it did even 6 months ago. This is influence by advice and argument—not power sharing: Gorbachev has opened himself to the advice and counsel of the military leadership across an array of civil policies that is unprecedented in Soviet history.

Lastly, the military has regained institutional control over defense policy and arms control, pushing aside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE POLICY

Almost certainly there will be a price to pay for the politicization of the military. I have already suggested that the officer corps is likely to be a less cohesive, less professional institution. This will hurt Soviet defense capabilities over the long term.

It is also likely that the Soviet political leadership—whatever form it takes—will need to take military voices more seriously on a wider array of policy issues than was true in the past. Foreign policy and domestic security policy are obvious examples. Economic, industrial, and science policies may be others. Again, this is untrodden ground in Soviet civil-military relations.

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[3] This notion was planted in the western press by Soviet Foreign Ministry officials who were disillusioned by the loss of influence and power their ministry has suffered over the past year.

More specifically, one is left wondering whether the growing political activism of the military might not lead to a reversal of Gorbachev's "new political thinking on security" with its deemphasis on military power. Here I return to the framework for understanding contemporary Soviet defense policy that I presented several years ago.[4] It argues that the sudden shifts in defense policy that characterize the "new thinking" (and now, Soviet military doctrine) are pragmatic and necessary reactions to real, pervasive, and enduring problems in the Soviet political and economic structure.

In this respect things have gotten measurably worse. These are just a few of the "objective" constraints that face any Soviet regime in the decade ahead:

—There is no stable political order in place—or on the horizon—capable of mobilizing Union resources to support a major military buildup, and it will probably take the better part of this decade to install one.

—*Glasnost'* and *democratization* have unleashed strong anti-military sentiments throughout Soviet society. The post-war consensus on "military power first" has dissipated.

—The economy is in shambles.

—Eastern Europe is no longer part of the Socialist alliance.

In this environment—one that will certainly characterize this decade—even a conservative military regime could successfully return the Soviet Union to Brezhnev-era style defense policies. The Soviet Union will have to proceed with its general military pullback and participation in meaningful arms control. Of course, the pace and tone of these processes need not be as rapid as we have seen in recent years.

Against this background it is not surprising that there does not appear to be any long term strategic planning taking place in the Soviet Union today. The Ministry of Defense leadership and the General Staff are, on the one hand, absorbed in coping with the daily crises of their ministry and the country. And, on the other hand, they are ham-strung by the political, economic, and social turmoil that grips the country. As Defense Minister Yazov, Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev, and other members of the military leadership have observed on several recent occasions: there is little they can do in the way of serious defense planning until the political and economic future of the country has been decided.

It is likely that they will have a long wait.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Meyer.

General Odom has a plane to catch and he will need to depart here in the neighborhood of 4 o'clock or 5 minutes after 4, something like that. What I would like to do is to go ahead with Dr. Pipes, but let every member be on notice to ask General Odom questions first. We will rotate with all of the questions going to General Odom. He will have a chance to answer them, and then we will let him depart. Dr. Pipes.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD PIPES, BAIRD PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA.

Dr. PIPES. I shall be relatively brief because so much has been said already.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Pipes, you just take all the time you want. You have waited patiently and have travelled far.

Dr. PIPES. You are very kind.

Senator WARNER. I do not mean in any way to abridge the Chairman's remarks, but we are all very anxious to hear you.

Dr. PIPES. I understand that.

I would like to join Professor Lapidus in congratulating this committee, as well as the Foreign Relations Committee, on taking up the issue of the Soviet Union. I think in the long run, what is hap-

[4] Stephen M. Meyer "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security*, Volume 13, No. 2, (Fall 1988), pp. 123–162.

pening in the Gulf now will be absolutely eclipsed by what is happening in the Soviet Union.

The outcome of the Gulf war is not and has never been in doubt. But what will happen in the Soviet Union we don't know, and it is far more important to us.

I remember during World War II, when we were allies with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, it was close to treason to question that Stalin's Russia was anything but a benign democracy. I think, even though the Soviet Union has helped us in the Gulf, it is very important that we take a very cold and objective look at what is happening there.

My impression is that there have been radical changes in the Soviet Union in the course of the last 2 or 3 months of the past year, and these changes have fundamentally transformed the political landscape in the U.S.S.R., of which neither the media, nor the public, nor I'm even sure the White House, are quite aware.

The shift occurred because Gorbachev decided that the public wants a firm hand against the spread of chaos, anarchy, black marketeering, and the general collapse of an order to which they had been accustomed, and that it is in his interest, as well as the nation's interest, to shift to the right.

We have had many bits of evidence to attest to the fact that he, in fact, has done that: the appointment of Pugo, a Latvian Checkist, to the very important position of Minister of the Interior, was perhaps the first symptom of it; then the extraordinary powers which Gorbachev claimed and obtained on November 17, to rule by decree; then the dramatic resignation of Shevardnadze; then the violence in Lithuania and Latvia; the delays in arms negotiations and the delays in the withdrawal from Germany and Poland. These are all straws in the wind. They all indicate how profound this change has been.

I am particularly troubled——

Senator WARNER. Would you include the call by Yeltsin for his resignation in that category?

Dr. PIPES. No, I would not, because Yeltsin has his own agenda, which is not necessarily part of that process. Yeltsin was not part of that establishment.

I am particularly troubled by the change in the Soviet media policy because, if you study Soviet politics, the changes in the way they report on news is always the most important indication of what is happening in the country.

I was in Europe at the time of the violence in Latvia and I listened to Radio Moscow. It did not report anything that happened in Latvia. They were telling us what was happening in Albania.

That has now become a pattern, a pattern of not reporting or minimizing unfavorable events inside the Soviet Union, and stressing favorable ones.

There is a party line already evident in the way they report on political conflicts. In particular, I suggest to everybody who has a short wave radio to listen to Radio Moscow on what is happening in the Gulf. It is quite frightening. They are accusing us of nothing short of genocide, of exceeding the mandate of the United Nations, and having the most sinister objectives in moving into the Gulf region.

The Soviet Union is no longer one, but is a deeply split country. It is split vertically, it is split horizontally. Very sinister elements are moving into positions of power in virtually all fields, to the extent that they can. They are seemingly backed by Gorbachev in doing this.

Therefore, Gorbachev is no longer a hope of peace, no longer a hope for liberalization. This has to be realized.

I am saying this without any particular rancor because I supported Gorbachev. I was sympathetic to Gorbachev. I recall when he got the Nobel Prize. I was called by some media. I was asked if I approved and I said, "On balance, yes." On balance, yes, I think he has accomplished a great, historic mission. But he has fulfilled this mission and he is now destroying his own legacy. Whether because he believes this is best for the country or because he believes it is best for himself. I don't know. It probably is both.

The new people, the groups that I mentioned are the generals, the KGB generals, and the highest elements of the party, because the middle levels and the lower levels in all these organizations are quite different. But they don't make policy. It is the upper echelons that make it.

They have a program. It may be a negative program; but a negative program is still a program. We know what they are against. They are against democracy. They are against the free market. Why? Because they know very well that if democracy is instituted in the Soviet Union, they will be out on their ear in no time at all. They will disappear as quickly as they disappeared in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, and elsewhere where free elections were held.

The introduction of a true, free market economy would cause them to lose their jobs in the economy and the very rich source of income which they derive by taking bribes for the dispensation of government goods and services. That is one part of the program.

The other part of the program is anti-Westernism. They hate the West for the reason that the West means democracy and free enterprise.

That unites them and binds them and that, I think, is their program.

I am very interested in their change of policy in the Gulf war.

Senator WARNER. Did you say "change of policy?"

Dr. PIPES. Yes. Their change of policy toward the Gulf war.

When Shevardnadze was Minister of Foreign Affairs, they were very friendly to us, and it is because of that that we could secure their cooperation in the passage of United Nations resolutions. They were even brooding about the possibility of sending Soviet troops to the Middle East. That, I think, was Shevardnadze's undoing because that was the last straw for the reactionaries. I don't like to call them conservatives: I consider myself a conservative, and I have nothing in common with these people. They are right-wing reactionaries.

It was the last straw, and I think that is what forced Shevardnadze's resignation. You will recall that he said during his resignation speech, which I think was improvised, that he had been virtually accused of treason.

The people who are now in control are doing everything possible to besmirch our motives and to prevent us from gaining a victory.

It is obvious why. If we attain the kind of victory which now seems to be in the cards—a rapid victory, a decisive victory, with minimum casualties—we will have dealt a very, very heavy blow to the Soviet military because, after all, it is their weapons, their strategy and their tactics that are being smashed.

When, in 1982, the Israelis disposed of the Syrian forces, I think a profound shock wave was sent through the Soviet military establishment, and it may have been one of the reasons for perestroika.

What the effect of an American victory, of an Allied victory, will be in the Gulf is hard to foresee. It may well, in the end, be the most important legacy of this war. It will profoundly affect all the premises on which the Communist Party and the Soviet military have proceeded now for many years, certainly since World War II.

It may well be that the effect will be not dissimilar to that produced on the Tsarist government by the Crimean War in the 1850s, when this great military power built by Nicholas I was defeated by the supposedly decadent forces of the West on their own territory.

I think we are almost certain to see a profound rethinking of the role of the military in Russia and the future of the military. What forms that will take, I don't pretend to know.

Clearly, it seems to me that the more intelligent Soviet generals have to realize that the kind of army that they have been building and on which they have been relying is just not fit for modern warfare.

Chairman NUNN. They are not fit for what, Dr. Pipes?

Dr. PIPES. They are not fit for modern warfare.

I don't believe they have the money to procure the modern technology or, as Professor Meyer has said, to integrate it into the armed forces. And they are stunned by the amount of money that an all-volunteer force would cost. They have made calculations—I have seen those figures—and they are, I've forgotten, three or four times more than today. This is because a Soviet soldier today gets the equivalent of $4 a year. You cannot build a volunteer army, even in the Soviet Union, with this sort of a wage. They will have to increase it, presumably, to the kind of wage that a worker gets.

Chairman NUNN. How many dollars was that?

Dr. PIPES. That's $4 a year—four dollars—at the black market rate. He gets 7 rubles a month. Seven rubles on the open market today is 30 U.S. cents.

Chairman NUNN. I assume they get food, clothing, all of that?

Dr. PIPES. They do get food and clothing. They can buy for that cigarettes and shoe polish. That is about all they can buy.

Obviously, you cannot build a volunteer army on that basis.

So the costs are staggering. The problems are enormous. I am no military expert, certainly not on conventional weapons, where I would defer to others. But it seems to me that, unless they decide altogether to go for peace and to dismantle their armed forces, their best chance is to rely more and more heavily on nuclear forces, because those are relatively cheap and the quality of their nuclear forces is very good. This will, I think, mean that we will have to rethink our strategy as well, and possibly lay greater emphasis on strategic defenses than we had done so far.

If these elements, these right-wing, reactionary elements take full power, we will almost certainly see a worsening of relations between them and us. This is because, in order to stay in power, in order to prevent democracy from prevailing, they have to create artificial tension between us and them. Soviet generals now have been for months claiming that the United States is already waging a war against the Soviet Union. They are now saying, some of them, that a Third World War is underway and the United States is winning it, that what is happening in the Gulf is a victory in that Third World War, and so on and so forth.

Now if that is so, if they think so and say so, then, clearly, they must conduct a very aggressive foreign policy, if not military policy.

Finally, let me conclude with some policy considerations.

The Soviet Union is deeply dependent on Western credits and Western technology to keep its economy afloat and to improve it. That will put certain limits on the kind of aggressiveness they can display in their foreign policy if we are willing to employ economic means to influence them, which I think is something we can and should do.

Second, if my analysis of what Gorbachev and his allies stand for is correct, then it is not really in our interest to maintain the fiction that the Soviet Union is the only source of stability and that the processes of democratization occurring in the Russian republic and the national republics is against our interest. We ought to pay far more attention to these republican movements. We ought to be in much closer contact, particularly with the Russian republic, but also with the other republics, and do a variety of things which we can do to bolster their claims to sovereignty. This is because as things stand, the preservation of the Soviet Union is tantamount to the preservation of dictatorship. Since the trends are centripetal, the only way you can keep this monster, this imperial monster together is by dictatorship. It is not in our interest to maintain the dictatorship, let alone to promote it. I think if Russia and the other republics are going to be democratic, it is only if power shifts to the republican governments.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Pipes follows:]

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Richard Pipes

THE SOVIET UNION ADRIFT

During the four decades that followed World War II, the United States faced a rigid and hostile Soviet Union. The resulting state of international tension led to two wars in which U.S. troops fought Soviet proxies, precipitated a number of regional conflicts and compelled the two countries to spend vast resources on defense. In a paradoxical way, however, this tension also maintained global stability as each of the superpowers restrained its allies and clients and avoided direct military confrontation. It is generally agreed that this period of history has now come to an end. Understandably, not a few political and military figures in both countries look back with nostalgia on the days of the Cold War.

With the approach of the 21st century the international situation is assuming new and as yet only dimly understood shapes. Various processes are at work, the most important of which may well be the waning of the nation-state, the principal organizing force of Western society and its possessions since the seventeenth century. Pressures from below in the form of ethnic separatism, guerrilla movements, religious fundamentalism and terrorism sap legitimate governments of their traditional authority. At the same time, emerging supranational bodies limit the scope of sovereignty. The flow of capital ignores national frontiers. So does the movement of populations, which surpasses anything experienced since the great migrations of antiquity. Escaping war or driven by the quest for economic opportunity, tens of millions of people uproot themselves. Just how far this migration has progressed is revealed by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, which dispossessed from this minuscule country more than one million migrant workers in less than a month. The politics of the future are likely to be less predictable as the number of international actors grows exponentially. Just as the classical empires of the nineteenth century gave way to a multiplicity of nation-states,

so too are the nation-states of today reeling from the pull of centrifugal forces. One cannot escape the impression that much of the modern world is entering a period of neo-feudalism.

The Soviet empire, until recently, managed by dint of extraordinary controls to isolate itself from these disruptive processes. Six years ago, however, its leadership realized that for this stability it paid a heavy price in the form of economic stagnation and public apathy, which threatened to transform the Soviet Union into a second-rate power. The Soviet leadership concluded that things had to change, but it had no program. The leaders seem to have thought the system was basically sound and could be set right by an infusion of fresh vigor. Gaidar Aliev, a one-time member of the Politburo, has said in fact that Mikhail Gorbachev was chosen to head the party precisely because he seemed more "energetic" than his competitors, expecting him to use his energy to advance the communist cause.[1] It is clear in retrospect that the Soviet leadership, including Gorbachev, greatly underestimated both the immensity of the task confronting anyone inclined to tamper with the status quo and the determination of its beneficiaries to resist change. Victims of their own propaganda, the leadership believed the communist regime to be in need of mere renovation.

The Soviet leadership soon learned, however, that it had inherited a thoroughly decrepit structure, no part of which could be repaired without causing other parts to totter. As this realization dawned, cautious corrections gave way to reforms, reforms to more fundamental changes, and fundamental changes to the virtual rejection of the Leninist-Stalinist legacy. The result of these incremental changes was to expose the vaunted stability of the communist regime for what it was: an artificial rigidity imposed from above and devoid of internal supports. What had been created by force could only be sustained by force; the price was national rigor mortis.

The reforms carried out at an increasingly rapid pace since 1985 shattered the illusions the Soviet regime had assiduously cultivated among its people: that they stood in the vanguard of progress and enjoyed a degree of security known nowhere else in the world. To justify increasingly fundamental reforms, it

[1] *Golos Armenii*, Oct. 7, 1980, cited in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report*, no. 200, Oct. 19, 1990.

became necessary for the Soviet leadership finally to tell the truth about the country's condition, which indeed was worsening even as reforms proceeded. All these factors had the effect of plunging the Soviet people into a kind of collective depression. Tatiana Zaslavskaia, director of a major Soviet polling institute, finds the population in the grip of extreme anxiety and pessimism:

> When a year ago we asked people whether they had confidence in tomorrow, 62 percent answered negatively. But in September of this year, only one-and-a-half percent still had confidence. Even in Moscow they numbered only five percent. And in many regions of the country, we could not find a single person who did not fear the future.[2]

Perestroika has thus laid bare the fraudulent nature of the communist system and, in so doing, has induced in the country a state that Zaslavskaia describes as one of "nervous exhaustion." No tampering with institutions or procedures can overcome this national malaise; it lies at the bottom of the plight gripping the Soviet state and Soviet society.

An understanding of the internal condition of the Soviet Union must precede any attempt to formulate a policy toward it. This prescription may seem obvious, but it was not always followed. The conduct of the United States abroad has been guided traditionally more by subjective desires than by objective realities. We approach foreign policy from a moralistic point of view. Experience teaches that the American electorate can be galvanized to support active involvement abroad only if persuaded that it serves a moral purpose. Appeals strictly to national interest do not work because most Americans see little to gain from foreign involvement, and realpolitik leaves them cold. This is said not in disparagement, but by way of caution. American moralism has been a force for good, even if on occasion tinged with hypocrisy, and it has appreciably raised the standards of international behavior. The trouble is that it tends to blind U.S. policymakers to the harsh realities of the world with which they must deal, for it prompts them to think in the same black and white categories to which they resort in the quest for domestic support.

Gorbachev has been pronounced a "miracle"; he has been anointed "man of the decade" and crowned with the Nobel

[2] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, no. 249, Oct. 30, 1990.

Peace Prize. Although the American press reports in somber detail the collapse of Soviet society under his rule, the prevailing view in and out of Washington holds that Gorbachev must be supported at all costs because every alternative is worse. This may or may not be true. But what is better or worse is not the question to be answered in formulating a sound U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1990s. The question should be, what is more likely? Events inside the U.S.S.R. have their own momentum. Our ability to influence them is marginal at best, and all the more since foreign policy plays in them a minor part.

II

Although the most visible manifestations of the Soviet crisis are economic, the root problem is political. Having laid claim to the ownership of all the country's productive resources, the Soviet government has assumed responsibility for all economic shortcomings. And inasmuch as the communists have allowed no other party to share power with them, consumer discontent translates into a rejection of communism itself. Surveys conducted in July 1990 indicate that the number of citizens who "fully trust" the Communist Party has declined to 14 percent. This is considerably less than the number of those who express complete confidence in the army, 35 percent, or even the KGB, 24 percent. Between 80 and 90 percent of respondents reject socialism; the small minority still favoring it consists almost entirely of older citizens who fear that a loosening of economic controls will rob them of social welfare benefits in their old age.[3]

The political crisis has two principal aspects: a vertical conflict within the Communist Party between conservative and democratic elements and a horizontal conflict between the central government and the governments of the union's 15 constituent republics.

Gorbachev initially tried to implement reforms through the party apparatus. Like the other ruling institutions of the U.S.S.R., including the armed forces, the party is divided along generational lines. Unfortunately for Gorbachev, the democratic elements, accounting for about a third of the party's strength, are concentrated among younger members

[3] *Izvestia*, no. 332, Nov. 29, 1990.

who hold subordinate posts. The older communists filling the ranks of the *nomenklatura* are rigidly conservative.[4] They opposed and managed to block, mainly by means of passive resistance, Gorbachev's reform program because it threatened their privileges and their livelihood, both of which rest on the party's command of the economy.

Frustrated by this resistance, Gorbachev decided to invoke popular support, which he knew to favor change. To this end, he took the immensely risky step of shifting the center of gravity of political decision-making from the party to the state. He brought into existence a new institution, the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, many of whose members are popularly elected; he also infused life into the republics' moribund soviets. At the same time, Gorbachev emasculated the party by depriving it of its monopoly status as the country's only legitimate political organization, reduced the Politburo to impotence and stripped the party of the bulk of its revenues. These moves accomplished a veritable revolution by subverting the one-party regime, which had been the operational constitution of the Soviet Union since 1918.

The shift to state institutions, however, proved exceedingly difficult to realize. Under the Leninist-Stalinist regime, state organs had dutifully executed party directives; they performed no legislative functions and had no legislative experience. The disestablishment of the party, therefore, had a consequence similar to that produced in March 1917 by the abdication of the tsar, namely, administrative disarray. In the former case, the imperial bureaucracy dissolved; in the latter, the communist bureaucracy was disabled. Tsarism and communism had this in common: they provided the only administrative links connecting the vast empire. They did this in a rather mechanical fashion, however, without developing organic bonds to society. Once the central linchpin of the system snapped, the structure fell apart for there was nothing to sustain it from below. Gorbachev, like Alexander Kerensky, has since been desperately trying to prevent governmental collapse which his own measures provoked by devising ever

[4] A poll reported in *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 29, July 21–27, 1990, showed that 68 percent of delegates to the 28th Party Congress wanted to maintain "democratic centralism"; 67 percent favored the party retaining its status as the "vanguard" of society, and 64 percent felt it ought to play a leading role in the army and the KGB. Since delegates came from the upper echelons of the party, however, these statistics may overstate the strength of its conservative constituency.

newer institutions to fill the void. But so far the process of disintegration has eluded remedies. Confusion reigns. Writing in early 1990, liberal historian Yuri Afanasev had this to say:

> Such an unwieldy governmental structure as ours . . . certainly has never existed anywhere. There are two chambers of the Supreme Soviet. There is also a Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, with its committees and commissions. Besides, there exists the Presidential Council and the Council of Ministers. Such a structure is hardly capable of operating normally. The division of functions, say, between the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Presidential Council is not defined. The president's authority is, as it were, executive, but there exists also the Council of Ministers, which lacks a precise sphere of activity.[5]

Since these words were written, two new bodies have been created: the Council of the Federation and the Council for National Security. The relationship of the first to the existing institutions is so imprecise that it cannot even be determined what, if any, functions are still left to the ministers.

III

It has been a constant factor in U.S. policy since 1917 that America's interests are best served by the preservation of the Soviet Union's territorial integrity. While it encouraged the dissolution of Western empires, Washington has supported the Russian empire by refusing to acknowledge the aspirations to statehood of the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. This policy has been implemented with such consistency that Washington chose to ignore the three Baltic republics' declarations of independence in 1990, even though it had never recognized their forceful incorporation into the U.S.S.R., treating them all along as de jure independent.

This policy of support for Soviet territorial integrity is based on two fears: that the instability and regional conflicts resulting from a breakup of the empire would balkanize eastern Europe and much of Asia, a potential development that is especially threatening in the age of nuclear weapons; and that expressions of sympathy for the national ambitions of the Soviet minorities would alienate the Great Russians, the country's largest and most important ethnic group. The first of these premises may be correct, but it is irrelevant; the striving of nations for independence has nowhere been impeded by

[5] *Strana i mir*, no. 3/57, 1990, p. 30.

considerations of regional or global stability. Applied consistently, such a consideration would require us to oppose the Soviet withdrawal from eastern Europe.[6] The second premise is invalidated by evidence that most Great Russians not only do not wish to force their subject peoples to remain in the union, but want out of it themselves.

Since its inception in 1922 the Soviet Union has been something very different from what it purported to be. Although nominally a federation of free and equal nations, it was all along a unitary state governed by the Moscow-based and Russian-dominated Communist Party through its bureaucracy, army and security police. The national aspirations of the minorities who make up nearly half the Soviet population were assuaged by powerless institutions and meaningless rituals, while any genuine nationalistic expressions were suppressed and silenced. Beneath the tranquil facade of a happy comity of nations simmered ethnic animosities aggravated by competition over consumer goods, jobs and housing. It required only a loosening of central authority for these animosities to rise to the surface.

The disintegration of the union occurring before our eyes is not confined to areas inhabited by non-Russians. Nationalism often expresses aspirations as well as frustrations that in ethnically homogeneous regions may assume nationally neutral forms. This explains the rise of Great Russian nationalism and, along with it, the Russians' decline of interest in their colonial possessions. Opinion surveys conducted in May 1990 show that 43 percent of the inhabitants of the Russian republic wished to secede from the union.[7] Contrary to widely held beliefs in Washington, a high proportion of Great Russians is consistently willing to concede independence to the other republics. This tolerance of separatism can be explained by a widespread feeling that the R.S.F.S.R., which has half the union's population but accounts for 70 percent of its industrial output and 80 percent of its exports, would be better off on its own.

The centrifugal forces do not manifest themselves exclusively at the republican level; some republics are themselves

[6] The fate of intercontinental missiles, should the U.S.S.R. fall apart, is indeed very troubling. There are good reasons to expect, however, that the Strategic Forces and the KGB, which control these weapons, would prevent them from falling into the hands of the republics, none of which has expressed an interest in them in any event.

[7] *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 21, May 26-June 1, 1990.

riven by ethnic discord. Within the Russian republic several minorities (e.g., Tatars and Yakuts) have staked claims to sovereignty. Elsewhere, small minorities living in the midst of large ones (e.g., the Abkhazians in Georgia and the Gagauz in Moldavia) have done the same.[8] Finally, some Russian cities and territories have asserted sovereign status as well.

Nationalist passions are only one reason for this phenomenon. Behind it also loom economic and political factors. The failure of the central government to satisfy the needs of consumers and the breakdown of the economic distribution system compel each region to attend to its own needs. At the expense of the all-union economy, each hoards commodities for barter with other regions. This trend is perhaps a major reason behind the breakup of national unity, certainly in the Russian republic. A related factor is the greater trust citizens of every nationality place in local authorities, who are more familiar than the center with their particular needs. Thus the regional decentralization now underway is only partly driven by nationalist ideas; it is motivated in large measure by the inability of the center to provide proper economic and political leadership.

There exists considerable evidence that Gorbachev appreciates adequately neither the intensity nor the complexity of the nationalities question in his country. He is willing to concede that the republics have some genuine grievances and deserve a greater voice in decision-making, but he has no sympathy whatsoever for separatist tendencies, which he blames on extremists. The separatism of the Russian republic is especially galling to him. To thwart it, he tries one day to undercut Boris Yeltsin, the president of the R.S.F.S.R., and the next to enter into a partnership with him, neither with much success. He has delayed far too long in fulfilling his promise to replace the Soviet Union's pseudo-federalist constitution with one based on republican equality. The need for such a constitution became imperative once the Communist Party was deprived of its hegemonic role. As a result of this delay, separatism has intensified. The proposals for a new union treaty made public in November 1990 might have satisfied the republics three years ago, but today several republics, including Russia, reject them. The process of disintegration has reached a point where

[8] Many Georgians and Moldavians believe that these separatist movements are instigated by Moscow as a means of diverting and blunting their own striving for independence.

it seems unlikely that a new treaty, no matter how accommodating, will satisfy the more nationalistic republics. Once they insist on separation, they are unlikely to settle for membership in a federalist union.

At the end of 1990 Russia and several of the minority republics are already behaving as if they were sovereign states, insisting on control over taxes levied and resources located within their territories. They enter into diplomatic relations with each other and with foreign powers. Both Yeltsin and the new foreign minister of the Russian republic have made it known that they favor returning the Kurile Islands to Japan, a concession the Soviet government has adamantly refused to make. The most spectacular expression of this self-assertion was the decision of the Russian republic in the closing days of 1990 to withhold from the central authorities 85 percent of the revenues that it had traditionally turned over to them. Each day brings fresh illustrations of the impotence of the central authorities. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. declared on October 24, 1990, that its laws take precedence over those of the individual republics. Before the day was through, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian republic reconfirmed that, unless ratified by it, union laws had no validity in its territory. Likewise, the U.S.S.R.'s Supreme Soviet banned counterdemonstrations on the anniversary of the November 7 revolution only to find itself overruled by the city governments of Moscow and Leningrad. Counterdemonstrations did indeed take place in every major city marking the anniversary; those in Moscow were attended by Yeltsin himself.

The Communist Party establishment, along with the army and the KGB, are understandably appalled by these centrifugal forces, for they will be left holding the bag if authority passes from the center to the republics, each with its own economic administration, armed forces and security police. The struggle for the preservation of the union has turned into a fight for the survival of the *nomenklatura*. It is the last line of defense of the embattled apparatus of the old regime. Gorbachev, for all his liberalism, is still the chief of this establishment. And he has made it clear that he is prepared to abandon perestroika, to throw himself into the arms of his conservative opponents, in order to preserve the union and salvage the preeminence of the central government. His military advisor, Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, declared in a somber warning that the armed

forces will not stand by and watch the union disintegrate.[9] Other high officials and generals have issued similar statements. These warnings suggest that Gorbachev is prepared to unleash a civil war in order to keep the rebellious republics in the fold. It is a war that the central government cannot win; in the long run, it does not have forces adequate to the task and cannot fully rely on its non-Russian troops.

The disintegration of the union, therefore, seems fairly certain, all the more since a substantial part of the Russian population does not wish to remain in it. The possibility still exists that Moscow will come up with a federal constitution to satisfy the republics, but time is running out.

Political authority in the Soviet Union has devolved to the point where the central government can do little more than issue decrees no one obeys and engage in foreign dealings about which no one cares. In the opinion of many Soviet intellectuals, the "Soviet Union" has become a fiction.

IV

Nature abhors a vacuum and politics abhors anarchy. The current situation cannot last because it satisfies no one. Unless the progressive decay of government is to result in the complete breakdown of organized life and turn the Soviet Union into a giant Lebanon, two alternatives appear likely: a gradual evolution of the individual Soviet republics toward self-sufficiency, or a reaction in the form of a coup that will, at least for a time, restore the union and reinstitute central authority by force of arms.

Opinion polls indicate that approximately two-thirds of the population of the U.S.S.R. favor democracy and a free market. At first glance, these figures appear to augur well for the future. They explain why Gorbachev and his associates dare not risk free presidential and parliamentary elections. But, unfortunately, democratic forces are divided and poorly organized. They consist of splinter parties gathered around powerful personalities. Attempts to form larger groupings have failed from lack of effective leadership and the fear that enforcing party discipline will lead to Bolshevik-type regimentation. Democratic politicians have gained control of municipal government in about fifty cities, but they face too many urgent

[9] *Sovetskaia Rossia*, no. 261, Nov. 14, 1990.

problems to concern themselves with national issues. The political interest excited two years ago by elections to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies has waned because the new institutions brought no improvement in living conditions. People are disenchanted with democracy, perhaps because they had no inkling how much more difficult it is to institute than dictatorship.

Matters do not stand much better in regard to economic questions. In June 1990, two-thirds of the Soviet population expressed a preference for a market economy.[10] Disaggregated, these figures give little grounds for optimism. It seems that by a market economy the respondents mean a system that promises affluence, but not its shadows—social inequality and unemployment. The oxymoronic "regulated market" launched by the authorities corresponds to the wishes of the majority of the Soviet people who want the prosperity of capitalism as long as incomes remain roughly equal and jobs are guaranteed. A mere 28 percent approve of a free market in the true meaning of the words, three percent less than those who prefer a strictly centralized economy.[11] The remaining 41 percent would have their cake and eat it too. Zaslavskaia's polling institute finds that 75 percent of the population resent the owners of cooperative enterprises, the country's incipient capitalists, and the other 25 percent at best tolerate them. Only 32 percent of urban inhabitants want a business of their own; barely four percent of the U.S.S.R.'s 100 million rural inhabitants aspire to become independent farmers. It is her conclusion that the majority of Soviet citizens feels that "most of their daily problems should be decided not by themselves but, above all, by organs of the state."[12]

Such polls suggest that the prospects for political and economic democracy in the U.S.S.R. are not at all promising, and that the conservatives have a bigger potential constituency than appears at first sight. Behind the facade of complete renovation, old attitudes survive, as do the forces that hope to profit from them. The latter bide their time: the greater the disorder and the more disastrous the state of the economy, the better their chances of regaining power.

Of these forces, the most important remains the Communist

[10] *Rabochaia Tribuna*, July 29, 1990.
[11] *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 21, May 26-June 1, 1990.
[12] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Nov. 30, 1990.

Party, still the largest organized political force in the country. The party has suffered heavy blows in the past two years, losing its monopoly on political activity and its hold on the state apparatus. It now has to contend with rival parties and elected institutions on national and local levels. Its popularity has suffered a precipitous decline. Members are resigning at an alarming rate: 700,000 turned in their cards in the first eight months of 1990 alone, among them some of the country's preeminent political figures. A current joke in Moscow says that the party is offering dispensation from dues for one year to anyone who enrolls a new member, lifelong dispensation for enrolling two new members and, for three or more members, a certificate attesting that the holder never belonged to the Communist Party. *Pravda*, the party's main newspaper, has lost so many readers that its very survival is in question. Still worse looms ahead. The Communist Party is to give up many of its economic privileges, including exemption from taxes, rent-free tenancy of government buildings and a monopoly on publishing, its principal source of income.

Even so, the party is far from finished. It manages, as it always has, much of the countryside and many provincial towns yet untouched by perestroika. In the provinces, it is said, the regional committees of the party (*raikomy*) are the only effective organs of administration. Compared to the Communist Party's 17 million members, the democratic parties, none of which exceeds 100,000, appear unimpressive.

The greatest source of the party's latent power continues to lie in its command of the armed forces and the KGB. Gorbachev tried to divest the party of its traditional control over the armed forces, but he had only partial success. The Main Political Administration, whose traditional task was to indoctrinate military personnel and keep them ideologically in step, has been reduced to providing innocuous educational functions. But the party retains other means of keeping its grip on the military. For one, 75 percent of the army's officers and 100 percent of its generals belong to the party and are subject to its discipline. Second, the party continues to appoint the commanders of the armed forces. Finally, generals have managed to stave off attempts to introduce political pluralism into the military on the grounds that it would be divisive and destructive of discipline. While Article 6 guaranteeing the party's monopoly on political activity has been removed from the Soviet constitution, it remains intact in the military establish-

ment. Here the CPSU is still the sole legal political party; since it has cells in all units of regimental size or larger, its hold on the military remains undiminished.

Like the rest of society, however, the Soviet officer corps is politically divided. The higher ranks are solidly conservative; the middle ranks, half democratic; the lower ranks, predominantly democratic. But it is the generals who direct army politics, and in recent months they have been increasingly outspoken in their opposition to Gorbachev's policies. They supported him initially because they realized that the country's deteriorating economic and technological base spelled trouble for the armed forces. What they apparently failed to anticipate was that meaningful enhancements of the industrial and technological base would require severe cutbacks in military appropriations and commitments. They are infuriated by the government's decision to give up eastern Europe, the fruit of Russia's victory in World War II. They despise glasnost, which they fault for the decline of Soviet morale and the rise of "Russophobia." They are appalled by massive draft dodging and by talk of an all-volunteer army. They feel that the armed forces, the mainstay of the regime, have been subjected to humiliations. This kind of open criticism of the government by men in uniform has no precedent in Russian history; it suggests the armed forces have slipped from Gorbachev's control and have made common cause with the most reactionary elements in the party, whose institutional base is the Russian Communist Party.

The KGB has made a rather ambitious bid to polish its public image. But according to a former high officer, Major General Oleg Kalugin, retired in disgrace, its activities have not changed. In sheer numbers, the KGB still exceeds the combined security forces of Europe, America and Asia (excluding China). According to Kalugin, there is not "a single sphere of life which does not feel the presence of the KGB's hand or shadow. . . . When we speak of the KGB's new look, we refer rather to cosmetics, to smearing rouge on the very faded visage of the old Stalinist-Brezhnevite school. The foundations, the methods, the procedures remain the same."[13] Specifically, he and others accuse the KGB of emulating the tsarist Okhrana by placing *agents provocateurs* in democratic and ethnic minority

[13] *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 26, June 30-July 6, 1990.

movements to sow dissent.[14] It is also believed to sponsor the ultra-conservative and antisemitic Pamiat.

Like the army, the KGB initially supported perestroika; and like the army, it grew alarmed over the scope of the reforms, closing ranks behind party conservatives. With 150,000 reliable troops at its disposal, the KGB has the capacity to quell hostile bids for power and to thwart pressures for genuine democratization.

There are thus formidable reactionary forces arrayed against the fledgling democratic and ethnic movements within the Soviet Union. United by a common ideology—hatred of the West and fear of democracy—these forces bide their time, hoping, as did the communist regime in Poland ten years ago, to give the opposition enough rope to hang itself. From conversations with Russian democratic representatives one gains the impression that, like the leaders of Polish Solidarity in their time, they underestimate the possibility of a crackdown.

There are numerous indications that, in order to prevent the breakup of the union, Gorbachev has indeed begun to move in the direction of a crackdown. On November 17, 1990, he sprung on the unsuspecting Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. a new program to enhance his already formidable powers to rule by decree. Under this new arrangement, the president will directly manage the ministers. The army and police are to be given broad arbitrary powers; the authority that the republics have arrogated to themselves is to be curtailed. These institutional changes have been reinforced by equally ominous shifts in personnel. Vadim Bakatin, the reform-minded minister of the interior, has been replaced by Boris Pugo, a hard-line KGB apparatchik. Pugo's deputy, Army General Boris Gromov, is widely suspected of entertaining political ambitions and is now well placed to deploy the Interior Ministry's several hundred thousand armed men in any future repressive action. The shifts have been interpreted to mean that the KGB and army have taken over the Interior Ministry. One well-informed German journalist has likened these events to the coup d'état of Louis Bonaparte in 1851.[15] It was in response to these ominous developments that Soviet Foreign

[14] *Leningradskaia pravda*, Oct. 21, 1990, cited in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report*, no. 214, Nov. 9, 1990.

[15] Christian Schmidt-Häuer in *Die Zeit*, no. 50, Dec. 7, 1990.

Minister Eduard Shevardnadze resigned from his post, and did so in the most dramatic manner possible, in the hope of alerting his country to the dangers of a new dictatorship. The December 11, 1990, television address by the head of the KGB, Vladimir Kriuchkov, which he stated was delivered on behalf of Gorbachev, was the most disturbing manifestation yet that this danger was genuine. It was the first time since perestroika that a high official of the Soviet government charged Western intelligence agencies with conducting a "secret war" to subvert the country by supporting dissident movements. The implication of these remarks is that the democratic and nationalist opposition is guilty of high treason. If Gorbachev indeed supports these neo-Stalinist views and moves in the direction of a crackdown, he will have to abandon everything for which he has worked since coming into office and revert to the ways of the old regime. It is unlikely that he would be more successful in turning back the clock than Poland's General Jaruzelski was nine years ago. But he may try.

V

The internal situation in the Soviet Union is so fluid and potentially explosive that it is impossible to formulate anything resembling a fixed policy. Trying to do so would be like planning the reconstruction of a city while it is being shaken by a violent earthquake. As long as the direction of Soviet policies changes course almost daily, U.S. policy must of necessity be appropriately flexible. One must be prepared for a range of alternatives, from a complete collapse of authority, through a variety of democratic or authoritarian regimes, to a bellicose military-police dictatorship. For obvious reasons Washington would prefer an integral state, administered by a democratically elected government, enjoying the benefits of a market economy and cooperating in the maintenance of world peace. The probability of the Soviet Union evolving into such a stable and stabilizing partner, however, is low. The forces unleashed by perestroika are unlikely to come to rest in this manner. Western attitudes still reflect the optimism of the early stage of Gorbachev's reforms, but the situation inside the U.S.S.R. no longer justifies these hopes.

American policy must adjust to the fact that Gorbachev is no longer a true representative of his country and that his base of popular support—below 20 percent according to recent polls—is too shallow to ensure his political survival, except as

dictator. As of now the popular politicians of the U.S.S.R. are, without exception, republican and municipal leaders who seem more attuned to citizens' concerns, among them Yeltsin, who enjoys the backing of over 90 percent of Russians. Gorbachev has emasculated the Communist Party, leaving it to the mercy of extreme conservatives. The state institutions he sought as his new power base have broken up and function only, if at all, on the local level. He has given up the party without gaining an effective state machinery.

Much as he is honored abroad, Gorbachev is increasingly irrelevant at home: nothing short of a coup can restore his domestic power. Such a coup would inevitably entail a radical shift to the right, away from democracy, human rights and the free market, toward some form of authoritarianism employing traditional repressive methods. In other words, if Gorbachev wants to stay in power he has to abandon the reformist program that has brought him such acclaim in the West. The future of democracy in the U.S.S.R. depends no longer on him, since he has no hope of governing by popular consensus: rather, it rests on the survival of republican governments.

The possibility of the Soviet Union reconstituting itself as a unitary state appears slender. It is likely either to break up completely or to evolve into a loose economic community of fully sovereign states on the model of the early EC or the European Free Trade Association. In either event, that which is now the U.S.S.R. will have to be dealt with not only, or perhaps not even at all, through the Kremlin, but by direct contacts with individual entities.

If this assessment is correct—and it is shared by many Russian intellectuals—then Washington cannot continue to act on the premise that the U.S.S.R. alone is a legitimate partner. Whether we like it or not, the power of its central government has already eroded to such an extent that the loci of effective sovereignty are located below the all-union level. This reality calls for a two-track policy: contacts with the Soviet central government on issues that, as of now, it alone is qualified to handle, such as arms agreements, supplemented by direct communication with republican authorities. Foreign powers dealing with the Soviet Union will be well advised to test the shifting balance of power to determine, by trial and error, which institutions—central or republican—are in a position to sign as well as implement political and economic accords.

Notwithstanding several striking concessions on arms reduc-

tions, the thrust of the Soviet military effort goes on its merry way. Some Soviet economists assert that there have been no meaningful cutbacks and that the military sector continues to enjoy the highest priority in the economy. According to the prime minister of the Russian republic, defense-related industries in the R.S.F.S.R. still account for 55 percent of industrial output; other sources indicate that in Leningrad 85 percent of enterprises form part of the "military-industrial complex." Despite promises of "conversion" from military to civilian production, *Izvestia* reports that defense allocations in the 1991 Soviet budget will rise, especially expenditures for military equipment.[16] None of these figures suggests that the Soviet Union is beating swords into plowshares. The implications of this evidence for the West are evident.

There is clamor in Europe and in certain sectors of American opinion for economic assistance to the Soviet Union to "save" Gorbachev. But billions of dollars in credits are unlikely to keep Russia stable and advancing toward political and economic democracy; its foreign debts have quadrupled from 1985 to 1989, to 85.8 billion rubles, without producing any improvements in the country's political or economic condition. Additional loans liberally advanced from many sources, including such unlikely countries as Saudi Arabia, will only serve to grease the rusty economic machinery that keeps the *nomenklatura* in power and enables it to sabotage reforms. One has only to recall how the tens of billions of dollars in loans granted to Poland, Hungary and Romania in the 1970s were used to sustain decrepit regimes. A group of liberal Soviet economists recently released a document arguing that the best way to help the U.S.S.R. is to refrain from helping it.[17] In any event, as long as the bulk of Soviet industry works for the military, and as long as Moscow spends billions of rubles to prop up communist dictatorships in Afghanistan, North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba, the Soviet government has no claim on help from the industrial democracies. Apart from food shipments, the one acceptable form of economic assistance to the U.S.S.R. is managerial know-how: that is, teaching business techniques to private enterprises and to those republics that have made a commitment to privatization.

[16] *Izvestia*, no. 339, Dec. 6, 1990.

[17] *The Anti-Communist Manifesto*, Lev Timofeyev, ed., Bellevue (WA): Free Enterprise Press, 1990.

At the same time, strong arguments can be advanced in favor of extending economic aid to the countries of eastern Europe where communist forces have been routed and which present no military threat to the West. These countries may not be able to accomplish the difficult transition to democracy and free enterprise without outside help. The 17 percent vote garnered by the Czechoslovak communists in recent elections and the astonishing showing in the Polish presidential elections by an unknown candidate who promised an economic miracle suggest the possibility of a sudden turn to the extreme left or right. In the countries of eastern Europe with the least developed democratic traditions—Bulgaria and Romania—the risks of economic despair leading to a triumph of extremism, including a return to communist totalitarianism, are very real. Were this to happen, hopes for a reintegrated Europe would be shattered.

VI

Perestroika, reform of the Leninist-Stalinist system, has failed: it has proven impossible to repair the rotten structure. The system is dismantled, but not yet replaced: the six years of Gorbachev's rule have been destructive. We now confront a country in the throes of accelerating anarchy, in which rival forces gravitate to opposite ends of the political spectrum. The democratic elements, having abandoned the leader of the central government, rally around republican figures, notably Yeltsin. Gorbachev's instinct for self-preservation drives him into the arms of conservatives. The only hope for democracy lies in the ability of the republics to assert their sovereignty because those who want the preservation of the union and its traditional institutions require a dictatorship.

The United States and its allies cannot afford to view the Eastern giant as one fewer problem on their foreign policy agenda. We may have won the Cold War, but its consequences will be with us for a long time. It will take decades to overcome the spiritual and material devastation that communism inflicted on the Soviet Union and its possessions. For this reason, we cannot rest on our laurels; the world is entering a new epoch of instability that the Soviet Union, too, will not escape.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Dr. Pipes. Did we rush you in any way, because we would be glad to come back to you?

Dr. PIPES. No, no. I said everything I wanted to say.

Chairman NUNN. Okay.

Let me ask General Odom one question, and then I will rotate questioning around for everyone to ask a question.

In terms of the Soviet threat in the next, let's say, reasonable period, 5 years, whatever you would like, do you see the threat to Western Europe as continuing to decline or do you see a turnaround in that Soviet threat against Western Europe?

General ODOM. It has obviously dropped dramatically with the breakup of the Soviet position in East Germany and East Europe. So the whole structure has changed.

I can imagine a situation, a worst case scenario—and I am not predicting it; I'm just thinking about a range of alternatives—where some of the marketization and democratization efforts in Eastern Europe do not succeed and there are political disturbances and disorders. I can see real concerns about a political return in the direction of a Soviet type regime there.

In that event, we might have the task of deterring Soviet reassertion in Eastern Europe. So that is sort of the worst case I can see in the European theater.

Chairman NUNN. I will rotate around now. I may come back later.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. I will follow along, General Odom, by asking you to comment on the views expressed by Dr. Pipes with respect to the Soviet Union's role in this Gulf situation. I think it would be helpful if you went back to the September timeframe, when Shevardnadze was very active, and take it up to date.

General ODOM. Well, I'm not sure I can recite all the details in that diplomacy. But I must say that by the time Shevardnadze retired or announced that he would resign, it was very clear to me that the Soviets were going to follow a policy there adverse to our best interests.

I did not expect a sharp turn. But it was clear in the military voices that one could read in the press that they were terribly upset about the prospect of the United States having a major military victory and becoming the dominant power in the region.

You saw that manifest itself slowly in diplomatic actions. So I think that is sort of in the cards, and we are now seeing it unfold. I think it will eventually evolve, if the regime in Iraq survives and can sell oil again, to where the Soviets may find themselves back in the guns market to rearm Iraq.

So, down the road somewhere, if not Iraq, then maybe some other state may decide to try to undercut our influence in the region. In this regard, I think we ought to keep our eye on the degree to which the Iraq affair has improved the relationships between Tehran and Moscow. Iran would like to see us out of that region, has no good feeling toward Saudi Arabia. So the complexities of the post-war settlement there are very serious and deep, and the projection of Soviet power into that region strikes me as a problem for us.

I think, however, that the Soviet diplomacy in the last day or two shows how fundamentally weak the Soviet position is. It is against our interest, but it is nothing like what it was earlier.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. General, let me ask you this question, if I might. Do you have any concern about the fact that if the Soviet Union does break up—and obviously several people in that part of the world now think it might—is there a possibility that that could cause us some concern with regard to the disposition and control of Soviet nuclear missiles? I guess I cannot quite imagine a scenario where it would break up into a number of different states and all of those states would say but we don't want any of those nuclear warheads.

What about that? Have you thought about it and do you have any suggested answer to ease my concerns?

General ODOM. Yes, sir. I've thought a great deal about it. I don't have scenarios that I would offer in which I would feel highly confident, but I have developed some in which I have less confidence.

It seems to me the best, and I would say most probable, scenario is that if the Soviet Union begins to collapse, the bulk of the senior ranks in the Soviet forces will turn to the Russian republic and essentially begin to make up the bulk of a new Russian Army, and with it the central part of the KGB. The KGB is very central to the command and control of nuclear weapons.

It takes not only the General Staff and the Strategic Rocket Forces, but also the KGB to control these things. I would expect them, if they thought they were going to lose territory, to bring those weapons back in to the RSFSR.

So I think the most likely scenario would involve the migration of those weapons into the Russian territory.

One can think of alternative scenarios, where the Ukraine, or Kazakhstan, or someone else tries to deny transport of those weapons out and succeeds in doing it. But none of the other republics would be in a position to command and control these forces and use them in any way. They would just own them, and I suppose they could fire a rocket off in some direction without much idea of where it is going to go. But none of them would have a command and control structure for it.

Then I am often asked the question: what about civil war among the republics? Well, we already have civil war in the Soviet Union, out in Central Asia, down in the Caucasus and even in Moldavia. So we should not say that we do not have some experience with that. Nuclear weapons do not strike me as a very attractive weapon for the conduct of civil war. So I don't expect to see them play much of a role in that regard.

Those are very tentative thoughts, and they are not very satisfying. But they are the best I can do, given the highly uncertain nature of things.

Senator EXON. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wallop.

Senator WALLOP. Bill, let me hope that I can discover another tentative thought in your prepared testimony.

I like very much the Machiavelli quote that you had on page 2, namely, "The principal foundation which all states have are good laws and powerful armies. Since there can be no good laws where there are not strong armies, I shall set aside any discussion of laws and proceed to speak of armies."

You then go on to say that you could do worse than to follow this approach in analyzing political change in the Soviet Union. Then you get to a kind of "end of history" thesis on page 18, in which you suggest that we could give up one leg of the nuclear Triad——

General ODOM. Right.

Senator WALLOP [continuing]. And not be risky.

I was hoping that this was an undeveloped thought. [Laughter.]

And if it is not a developed thought, or if it is a developed thought, I wish you could enlighten us as to which one we could do without and still try to stand on the remaining two legs.

General ODOM. Well, if I had the choice, I think we can deter Soviet nuclear forces with a land-based missile force and with an SLBM force based at sea.

I don't think the Soviets are going to spend a great deal more money on their air defense system. I don't think they have it. They may try to modernize it to some degree.

Therefore, I think we have already charged them about as much money in building air defenses as we are going to charge them with the bomber threat. I might keep air-launched cruise missiles, but I certainly would not invest much money in bombers. And I would move money to parts of the defense budget in which I think we really need military power to continue to influence the post-Cold War security order.

Sir, I think you have heard me before on this. High on my list are airlift, sealift, Army Heavy Forces, and close air support.

Senator WALLOP. And defense?

General ODOM. And also I would put part of that money into strategic defense.

I think the diffusion of military power in the world, certainly missile technology, means that anti-ballistic missile defense, at the tactical level and at the strategic level, is simply required for U.S. security in the future. I would put a high urgency on that.

Senator WALLOP. I see that your thought is better developed than it is on page 18, and I am relieved at that. [Laughter.]

Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Mack, do you have any questions for General Odom? He is going to have to leave, so the first round is only for him.

Senator MACK. First of all, I apologize for not being here when you made your presentation. So I might just make a short comment and build on the question raised by Senator Wallop.

It seems like the economic chaos within the Soviet Union really brought them to the same conclusion that our Nation came to many decades ago, and that was that to maintain a huge conventional force was impractical, especially, again, with their economic conditions, and, therefore, they have moved toward a more, a greater reliance on their strategic capability. It really has very little to do with the political consequences, I think, of what has been going

on within the Soviet Union. It was an economic decision that forced them to move in that way.

In respect to the statement raised by Senator Wallop, my immediate reaction to what you had to say—and I plead that I have not been on this committee for a very long period of time—just a matter of weeks, as a matter of fact—my immediate reaction was that, with the Stealth capability that has been developed and apparently the total inability to detect this aircraft, it seems to me it would make a lot of sense to invest in what they cannot possibly protect against.

It seems to me that the Stealth bomber maybe would be the thing that would be the most effective deterrent against the Soviet strategic capabilities.

General ODOM. Well, there are other forms of Stealth than just the B–2. There are Stealth cruise missiles, which I would applaud enormously, and Stealth fighters, which seem to me to have some utility. But if one is looking around—and I am not against having those capabilities—but if I had to cut, and you ask me where I would take the cuts, that's where I would take the cuts. This is because I think the Soviets have paid an enormous amount in their air defense program, and I am not sure we are going to pump much more out of them in the competition.

Let me say, over all, I think our past experience shows that we should stay in the qualitative competition, in most of the leading edge technologies, with the Soviet Union.

I like Samuel Huntington's argument from many years ago, 1958, when he wrote short history of arms races, and he divided them into two kinds: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative arms races, he concluded, often lead to war. Qualitative arms races can become surrogates for war.

Therefore, some arms races may be good arms races, and others may be bad arms races.

I think, referring to what Professor Pipes said earlier, about the impact of our military performance against Iraq on the Soviet Union, the qualitative performance there is going to have a dramatic impact on the Soviet Union. Therefore, I don't think you ought to take that kind of pressure off.

I think one of the very important things in force development is to keep that qualitative pressure up. We cannot defend this country with qualitative factors alone, of course. We also have to have numbers. Therefore, there will be the problem of deciding how much of what we buy, how much we should buy in different categories. But I will leave that for another time.

Chairman NUNN. General Odom, I don't want you to miss your plane. Do you have a ride? If not, somebody can take you.

General ODOM. I'll find a way. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. To make you feel good, I'm going to ask the panel to comment on your comments as you leave. [Laughter.]

We'll tell you later what they say, though.

Thank you very much for being here. We appreciate your coming.

General ODOM. Thank you very much, sir, though it all sounds like a devious plot behind my back. [Laughter.]

Chairman NUNN. I will ask, with my remaining time—and we will rotate this around—Dr. Meyer and Dr. Lapidus, if you would comment on what you have heard from General Odom and Dr. Pipes.

I would just like to see where we have agreement here and where we have disagreement. If you have agreement or disagreement with the general thrust of those points, I would like to know what they are.

Then, too, Dr. Pipes, though you did not get to hear all the testimony, I would like your comments on General Odom's thoughts.

Dr. MEYER. I am in general agreement with what I have heard, in terms of the characterization of the trends in the Soviet Union. I think the differences that you may have heard, or the subtle differences among the panelists are merely more a reflection of the way they approach the problem than any real, deep seated differences in understanding the processes going on there.

Everyone seemed to say that the place was coming apart politically and economically. Then the issue became how does that factor into the military equation.

In the work that I do, which is really limited mostly to defense economics, defense technologies and the military establishment, I think what I have heard from the three panelists, with the one exception that I made to what Professor Lapidus said about Mr. Gorbachev, is the background that I begin with when I begin looking at that organization and how it is functioning and what it is likely to do in the next decade.

I do have responses to some of the specific questions that were asked, but we can get back to those later on.

Chairman NUNN. Okay. But if you just want to make reference to those, you may not get back to them later on. If you have something you want to say, I am inviting you to say it now.

Dr. MEYER. All right, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I will, then.

Let me go in the order which I remember them.

The question of nuclear control is one that I have spent a tremendous amount of my time looking at. I take from your question that you are really interested in the intercontinental forces, the strategic forces and their control.

Senator EXON. ICBMs.

Dr. MEYER. Absolutely.

I think that is really no problem whatsoever.

There has been a lot of very silly stuff written in the press the last year about nuclear command and control, and it is by people who really have no experience with these systems. They think it is like a couple of kids running into a parking lot and they see a car, and they rip the wires out, and then turn them, the engine starts, and you drive off. I can assure you that if the Kazakhi government took over all the SS-18 fields that they have, they can't just don their, you know, physicist's hat, get down there and launch any of this equipment.

The strategic forces, if, in fact, one of these republics were to try to take them over, are immune from that sort of thing.

The worst thing that would happen, the worst thing, is that these people would spend days trying to blast their way into a silo—which, don't forget, is designed to resist a direct nuclear

attack—and once they got inside, they would have all this equipment. But, even if they knew precisely what to do, nothing would happen. Then, suddenly, a Soviet bomber would appear overhead and blast the silo out of the ground.

I agree with General Odom's answer. The military would retrench to Russia. In fact, we have already seen that with the tactical nuclear forces. The Soviet Army has pulled tactical nuclear forces out of the peripheral republics and moved them in.

On the strategic forces, my sense is in START II—assuming we get through START I—we'll see the Soviets wanting some kind of guarantee, a geostrategic redeployment of forces, because they want to remove the SS–18s that are outside of Russia.

But there really is no problem. The problem is for the Soviets. If the kind of scenario that was raised ever occurred, it would be a problem for the Soviets because they would lose part of their strategic force for a while that they couldn't count on to deter us. But we would have nothing to worry about. The same holds true for the bombers, and whatever.

On the question raised about the economic motivations, for cutting general purpose forces, yes, I would agree: economics was the basis. But things have changed so much now that, even if the economy were back on track, they cannot stay with large, general purpose forces because of the social and political change that has occurred in the country. They cannot man them. They cannot deploy them.

And so, in a sense, even if they solve the economy miraculously, they still have to cut those forces in a drastic way because much bigger things have taken place since the initial Gorbachev effort to try to cut forces due to economic problems.

So all these things are intertwined, which is why they can't solve them. I don't see how any Soviet regime can solve the problems they have now. It is just incapable of being untangled, I think. And all of this has an impact on the military. It all drives it down to a smaller, Russified force, centered around Russia.

That is how I would see the interplay of the politics.

Chairman NUNN. Let me ask Dr. Lapidus to comment, and then we will come back to you.

Dr. Lapidus, on the general question of responding to what others have said, pro or con, would you comment?

Dr. LAPIDUS. I tend to agree very much with this analysis.

I would just like to clarify a little bit of the discussion concerning the Russian republic. What we are really talking about are two somewhat different phenomena here.

On the one hand, there is the Russian republic as currently constituted, with a comparatively democratically elected legislature, Yeltsin as its leader, and a slight edge of democratic forces in the composition of the Russian Government.

On the other hand, a very large part of the economy of the Russian republic is comprised of the military-industrial complex, which is really outside, completely outside the role of the republic. It is controlled by the central authorities.

So, were there to be the kind of shift that was speculated about earlier, in which the army became predominantly Russian, these forces were taken over, in some sense by the Russian republic, it

would be a very different Russian republic. We are really talking about the struggle of two kinds of Russia, in a sense: the part that is now committed to the imperial system and that is associated with the center, as we have known it for a period of time, and a Russia under Yeltsin, with a very different political orientation, which probably would not necessarily want to control massive military forces, which would not want to take over intact the old KGB.

So there is a real confusion here in our discussions about what role Russia would play in this future development, what kind of Russia it would be. In a sense, we are confusing two scenarios.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. My time has expired. Senator Wallop.

Senator WALLOP. Dr. Pipes, I would ask you if you think there really was, as you suggested, a change in Soviet policy vis-a-vis the Gulf War. I can remember arguing in September that, not that they were playing a double game all along, though I think now I suspect it, but that Soviet objectives remain fundamentally different in the Middle East. Their need for high oil prices and hard currency was acute and remains acute, though their ability to export now, I think, probably has diminished.

There were Soviet military advisers in Iraq as late as January. A Japanese friend of mine told me that he had seen the Soviet Energy Minister in Baghdad. The Soviets and the Iraqis have had and have a mutual defense treaty between them. There were reported military supply flights from the Soviet Union into Baghdad, and some believe there may be some kind of barter arrangement between Iraq, Iran and the Soviet Union.

Is there any reason to suppose that there was a change, or was there just a cleverly disguised Soviet policy?

Dr. PIPES. No, I think there was a change. I also wondered, I mean, being naturally suspicious of Soviet motives, why they backed our resolutions in the United Nations. I suspected that maybe they wanted a war in the Middle East; that they thought it would be a long, drawn-out war; that we'll make enemies of all the Arabs; that we'll get bogged down, as they did in Afghanistan or that it would be another Vietnam; and that everything would be fine for them and that prices would go up.

But, in retrospect, I don't think that was their motivation.

Shevardnadze was the key person in the whole change in Soviet foreign policy. Shevardnadze felt that the Soviet Union requires good relations with the West under any circumstances in order to rebuild its economy and ultimately to stabilize itself. He was willing to pay a very high price for that, and he paid this high price ultimately in his resignation, in being forced out, to accomplish that.

Now, it is true that, while his people were voting for U.N. resolutions, the Soviet military was doing its own work. I go back to what I said at the beginning: they no longer have one government. Sometimes the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing.

I think the military, from the beginning, opposed it and didn't want to have anything to do with it. To the extent that they could, they sabotaged it.

We have apprehended a ship carrying military supplies there. They lied about their military advisors. But this I think is the military sector.

Senator WALLOP. You think they were operating outside the authority of the central government?

Dr. PIPES. Quite on their own, I think.

Now they are in control, to a very large extent, and I think policies are dramatically shifting as a result.

Senator WALLOP. Dr. Lapidus, when you speak of the two Russians, the one central and imperial, and the old, historical Russia, how do you foresee that being resolved over the course of time? Is there any means by which the old, what one might call Tsarist, Russia could ever persuade the empire Russia to dissolve that pressure, or are they going to end up in civil strife, whether it is manifested in combat or just in internal political struggle?

Dr. LAPIDUS. Well, if the process of reform had continued without the reversal of the past few months, the direction that the reformers were attempting to push and the policies that were being pursued by the Minister of the Interior, Bakatin would have gradually brought internal security to some increasing degree under the control of the republics themselves.

So it would have had as one of its consequences sort of weakening not only central control over military forces, by allowing the republics perhaps to begin to create their own territorial military forces, but it would also have weakened the all-union operation of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It would have given the republics increasing control over the forces within their own territories, and, therefore, weaken the old, sort of nation-wide structure of these institutions.

I think all of these elements were really fused in the entire reformist program that was embodied in the Shatalin plan. It involved a significant redistribution of the powers of the central government to the republics, not only economic powers, but also powers in all of these other areas. It would have meant that the republics would have emerged as much more powerful actors, and it would have changed the basis of the union.

In fact, to some extent their model was really the European Community model—individual political entities with very substantial control over their own political, economic and other affairs, ceding some powers to a central authority, but the minimum necessary to assure overall national security, coordinating national autonomy, and so on.

This would have been a very different strategy from the strategy of Gorbachev and the central government, which was basically a very limited decentralization of what remain the powers of the center.

So if this alternative, if the reformers' program were to have been enacted, it would have led to a very substantial diminution of the power, ultimately, of all of these central institutions, and it would have led to the republics having greater responsibility for their own internal security, as well as economic and political life.

Senator WALLOP. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. But I think right at this moment, it would be interesting to have each of

the three panelists comment on what seems to be an inconsistency in the role of the Soviet military in the Baltics.

I think Dr. Meyer says that they don't like the politicization. But it seems that they were rather willing, and if they were unwilling, they were very aggressive in expressing and taking out their unwillingness on the Baltics.

May we just have a quick characterization of their role?

Chairman NUNN. That's fine.

Dr. MEYER. The military did not want to go into the Baltics. They wanted the KGB and the MVD to do it, the internal police.

As I said, the former head of the airborne forces which ultimately spearheaded that, along with the KGB, was against their being used. But when the boss said we've got to crack down, the airborne forces went in.

The problems didn't occur with the airborne forces. It was the internal police and the KGB troops that did most of the shooting and caused most of the problems.

In fact, one of the airborne units was later subordinated to the KGB in order to remove the direct military involvement.

Again, there is a problem here. The senior military leadership does not want their forces being used this way. In fact, they had junior commanders on the scene refuse to fire and refuse to order their troops to fire from the military. That was not true of the MVD. It was not true of the KGB. Those people took their orders.

This is the kind of difference in institutions.

Nonetheless, when someone had to go in and restore order, they sent in the most reliable military forces they could, the airborne troops. The question is: in the future, what are they likely to do?

I think we have seen a very good indication that the military does not want that role. In fact, the reason that they probably finally agreed—not "agreed;" that's the wrong term—the reason they probably were willing to go into Lithuania is the notion that if we could stop it here in a small way, we won't have to do the much larger job later on, which we know is impossible.

We do see more and more forces being transferred to the KGB border troops and to the internal police, precisely to take over this kind of role.

Dr. PIPES. I agree entirely with this.

This has a long history. In Russia, since the days of Peter the Great, the Army was used to quell domestic disturbances. It was its big function. It is one of the reasons Russia always has had such a large armed force.

The Army never liked that role. It certainly did not like it in more modern times.

Now, Lenin knew that what started the February Revolution, which brought down the Tsarist government, was a mutiny of troops, who refused to fire on civilians. When they refused to fire on civilians, the revolution spread like a wildfire.

For this reason, he created special forces, military forces, first attached to the Cheka, which was then what today the KGB is, and later on to the Ministry of the Interior. These are highly trained, crack troops, whose task it is to quell these disorders.

I think he will be extremely hesitant to use recruits to fire on unarmed civilians.

In Poland, in 1981, when they cracked down, they created special troops, so-called "Zomos," thugs to whom they gave a lot of vodka to drink and then sent them to beat up and kill people. They did not dare to use regular troops.

I think I agree with that. If there were disturbances over the country, they could not rely on the armed forces.

Dr. LAPIDUS. I would like to say that, while I agree that the military was reluctant to itself become directly engaged, the military was a very powerful force pressing for a crackdown in the Baltic republics.

First of all, the military created this extraordinary alarm about the problem of conscription and how the Baltics were evading conscription, and were very upset about that.

Second, the military has been engaged in an ongoing struggle for several years now, exacerbated in recent months over the treatment of military officers and their families in the Baltic republics. In part, it preceded the Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe, but it was exacerbated by it.

Basically, the Soviet system sort of accepts as a norm the notion that retired military officers should have the opportunity to settle anywhere they want to in the country. Because the standard of living in the Baltic republics is extremely, considerably higher than in the rest of the country, and because considerable numbers of military officers have been stationed in the Baltic, you have a very large community of retired military in the Baltic republics, as well as very substantial troop emplacements.

As part of their assertion of sovereignty, the Baltics were trying to cut back and restrict the numbers of additional Russians, including not only military but also blue collar workers, who would be shipped in by the central government to the Baltic republics. They were creating difficulties. They wanted to restrict the amount of migration into the Baltic republic. They refused to give them priority in the assignment of housing space. There were stories that their children were being excluded from local schools because the Baltics did not want them there.

In the big debates about citizenship and creating Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian citizenship, the republics proposed to alter a very interesting Soviet law, which allows military garrisons to vote in whatever territories they are stationed. The Baltic republics insisted that this was intolerable, that it controverted the practice of all normal, civilized states, that these garrisons should vote in the places of their permanent residence, and that they should not be allowed to overwhelm and influence the outcome of internal political processes in the Baltics.

So there has been, over the last several years, a bitter battle going on between the local authorities in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia and the military. The military, the sort of organization Interfront, which is the basic right-wing organization that has been trying to mobilize resistance of the Russian settler communities to the Baltic republics, has very substantial membership, as well as leadership, composed of military, and especially retired military officers.

So I would emphasize the enormous role that the military has played as a pressure group, pushing for a crackdown, even though it did not want to do the dirty work itself.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let's now return to the ICBM and then I will have a question on ICBM modernization and which way you think we are going.

I was interested in your response, Dr. Meyer, and I want to clarify it.

I was not talking about somebody breaking into an ICBM silo and setting it off ala a SCUD missile. We all have been involved in the development of our ICBM program. So we understand fundamentally on this committee, Doctor, that you don't break into an ICBM silo and set it off.

What I was talking about and wanting to get your opinion on is this. I guess it is your opinion, expressed by as near as everyone I have heard, that if we should return to an imperialistic Russia, a loose confederation, maybe not even a confederation of states, you don't believe that we would have two, three, or four autonomous Russian republics that might have a few thousands warheads, ICBM warheads, that the Soviets have? And somebody wouldn't have to break into the silo. I would imagine that, over the years, such a situation would have some KGB agents and others, who used to work for the Soviet Union, as we know it today, who might gain entry into those facilities and, indeed, know how or figure out how to have an active ICBM threat that might worry us or others.

Another way of putting it is this. It is bad enough to have a Soviet Union, with the inventory that they have now, rather than further proliferation under noncentralized governments that we may have to deal with.

I take it from the panel's response that you do not believe—and if it's true, I'm delighted to hear that—that we have to concern ourselves with the possibility of a fragmentation of the Soviet nuclear stockpile?

Is that what you're saying?

Dr. MEYER. Senator, I'm sorry I misinterpreted your question.

I cannot tell you the number of times I have had even military officers raise the issue of an Azerbaijani regime go crazy and storm across the border and break into missile silos. So I am just conditioned to respond to that.

The scenario you raise, where essentially the different governments go their own way, and with indigenous capabilities and forces they maintain the silos, so that we have several different nuclear powers, no, I do not find that credible whatsoever.

Those systems are very sensitive. They would start to decay on their own very quickly. Without the huge infrastructure needed to maintain them, they would become inert fairly rapidly.

But, more importantly, all the command and control from this stuff runs all the way to Moscow. It is all controlled from Moscow.

So I am sure that if, in fact, the kind of political scenario, where Kazakhstan breaks off and the Ukraine breaks off, in that scenario, the first thing the General Staff would do would be to destroy those silos, in any case just to keep the technology away. But even if the local regimes rented them or leased them from the central

government, there is really nothing they could do without overriding that central control, which is very, very strong.

So I don't believe we have anything to worry about in that regard.

Dr. PIPES. If I may intervene with a question, what about tactical weapons?

Dr. MEYER. Tactical weapons we have already covered, and that is different.

Senator EXON. When that question came up, I was talking about ICBMs, not tactical weapons.

Dr. PIPES. I see.

Senator EXON. I think we all agree that the tactical weapons could be a problem.

Dr. MEYER. Yes, and that's why the central government has removed them from those republics.

Senator EXON. Do the other two witnesses agree that we should have no major concern about the proliferation of ICBMs in case there would be a breakup of the present governmental structure?

Dr. LAPIDUS. I would simply point out that a large number of the national democratic movements in the various republics have proclaimed their very great desire to have nuclear free zones, like the Baltic republics and the Ukraine.

Senator EXON. Well, maybe we could have a whole, nuclear free zone in all of the Soviet Union. That would be the ideal situation.

Dr. LAPIDUS. But, in any case, it is hard to predict what they might do at some later stage. But right now, they are extremely anti-military, anti-nuclear in their orientations, and would like to be incorporated into a larger European order, in which there are substantial nuclear free zones.

Senator EXON. Dr. Pipes.

Dr. PIPES. I think that a Russian Government, based on Moscow, would do everything in its power to retain complete control over all the ICBMs. But things can happen. I mean, we cannot predict. This is why it is so important to stress defenses, strategic defenses.

We are entering not only a new century, but a new millennium, when many powers will have access to nuclear weapons. It's not only a Russia, a Siberia, a Ukraine, or an Azerbaijan, but Middle Eastern powers and other powers. Since the future in this respect is so unpredictable, the more money we spend on defenses, the better.

I come from Cambridge, Massachusetts, where "SDI" is the dirtiest word you possibly could use. I mean the whole community there, particularly MIT, is dead set against it.

I tried to test the waters by asking at the long table at the Harvard Faculty Club a few days ago "What about the Patriots?" Well, I got the line, the party line, which is that the Patriots have nothing to do with SDI. They antedate SDI and, therefore, they have nothing to do with it.

But that is Cambridge.

I think it is extremely important to realize what the Patriots have done and what we are told other programs can do. It seems to me that in view of the unpredictability of things, it is most important that we spend a great deal of money on SDI and a great deal of effort on it, and move the program as fast as possible. In 10 or 15

years from now, we really don't know how we will defend ourselves against proliferation, inside the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

Senator EXON. I want to thank you.

But I do have a question for the next round, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask if we could switch to another subject which interests me. I pride myself on being an amateur agriculturist, having owned and operated farms for many, many years, for most of my life.

I am still perplexed as to why the Soviet Union is unable to provide the basic dietary needs of its people, given the vastness of its lands.

I would like to have each of you comment as to where that situation is today and what is the likelihood of any reasonable improvement in the foreseeable future.

Dr. Pipes, what do you say?

Dr. PIPES. Well, there are several answers.

In the first place, Stalin had done everything in his power to destroy the Russian agricultural class. Anybody who was a good farmer was labeled "kulak" and was deported and ultimately killed.

Senator WARNER. What was his reason for doing that? I know that chapter in history, but it perplexes me.

Dr. PIPES. That goes back to Lenin. Lenin wanted collectivization because the Soviet program, the Bolshevik program, was to nationalize, that is, to place under party control all economic resources. That included agriculture.

In the 1920s, 80 percent of the population was engaged in agriculture. It was the main product of the country. But they could not take over between 1918 and 1927 because they did not have the forces to do so.

The idea was that you rationalize agriculture by essentially going through something similar to the English Enclosure Acts, ending the strip system, introducing modern farm machinery, rationalizing it, and taking control from the center.

It had the opposite effect. It destroyed everything.

Now, the memory of that lives very much among the Russian population. When they are told today to go back to the land, they're going to get land not in private ownership but on a 99-year lease, they say well, you're going to do to us the same thing that you did to our grandfathers in the 1920s. When we start the thing going, you will expropriate us.

That is one problem.

The second problem is the absence of an infrastructure. They have, for 70 years, put all their money into industry, particularly the military industry, and done nothing for the village.

If you travel through central Russia, the poverty is striking. There are no roads, there are no silos. In many areas, there is no electricity. There is no running water.

What does this mean? First of all, it means that nobody wants to live in the country. They would much rather live in the cities, which at least have some amenities. Second, it means that a very high proportion of the foodstuffs which they harvest, rots.

Gorbachev has said when he was in charge of agriculture that if they could only save what rots, they would not need to import anything. It's about 20 percent of their harvest.

So they have neglected and, in fact, more than neglected, they have destroyed the agricultural sector. I may add another reason as being that they regarded the peasant as an enemy of the Bolshevik state. Now they are stuck and they don't know how to revive it.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. Dr. Lapidus.

Dr. LAPIDUS. I think there are many Soviet economic reformers who argue that Gorbachev made a fundamental mistake when he came to power, that he should have never taken the path of political democratization but that he should have used his very strong powers in 1985, 1986, 1987, to inaugurate a major program of economic reform, focusing on the agricultural center; that, in effect, he should have adopted a Chinese strategy of decollectivized agriculture, distributed land to the peasants, and then, having solved the food problem, having provided the population with an improved standard of living, he might then more easily have moved on to other aspects of his program.

I think what Gorbachev realized and perhaps these critics do not, is the extent to which the whole structure of agriculture is deeply embedded in the existing bureaucratic arrangements. You have a massive bureaucracy that is tied to the collective farm system, that is tied to keeping the peasants in these gigantic cooperatives. And in order to break the resistance to, in effect, granting the peasants land, you had to undertake all of these other programs to delegitimize the old system, to break the power of the rural bureaucracy, and so on. To this day, that resistance is still so powerful that land reform has still not been attempted.

So I think that is one enormous obstacle, in addition to those that Professor Pipes has mentioned, enormous resistance to giving up the degree of control that has been exercised, enormous resistance to allowing the peasants to become independent owners of land.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Meyer, do you have anything further to add before I shift to another question?

Dr. MEYER. No. I agree with both those statements. I would just add that the distribution issue is important. I think the amount of foodstuff lost on the road, essentially, because of the inability to distribute them is probably even higher, at 30 percent or more.

Senator WARNER. I just don't understand why they don't turn more of the military simply to a transportation effort.

Dr. MEYER. Agriculture was the bank for funding the rest of the country. And so, whenever money was needed for investment or for defense, they took it out of agriculture, including investment in infrastructure for transportation. Now they are paying the price.

So, even if they were to double production tomorrow, it would not increase the amount of food available, because they would have no way to move it.

Senator WARNER. Let me shift to the question of Soviet Jewry and the likelihood of any major shift in the current status of allowing substantial numbers of these persons to depart the Soviet Union and the impact on the Soviet Union having lost the intellect that, almost to the person, they take with them when they leave.

Why don't you start, Dr. Meyer, and we'll go the other way.

Dr. MEYER. That is not really an area that I work in very much at all. So I will leave that to my colleagues.

Senator WARNER. All right. Dr. Lapidus.

Dr. LAPIDUS. I would say that there is an even larger issue looming on the horizon, namely, whether the Soviets will adopt what already exists in draft form, namely, legislation that would allow free exit from the Soviet Union altogether.

Senator WARNER. For everybody.

Dr. LAPIDUS. Yes, for everybody—in other words, that this policy would no longer be limited to Jews and a few other selected minorities, but that it would become part of the human rights policy of the government as a whole.

Now, as you may know, the Human Rights Commission has drafted that legislation. They have been fighting to get it on the agenda. Indeed, it became a source of some anxiety to Western governments, including our own, because there was some fear that it would then trigger a massive wave of emigration from the Soviet Union.

My own guess is, with this new conservative tide in the Soviet Union, there may be growing reluctance to even bring that legislation to the floor of the parliament for any discussion whatsoever.

Senator WARNER. It does have a negative impact to allow these well educated and highly motivated people to depart the Soviet Union. It has to.

Dr. LAPIDUS. Well, I think you are already seeing the beginnings of what could become a massive brain drain which goes far beyond the question of Jewish emigration. You have, from my own experience in university, extremely large numbers of Soviet citizens, whether students who came to the United States or to the West to study abroad, or people who came in connection with joint ventures and so on, who do not want to go back. We see them—I'm sure you see them, Steve, and you see them at Harvard, too—very large numbers of people.

In fact, when I was in Moscow in late December, I had a kind of reunion with a whole group of young Soviet students whom I had come to know over the years, who had spent time in the United States and were back in Moscow. They kind of threw a little reception for me. This was in the middle of the Shevardnadze speech, the Kriuchkov speech, these very ominous developments in late December. Their attitude was damn it, if this isn't going to become a normal country, I'm leaving.

So there is a younger generation of people with exposure to the West who are bitter about these kinds of developments and who are prepared to leave.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Pipes, what are your views?

Dr. PIPES. There definitely is a depleting effect. I think it is, again, one of these measures that Shevardnadze foresaw, because he felt that it was good for the country, good for its image abroad.

I might also mention that you have important population shifts within the Soviet Union, because many Russians now are leaving the borderlands, particularly Central Asia and the Caucasus, where they feel endangered.

Senator WARNER. What do you mean by Russians leaving Central Asia?

Dr. PIPES. Russians are leaving the Central Asian republics and moving to Russia because they feel threatened. I think something like 500,000 have moved throughout the U.S.S.R.

For example, in Tadzhikistan, which is a small republic, so many Russian engineers left that, for a while, they had problems running the power stations.

There are enormous population shifts within the country and out of the country. Of course, in addition to the Jewish emigration, they have a very sizable German emigration, too.

Senator WARNER. I thank the witnesses and I also appreciate your appearance here today.

Chairman NUNN. Let me pose a question to each member of the panel.

General Odom, on page 7 of his testimony, talks about Boris Yeltsin and comments that the "new structure of Soviet politics became 'Saint Boris of Holy Russia' versus 'Comrade Gorbachev of the Soviet Union.' " He goes on to say: "Not only is Yeltsin leading Russia against the Soviet Union, he is supporting the secessionist movements," and so forth.

He makes a big point of Yeltsin versus Gorbachev.

My first question to each of you is this. Do you think Yeltsin is really this central now? My second question: if you had to name the three or four key players to watch in the Soviet Union, whether they are central, whether they are in the republics, whether they are mayors, who would be the—whatever number you would like—three or five that you would say are the key players that we need to understand and have more contact with?

Let me start with Dr. Pipes.

Dr. PIPES. I think the conflict of Yeltsin-Gorbachev is central. It is somewhat reminiscent of the Trotsky-Stalin conflict.

They are really the only real players. You have mayors of cities like Leningrad and Moscow who are very democratic, liberal people, Sobchak and Popov, people like Stankevich, people like Yaklovev. These are all people on the democratic side. But I don't think any of them have any really great following.

This is one of the reasons why the reactionaries are now aiming all the guns on Yeltsin, because we know he is the central bastion.

I am told, though I don't know how true it is, that he is so afraid for his life that he sleeps in a different apartment every night, because there have been threats on his life.

If Yeltsin were either demoted or if anything were to happen to him, I don't see really anybody there who could stand up to these forces. He is the only really major political figure.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Lapidus.

Dr. LAPIDUS. I don't think it is appropriate to view Yeltsin as the major competitor of Gorbachev for the same position. What he is is a protagonist of a different approach to Soviet politics, in which he would not replace Gorbachev as the all-union president, but in which he would be the leading member of a new confederal arrangement.

I don't think that he has oriented himself toward the central institutions. In that sense, he is not a competitor for the succession to the center. It represents an alternative political strategy.

If the central institutions sort of continue to exist in some powerful way, I think one ought to look at other figures who are clearly being promoted within the party leadership as potential conservative alternatives to Gorbachev, people, for example, like Volsky. I would also look at a few key figures within the military—Gromov, for example, who is clearly a rising star. And I would focus a little bit more attention on the leaders of the key Central Asian republics—Nazerbayev and several of the others—who are going to have an enormous influence over which way the struggle over the future of the union goes.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Dr. Pipes, could I come back and get you to answer the second part of the question. Are there any people that we need to keep up with or know a whole lot more about, than just in general, than Yeltsin and Gorbachev?

Dr. PIPES. We know quite a lot about the people who are in the democratic camp. I think we should take a very close look at the people on the right. Gromov has been mentioned. He is a general, who is now Deputy Minister of the Interior. He was the last commander of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. He is quite popular, quite energetic, with considerable political ambition. His boss, Pugo, the Minister is another. Some of the other generals—I don't know. Yazov, Akhromeyev, they are all people who are very determined, are linked by very close ties. There is Polozkov, who is the Chairman of the Russian Communist Party, an extremely reactionary group.

I would say that these names are the most likely successors to Gorbachev, rather than the other names I mentioned, like Sobchak, Popov and the others, who are on the democratic side.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Dr. Meyer.

Dr. MEYER. I would return to Professor Pipes' analysis. I think that here we are really just talking about Gorbachev and Yeltsin as individuals. Yeltsin is a symbol, in the sense of the anti-Gorbachev, if you will. Notice that he does not belong to a particular political party. He does not have a structure behind him to support him. He counts on popular outpourings for his support.

That is on the one hand strong and on the other hand very weak because there is no organization to back him.

When you put Gorbachev and Yeltsin aside, I don't see an individual out there that is worth looking at or investing time in trying to understand. My guess is if it is not Yeltsin that replaces Gorbachev, it is going to be a very murky coalition of individuals who we don't know much about, or even if we knew much about them, we don't understand the dynamic among them.

I would just remind you that, even back in the Sixties, when we knew precisely all the personalities in the Politburo, we still had not the faintest idea of how they were going to shake themselves out in the 5 years that followed Khrushchev's downfall. Many people bet on Kosygin for a whole set of reasons, because Brezhnev was dull and stupid. And I think a lot of people were surprised when Brezhnev emerged out of that.

In terms of the military, with the exception of names like Gromov and others, I don't see those people as being key players.

It is more likely that someone who is bright and energetic, like Gromov or an Achelov, would become the Minister of Defense and play in this coalition. Unfortunately, we are going to have to wait to see that play out. If it is not Yeltsin, I would predict that it is going to be an invisible "group," essentially.

Chairman NUNN. I would like to ask all of you one other question.

Should we direct our economic cooperation and other forms of economic assistance to the Soviet Union away from the central government, toward the republics, and the democratic forces? How should we use our economic relationship?

I am not talking about subsidies and aid alone. I am talking about the overall economic relationship. Where should that be focused?

Dr. PIPES. I emphatically think that we should turn as much as possible to the republics, especially the Russian republic, which is the most powerful economically—it produces 70 percent of all the industrial output and 80 percent of all the exports—and to private enterprises, and so on, and work with them, rather than with the central government.

Every Russian democratic intellectual will tell you that this ought to be done. We ought not to give assistance, economic assistance to the central government.

A very good book recently appeared, published by a group of Russian economists, called "The Anti-Communist Manifests." One of them says that the best way to help the Soviet Union is by not helping it.

Chairman NUNN. That is the central Soviet Union?

Dr. PIPES. The central Soviet Government.

Chairman NUNN. Would you help the republics?

Dr. PIPES. Yes, absolutely. I would assist each of the republics. Above all the Russian republic, which is the central one. I would enter into relationships with the Baltic republics, which are fully committed to democracy. I would be a little bit cooler toward the Central Asian republics because they are much more tied to the central government and show much less a spirit of either democracy or free enterprise. But definitely that is where I would turn.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Lapidus.

Dr. LAPIDUS. I also would try to focus aid programs on the republics and also on localities, and have direct cooperation with various city and regional governments that are oriented in a democratic direction.

Contrary to Professor Pipes, I would include Central Asia. I think it would be seen, first of all, as quite discriminatory. Second, I think there are important things that could be done in Central Asia in the area, for example, of assistance with massive health problems, sort of sanitizing water supplies that have become contaminated as a result of pesticides and so on.

Second, I would also target our assistance. I think in many ways we have made major mistakes in our private programs in targeting the large state enterprises. It seems to me that our economic assistance should be encouraging the development of small scale entre-

preneurship, rather than working with the large state enterprises that have a stake in the perpetuation of the centralized system.

Finally, it seems to me that it would be enormously helpful to create a serious program to help support the possibility of large numbers of Soviet students from different regions of the Soviet Union to come to the United States for study. Right now, the possibility of doing that depends entirely on the universities that don't, at this point, have the resources to finance it. These are students who do not have any hard currency and, therefore, have no possibility of coming unless the money comes from outside. It is a little bit analogous, though not completely, to the situation we face with China.

I think it could be enormously useful to offer massive support, so that large numbers of Soviets could come to the United States to study.

Dr. PIPES. If I might just add a footnote to what I said before, I think also we should maintain and strengthen the controls on high technology transfer. There has been a tendency in the last couple of years to relax these rules.

But in view of the great importance of technology, particularly to military power, computers and things like this, in which the Soviet Union is very much behind us, I think this is not the time to relax, as long as the Soviet Union is one and maintains its high profile military posture.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Meyer.

Dr. MEYER. I have nothing to add to what has been said.

Chairman NUNN. Do you agree on the cutting back the transfer of technology? I think certainly on military technology I would agree with Dr. Pipes completely. But it is hard to draw the line there, and economic assistance without any technological assistance is pretty tough.

Dr. MEYER. It is hard. All I can say is that the Military-Industrial Commission of the Soviet Union and the defense enterprises are counting on access to Western technology to help them through this next decade. That is certainly true.

In fact, a lot of the opening of Soviet defense enterprises and the willingness to invite Americans in is in the hope that dual use technologies will flow into the Soviet Union. This is a very important thing, and they have said it openly. They are not pretending that this is not part of their agenda.

The question is can you realistically control a lot of that stuff. I really don't know the answer to that.

But I do know that they are certainly counting on that flow of technology, more so than they were in the 1970s and 1980s, precisely because of the problems that they face in the decade ahead.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

There is a follow-up question on that that I would like to get your brief thoughts on, and then I would like to turn to ICBM modernization if I might.

Whether it is the central government or whether it is some breakup of that into autonomous republics, it seems to me it is in our interest to begin to help the Soviet Union to some extent with trade and, in the process, ourselves. Obviously they are very hard

up for any currency, which makes it difficult for us to trade with them.

Should we explore the possibility of barter with the Soviet Union? I don't know what they have that we need. Oil is one thing that we are going to have to continue to import. Could we offer them food for oil, or something that they might have that I might not know about? Just a basic question: is barter a way that we should look to possibly to improve the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States?

Dr. PIPES. Well, that barter would have to be conducted at world prices, I presume. So it is really hard to see how it would differ from what is going on now, when we buy their raw materials and sell them the things they desire from us.

Under any system, barter, cash and carry, or credits, they have very little to sell to us. I don't know what the trade figures are now, but a few years ago I remember reading that, apart from the foodstuffs which they bought from us, the grain, our foreign trade with the Soviet Union was equal to that of our trade with Trinidad-Tobago. That is roughly at the level at which it can naturally be.

Now, the only way you can have massive trade with the Soviet Union is by means of large credits, state guaranteed credits, Export-Import Bank guaranteed credits, and I am very much against that.

I am very much in favor of trade, barter or any other form. But I think you will find that there is very little they can sell, particularly now that their oil productivity is dropping and they are selling considerably less oil than they used to sell.

Senator EXON. Other witnesses? Dr. Lapidus.

Dr. LAPIDUS. I would also say that, although it looked for a period of time as though the Soviets were really trying to create a more stable climate for foreign investment and joint ventures, if I were in the business right now, I certainly would not risk very much in this particular environment. I think it is going in the opposite direction, and with the new regulations that allow the KGB to scrutinize the records of any enterprise, it seems to me that this is not the moment to be encouraging anything very substantial.

Senator EXON. I am not talking about going into partnership with them. I am talking about barter or something as an exchange for hard cash.

Dr. LAPIDUS. On those terms, that's already going on.

Dr. PIPES. There is very little business there. There is always this myth which goes back to the 1920s, that the Soviet Union is an enormous potential market, and so on. But it really is not.

We do not have compatible economies. We need very little from them and they need a lot from us. But they cannot pay for it. Therefore, our economies really are not compatible.

The only way they would become compatible is if we extended to them massive credits. Then they would buy things from us.

Senator EXON. Dr. Meyer, this seems to be in your field. What do you think?

Dr. MEYER. I agree with what has been said.

I think that, to the extent we can barter, we are bartering with them already. There is very little that they have that we can use,

and there is very little that we have to offer them that they can really use, outside of limited high technology items for their defense-industrial base.

They are bartering with the Koreans, they are bartering with the Japanese, and they have bartered in the past with the French and the Germans. That will never solve their problem or help us out tremendously.

I think the extent to which it is possible, it is already being done.

Senator EXON. Let's return to ICBM modernization.

The Secretary of Defense, in a hearing earlier this week or the last part of last week, reminded us that the only nation in the world today that would have the capability of literally destroying the United States of America remains the Soviet Union. That gets us back to our ICBM modernization and the deterrent that it has provided.

I assume that one of the problems, in addition to the others that have been mentioned here today, that the Soviet Union has is that they have been robbing their domestic economy through a heavy investment in military hardware and equipment, including ICBMs.

I believe it was Dr. Pipes who said in his testimony that the Soviet Union will be emphasizing ICBM modernization because it is cheap. They are on the cheap and that is the cheaper way of providing some national security for themselves.

In this regard, we are advised, at least most of us believe, that even at this time the Soviet Union is moving quite aggressively ahead on modernization of some of their ICBM inventory.

Do you agree with that? Are they likely to continue it? If so, what should we be doing?

Should we, as General Odom said was a possibility if we had to make some sacrifices, possibly not have three equal legs of the Triad? I believe he was talking primarily about the B–2.

What do you think they are doing in this area? Do you think they are continuing to modernize? What are your suggestions to those of us sitting on this side of the table who have some decisions to make in the future in this regard?

Dr. MEYER. It is somewhat difficult to talk in detail about Soviet strategic force modernization in an open session.

Senator EXON. I agree.

Dr. MEYER. But what I can say is the following.

There is no doubt that the Soviets are modernizing their strategic forces, and there is no one who ever expected them to stop modernizing their strategic forces. It is taking place in the ICBM area, in the submarine-launched ballistic area, cruise missiles, bombers, and strategic defense as well. There is no doubt about that.

Senator EXON. And submarines, I would add.

Dr. MEYER. Yes, that's right—and submarines.

But what can also be said just as definitively is that the strategic force area has suffered cutbacks, just like the naval area, the ground forces, the air forces, and the air defense forces. Strategic offense and strategic defense programs have been cut in procurement, in both quantity and in the range of programs underway, and research and development on strategic programs has been cut as well in some major ways.

So what we do see is modernization in all the legs, but at a slower pace and with much less of an effort than one would have predicted.

Second, we know from both the reform programs put forward by the Ministry of Defense itself that they are expecting to come in under the START I agreements in terms of the quantity of the force. And so yes, absolutely, modernization is taking place. At the same time, it is totally consistent with the drawdown of the general Soviet military force structure. And it is taking place not just in procurement, but also in R&D. This means that ten years from now, we are going to see fewer innovations in the strategic force area as well.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Before you move the microphone away, what about the B–2? What is your judgment?

Dr. MEYER. My view is that I tend to agree with General Odom. I think of all the strategic forces we are building, the B–2 is the least useful at the margin.

The B–2 has one advantage over everything else we have, which is in attacking strategic, relocatable targets. As we have learned from the Iraq War, locating mobile targets is tough until they fire. By the time a mobile SS–24 or SS–25 is fired, we would not need to find it anymore. The B–2 can't do anything else much better than any other force, other than to look, go after, a mobile target. Finding those things is near impossible.

So, when you look at the marginal dollars spent on strategic modernization, I would argue that the B–2 produces the least marginal effect for the dollar, and that there is no class of targets that you are really interested in attacking with that weapon, once you sort of look at the overall posture.

Senator EXON. Doctor.

Dr. LAPIDUS. I would simply add to this that, in view of the significant reduction of the overall Soviet military threat, in view of their significantly reduced economic capacity so sustain anything like past rates of military building, and in view of the very sharp scaling back of global Soviet commitments, it seems to me that we find ourselves in a situation where we have an extraordinary opportunity to scale back the overall level, as well as to reallocate our own military commitments. In a sense, we should not be wedded to images of the Soviet threat that are not any longer applicable.

Dr. PIPES. I used to follow these things closely in the 1970s and early 1980s but I have not done so since. I don't really know whether they have modernized or not.

But I think I understand their psychology and mentality to some extent.

Chairman NUNN. Of what?

Dr. PIPES. Of the Soviet generals and the Soviet apparat. They must have military force at their disposal. It is the way they rule, by military force, not by mandate, not by consensus, but that way.

It seems to me, as I said in my testimony, that if things go in the Gulf the way they have been so far and if we achieve in a few days a smashing, almost unprecedented, victory with our conventional forces, you are going to see something very strange happening. It

used to be in the past that Soviet conventional forces were considered superior and we developed the flexible response doctrine to stop them with nuclear weapons. Now that I think our conventional forces have proven themselves superior to Soviet ones, they are going to lay the kind of stress on nuclear weapons that we used to put in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. That stands to reason.

Therefore, I would expect them to make a very major drive for improving and modernizing their nuclear forces, which they can use not only for combat purposes, but for purposes of nuclear blackmail, at which they are very skilled.

Senator EXON. I would just say in closing, Mr. Chairman, and in response to your statement, Dr. Meyer, that it is true that the B-2 would not be tremendously effective with regard to mobile missiles. But I have never seen any war scenario where all of the land-based fixed ICBMs would be launched at one time.

I would also have to say that we have to keep in mind that a B-2, with its stealthiness, would be, I suspect, a significant deterrent to the Soviet leadership. This is because, while we have not talked about that a great deal, it seems quite obvious to this Senator that one of the missions of the B-2 would be for spot bombings of command and control facilities that might give the Russian leadership some second thoughts.

There is no other system that we have that would likely be able to go in and take out those kind of facilities after a first strike has been launched. Let's also remember that one of the things about a bomber is that it can be recalled after it is ordered off the ground in alert situations.

But, in any event, I have enjoyed very much your informative testimony today. It has been helpful to us.

Thank you all, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Before we close, I would like to ask any of you if you have any other thing that you would like to offer or were there any comments or responses of yours that we did not complete? Are there further comments about what anyone else has said? [No response.]

Dr. Lapidus, do you and Dr. Meyer share Dr. Pipes emphasis on SDI defenses?

Dr. LAPIDUS. Again, it is an area that is not in my area of technical expertise, either. But to the extent that specialists who I respect and have consulted about it, they really also sort of share the view that the kind of systems that went into the Patriots have very little in common with SDI, and that SDI, as originally defined and proposed and in part as currently being developed, is a very wasteful expenditure of resources which could be better committed to other purposes.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Meyer.

Dr. MEYER. Since Dr. Pipes has characterized MIT as anti-SDI, I have to say that it is not quite true.

SDI means many things to many people. To the extent one is talking about limited defenses based on technologies we know about, that exist, that are affordable—I would stick actually with just "exist"—there are some very interesting notions put forth about limited strategic defenses that are all based on conventional, ground-based technologies that we know something about that

make a lot of sense to explore, absolutely, in the current and future strategic environment. This has to be divorced, though, from the discussion of very bizarre technologies that only exist on television or on simulation monitors. There is a big difference between those.

The technical people who work on Patriot—in fact, they live around the block from me because I live around the block from the plant that makes this—Patriot is a very different sort of thing. It has much more in common with the limited launch protection systems that have been discussed here before.

So, yes, in that context, if you think about the problem of strategic defenses and get away from the term "SDI," I think there is a lot that needs to be discussed. Frankly, in terms of issues of marginal utility, there is much more there that should be explored that is not being explored because the debate has become so political.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Dr. Pipes, on the question of strategic defenses, could you tell us what kind of goal you would have? I am not talking about the technical side of it now at all. I am not trying to get into that. We can get into that later. But just what would you like defenses to do philosophically? Are you talking about something that would be near-perfect and start phasing out the offensive? That was the original concept.

Right now, I believe the Joint Chiefs' goal is to be able to handle about 50 percent of the SS-18s. But President Bush indicated in his State of the Union address that the administration was moving more toward a limited defensive goal, although that has not yet been completely explained.

Could you just give us your philosophical base on where you think defenses ought to go?

Dr. PIPES. I would say that it should be sufficiently effective to spoil or to throw grave doubts on any Soviet first strike plans. If it does that, it is a very inhibiting factor.

The Russians have written a great deal about their first strike plans and what they intend to achieve. If one could intercept 50 percent of the SS-18 warheads, it would be fantastic, I should think. I would be satisfied even with less than that. This is because it would throw a monkey wrench into Soviet planning. It would create a tremendous uncertainty. A first strike must succeed or it is worse than useless.

I see SDI as a spoiler of first strike planning.

Now I am not quite prepared to say what percentage. But I should think 50 percent would be fine.

Chairman NUNN. What about a more limited role? Are you interested in a more limited defense against third country missiles?

Dr. PIPES. Well, definitely third country, absolutely. There I should think we might be able to achieve something far higher than 50 percent. But I had in mind the Soviet threat.

Against third countries now it is extremely important. I don't know what we would do now, for example, if the Israelis had not destroyed the Iraqi nuclear facility. It boggles the mind to think of what the situation would be if Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons, even a few, even half a dozen. That is absolutely essential, to be able to stop that.

But that is a far smaller problem than the problem of the Soviet Union with its enormous arsenal.

There I repeat: nothing like perfection, nothing even near perfection, but just enough. If we can conceive how they plan a first strike, what it is they feel they have to take out and what degree of certainty they must have, if we can spoil that sufficiently, then it performs its function.

Chairman NUNN. Would you gear the pace of that kind of effort to what we see the Soviets doing with their own forces and with modernization? If they speed up, does that have a bearing? Or do you believe we ought to go full barrel ahead, even if they are depleting, gradually depleting their nuclear forces?

Dr. PIPES. I'm sorry, I don't understand the question. Is it if they are speeding up their nuclear building? Offensive weapons or defensive?

Chairman NUNN. Yes, offensive.

Dr. PIPES. Oh, offensive.

Well, I think if they are indeed speeding up their offensive effort, then we have to keep up with it.

Chairman NUNN. I'm saying the other way around. Suppose we see trends where they are basically moving the other way there. We don't yet, but I'm asking "if."

Dr. PIPES. Well, it depends on what it would be. I mean, a 20 percent or 30 percent cutback in Soviet offensive weapons still leaves them with an awesome arsenal. They have much more than enough to destroy us, even if they cut back.

Chairman NUNN. So a START agreement would not come close to it?

Dr. PIPES. Even if a START agreement were signed, the problem would still be here. I hear various figures about how many times we can destroy each other over and over and have the rubble bounce. But it is clear that even after a START agreement they will still have a great deal left.

Chairman NUNN. Are there any other comments, if not on this, then on anything else? [No response.]

We appreciate all of you being here. It has been a very helpful hearing and we are grateful to you.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

CURRENT TRENDS IN EASTERN EUROPE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Dixon, Warner, and Thurmond.

Professional staff members present: Robert G. Bell, Richard E. Combs, Jr., and John J. Hamre.

Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, and George W. Lauffer; professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Elizabeth Ann Harlow, Camden Jones, and Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; and Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets today to receive testimony on broad trends in Eastern Europe and in Soviet-Eastern European relations. The countries of this region have undergone remarkable change over the past 2 years, as symbolized by a just-announced decision to dissolve the Warsaw Pact by March 31.

It is clear where these nations have been. For some 40 years they have been constituent parts of the Soviet foreign empire, and in that capacity they also have been constituent parts of the Soviet threat to our national security interests.

While it is clear that they have left the Soviet empire, it is less clear where they are heading and how long it will take them to make that journey, although we all wish them well.

We are fortunate to have a panel of leading experts on Eastern Europe to address these and related questions: Mr. James Brown of The RAND Corporation; Dr. Charles Gati of Union College; and Dr. Andrzej Korbonski of UCLA.

So far in this year's budget cycle, the committee has heard from Secretary Cheney and General Powell on the changing threat, the revised military strategy, and the resultant defense budget. The committee then met in closed session to hear from CIA Director Webster and DIA Director Soyster on the international threat environment. Yesterday, the committee heard from a panel of nongovernmental experts on developments and trends in the Soviet Union.

Today we focus on broad developments and trends in Eastern Europe and in Soviet-Eastern European relations. In subsequent hearings the committee will look at more specific facets of the Soviet and Eastern European picture. We appreciate very much the willingness of today's experts and panelists to make time in their busy schedules to appear before us. We are delighted to have you here and look forward to the testimony of each of you.

I do not know whether there has been any agreed-upon order here today. Is there any preference?

Okay, as seated from left to right we will hear from each of our panelists, and then we will come back with questions.

When we complete this set of hearings, what we will try to do is see where there are points of consensus and where there are points of disagreement so that we can bear down on those a little bit more. So as you go along, I hope you will take note of what the other panelists are saying, and where there are points of strong agreement or disagreement. It would be helpful to us to know where those are as we proceed today.

Senator Warner, do you have any opening statement?

Senator WARNER. Let me add, Mr. Chairman, my pleasure and appreciation to these three gentlemen for joining us here today. The world now is quite properly captured by this most unusual chapter in history in the Gulf which, God willing, will soon be terminated. The issues in Europe, however, go on year after year. Our defense budget is perhaps most heavily impacted by the Soviet Union and its potential for aggression than any other element. Your testimony, therefore, will be vital to the actual fabrication of our budget here.

Second, as the Chairman said, with the beginning of the end of the Warsaw Pact the world will focus its attention on NATO. Should, in fact, NATO be continued and, if so, at what funding level? That, in my judgment, is highly dependent on the future of the former nations in the Warsaw Pact and the likelihood that they at any time could become subservient again to the Soviet Union, or be used by the Soviet Union, with or without their consent, as the avenues of approach to engage NATO or allied forces.

Your testimony will be very, very important as we put together our budget, and we thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

Before we proceed, I will enter into the record the prepared statement of Senator Dixon.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have with us today such a distinguished panel consisting of Dr.'s Andre Korbonski, Charles Gati, and James Brown to examine the current trends in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Chairman, I applauded the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, as we knew it, at the height of the Cold War. The Communist/Soviet 40 year economic program precipitated the political crisis which acted as the catalyst for these historic events that, in turn, vindicated our democratic values. I also welcomed the proposed military force reductions in the conventional forces in Europe treaty and the announced formal dissolution of the military bloc to the Warsaw Pact, all of which will combine to allow the United States to significantly reduce its military presence in Europe.

I am concerned, however, about the prospects for significant economic recovery in the Eastern European countries. Additionally, I am concerned by ethnic rivalry and hostility in this region and its potential destabilizing effect on international security. Finally, I am concerned about the prospect of continued Soviet domination in this region. I look forward to exploring these and other issues as we hear the testimony of this distinguished panel on the current trends in Eastern Europe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Brown, we will ask you to lead off.

STATEMENT OF JAMES BROWN, SENIOR CONSULTANT, THE RAND CORPORATION

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If one takes Eastern Europe as a whole—and here I mean what is now referred to as East Central Europe and Southeastern Europe or the Balkans—and if one interprets security in the broadest sense of the word, then to my mind the most important factor in the region bearing on security is the indirect but very important economic factor. This is because it is only, I would argue, on the establishment of a sound economic basis that a viable, stable democracy can be built in the countries concerned. It is on this score that I tend at the moment to be rather gloomy about future prospects in Eastern Europe.

If I may just enumerate some of the reasons or some of the tremendous economic difficulties, which have very far-reaching effects indeed, that Eastern Europe is facing, then this will perhaps give some idea of the degree and the nature of the issue:

First of all, a collapsing economic structure in all the countries concerned;

Second, huge external debt in the case of most countries;

Third, ecological catastrophe in the case of all of them;

Fourth, a decayed social welfare system in all of them;

Fifth, extensive emigration to the West from all these countries of what might be termed the best and the brightest, the ablest, the youngest, often the most resourceful. Many of them want to come to the West either for the purposes of emigration or for extended stays;

Sixth, I would say inadequate Western aid, inadequate in terms of the immensity of the problem which exists there.

A further point for the moment, and for some considerable time to come, the unreliability, expensiveness or inadequacy of Soviet raw material supplies on which the Eastern European States have so crucially depended in the past; and

Finally, of course, and this was quite unexpected, these are, the repercussions of the Gulf war.

It is for these reasons that I would stress so heavily the economic factor in the broad sense of the security equation, and I would think that some of the chances which may have existed, some of the good chances which may have existed perhaps a year ago, of overcoming some of these economic problems have already been lost.

I would like now to come to one of the most evident aspects of Eastern European development over the last year or so, since the overthrow of communism. This is the resurgence of nationalism. This is partly due to past historical grievances and partly to present frustrations and uncertainties. This resurgence and its dangers have been the most evident so far in Southeastern Europe, in the Balkans, as opposed to Eastern Europe.

Here, just again to give some idea of the scale of the subject to which we are referring, I have outlined in my written statement just a few cases of actual or potential instability in Southeastern Europe.

Serbia Croatia;

Serbia and the Albanian community in Kosovo;

Serbia and Albania itself over Kosovo;

Bosnia-Hercegovina with its Moslem Serb and Croat communities;

Macedonia vis-a-vis Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and its own Albanian minority;

Romania-Hungary over Transylvania;

Romania and the Soviet Union over Moldavia;

Bulgaria and Turkey over the Turkish minority in Bulgaria;

Greece and Turkey over Cypress, the Aegean.

These are individual dangers, but looking toward the end of the century, I think the main thing to be feared in Southeastern Europe is the emergence of a Slavic Eastern Orthodox, Muslim confrontation.

I think when one views the strength of the Moslem minorities in various countries in Southeastern Europe, the fact that in Albania itself they constitute between 65 and 70 percent of the entire population, and when one also begins to assess the resurgence of Slavic nationalism in Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and the enmity and the historical hatreds that exist between these two important religious and ethnic factors in the Balkans, then I do fear that, as the years go on, before the end of this century, there is every danger of a serious confrontation.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Brown, if I could ask you one question there. How many countries and which ones would this pertain to?

Mr. BROWN. This would pertain to Yugoslavia. It would pertain to Bulgaria. It would pertain, of course, to Albania. It would pertain to a certain extent to Greece, where there are up to 200,000 Greek citizens of Turkish origin in the northeastern parts of Turkey. It would pertain also to Turkey itself.

I think the dangers here are a resurgence of Islamic nationalism in Turkey itself, some degree of internal disintegration in Turkey, of Turkish external frustrations over not being accepted into the European Community, and over disappointment regarding their reward for their services in the Gulf war. For all these reasons, I

think the danger is developing of a very frustrated nationalistic Turkey.

What one faces here regarding Turkey is a turning inward, a turning away from the West, a repudiation of the Ataturk tradition, if you like, of westernization and secularization. This, I think, especially in view of the instability in the Balkans, generally is one of the big dangers in the area.

I will now go on to talk about the immediate and the shorter-term dangers to Eastern Central Europe, as opposed to Southeastern Europe, arising from the weakness, even disintegration, of the Soviet Union.

To my mind, the longer term dangers to the East Central European States from the Soviet Union come from the growing and ongoing weaknesses of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the Soviet Union. I have outlined a few of the aspects of it in my written testimony.

First, the threats to East Central European security arising from instability or disorder in the western parts of the Soviet Union, especially the Ukraine, could affect four different Eastern European countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania.

Second, there is the economic dimension of Soviet disintegration which I have talked about earlier: the growing undependability and inadequacy of Soviet supplies of crucial energy and raw material supplies to Eastern Europe.

Third, there are the transnational ethnic problems, crossing the borders between East Central Europe and the Soviet Union, which could become inflamed.

Fourth—and I think this may turn out to be the most serious danger of all—there is the danger of an avalanche of emigration from the Soviet Union through Eastern Europe toward Germany. This is very much talked about in Eastern Europe now. It is also very much talked about in Germany too——

Chairman NUNN. Could you repeat that last point? I did not get it.

Mr. BROWN. The fourth aspect of the threat to the East Central European States from the Soviet Union concerns the specter of the avalanche of emigration from the U.S.S.R. through Eastern Europe toward the West. This has been talked about and feared in all the East Central European States now and is being talked about and very much feared in reunited Germany.

I think perhaps some of the estimates that are being made of the potential for emigration from the Soviet Union may be overdramatized, but I think that this fear is very much there, and I think that fear, the strength of it, is very much a political factor.

I will stop there, Mr. Chairman, if I may, and answer any questions that might crop up later.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY J.F. (JIM) BROWN

NOTES ON EASTERN EUROPE'S [1] SITUATION AND PROSPECTS

1. *Eastern Europe in the Current International Framework:*

In 1989—the year of the revolutions—Eastern Europe was at the center of world attention. Just 2 years later it is back on the periphery. It has been marginalized by:

(a) The disintegration of the Soviet Union
(b) The reunification of Germany
(c) The Gulf crisis

To these must be added a growing Western sense of disappointment over what is perceived as the lack of economic and political progress in the East European countries themselves.

2. *East European Progress So Far*

Compared with, say, the beginning of 1989, the progress in Eastern Europe has, everywhere, been swift and remarkable. Communist governments have been replaced by democratic governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, by a post-communist-quasi democratic government in Romania, and a mostly democratic government in Bulgaria. Albania is moving toward free elections. In Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia are democratic and the other republics are all in a post-communist phase—some further along the road toward democracy than others.

That is a remarkable transformation. But we must now stop thinking of developments in relation to the immediate past and start thinking about them in terms of the future. Here there is cause for concern.

3. *The Essential Condition for Stable Democracies*

This is a sound economic basis. It can be achieved by moving as quickly as possible away from state socialism toward a market economy. In Eastern Europe almost everybody is agreed on this, but there are two schools of thought about the most effective way:

(a) By "shock therapy": price liberalization, currency convertibility, and "privatization," as quickly as possible. The social consequences of this, while not ignored, should in no way be allowed to delay implementation of the program.

(b) "Gradualism": moving toward the same goals but more slowly in view of the social consequences. If this social aspect is not recognized, the resulting instability could ruin prospects both for a viable economy and a stable democracy.

"Shock therapy" is the current policy in:

(1) Poland, where it is associated with the name of the minister, Leszek Balcerowicz.

(2) Czechoslovakia, where finance minister Vaclav Klaus is its strongest champion. President Havel and several other senior politicians are known to lean more towards "gradualism".

(3) Yugoslavia, where the federal premier Ante Markovic has tried to implement a draconian program. Bud the Yugoslav federal government is so weak that its programs are no longer of any consequence.

"Gradualism" is the policy at present favored in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary—largely through fear of the social consequences of "shock therapy".

4. *Overcoming the Economic Problem*

"Shock therapy" is much more socially painful (unemployment, high prices, etc.) than "gradualism." But both create social problems that can best be mitigated by the existence of a broad political and social consensus that can cushion the economic progress against social and economic discontent. The optimal sequence, therefore, should be:

"A": Consensus. This facilitates:
"B": Economic transformation. This then forms the basis for:
"C": Strong political institutions and viable democracy

Points "A" and "C" are far from being the same. Whereas "C" implies the airing, even the exploitation, of political differences, "A" means the temporary sinking of differences to secure an objective—in this case "B". "C" could mean that the economic transformation, or its painful social consequences, becomes a political football which could spoil the transformation's chances of success. Ideally, therefore, "C"

[1] "Eastern Europe" is here used as a shorthand term—inaccurate but convenient—for Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

should not precede, but follow, "B". Once "B" is achieved then "C" can take over from "A".

This sequence is necessary for two reasons:

(1) Political democracy, always very frail in Eastern Europe (except in the Czech Lands), needs very careful nurturing. It cannot be built on will and enthusiasm alone.

(2) The economic situation in Eastern Europe is turning out to be much worse than was ever anticipated. There is already talk about a new Latin America, and about the Oder-Neisse river becoming Europe's Rio Grande. The shorter- and longer-term problems are:

(a) A collapsing economic structure
(b) Massive external debt in the case of most countries
(c) Ecological catastrophe
(d) A decayed social welfare system
(e) Massive emigration of the "best and the brightest"
(f) Inadequate western aid
(g) Unreliability, expensiveness, or inadequacy, of Soviet raw material supplies and markets
(h) The Gulf war

The combination, therefore, of lack of political culture and economic disaster made it so important for the East European countries to make the right, sequential, progress to economic stability and then political democracy. But the opportunities for this may already have been discarded.

Poland up to the beginning of 1990 seemed to have the prerequisites for success:

(a) a unified country
(b) the Solidarity "myth"
(c) a strong consensus composed of the political elite; Walesa and the workers; the Catholic church; the man in Rome
(d) a bold "shock therapy" economic transformation plan

But Walesa deliberately broke up the consensus, in the name of "political pluralism" and "democracy." After a divisive election he is now president and, ironically, is trying hard to restore the consensus he broke.

Czechoslovakia now looks like going generally the same way. The consensus represented by Civic Forum is breaking down just as the economic transformation is getting under way. In Hungary there are encouraging signs of a stable parliamentary system but economic transformation has hardly started and the parliamentary system could seriously weaken under the strain when it does. In Bulgaria a largely technocratic, "above-party" coalition is trying to stave off economic collapse, but the political differences there are very deep-seated. In Romania there is no consensus at all.

5. *The Resurgence of Nationalism*

Nationalism proved too much for communism. It could prove the same for both internal democracy in some countries and international relations throughout the region.

Nationalism already threatens the integrity of Czechoslovakia and has all but destroyed the integrity of Yugoslavia. It poisons relations inside states and between states—inside Romania, for example, and between Romania and Hungary. In situations of political weakness and economic destitution, it perverts democracy by abusing the freedom democracy bestows. And in Eastern Europe the large number of historical national grievances that can never be satisfactorily redressed threaten serious instability in the future.

These dangers are much more apparent in south-eastern Europe (the "Balkans") than in east-central Europe. The following are the main actual or potential "nationalistic flash points" in south-eastern Europe:

(a) Serbia-Croatia
(b) Serbia and the Albanian community in Kosovo
(c) Serbia and Albania over Kosovo
(d) Bosnia-Hercegovina, with its Muslim, Serb, and Croat communities
(e) Macedonia, vis a vis Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and its own Albanian minority
(f) Romania-Hungary over Transylvania
(g) Romania-Moldavia
(h) Bulgaria-Turkey over the Turkish minority
(i) Greece-Turkey over Cyprus, the Aegean and, in this context, over the Turkish minority in Greek Thrace.

Broadly speaking, what the nationalist antagonisms in the Balkans could eventually lead to—and this is indeed a worst case scenario—is a broad adversarial con-

frontation between Orthodox Christian Slavs, on the one side, and Muslims, on the other. (The Orthodox Slavs would consist of Serbs, Bulgarians, and Macedonians, with perhaps the non-Slav but Orthodox Greeks thrown in.) The Muslims would be from Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Greek Thrace. And, backing the Balkan Muslims, could be Turkey (this would certainly bring the Greeks into the confrontation).

This scenario may look very improbable at the moment. It is hard, for example, to see a Serb-Macedonian-Bulgarian coalition, because of their traditional mutual hatreds. Greeks have despised all Slavs, and particularly dislike Macedonian pretensions. As for Turkey, the Ataturk legacy inhibits any re-entry into the Balkans. But this legacy is under strong pressure in Turkey, and in the case of any perceived oppression of Muslims by Slavs in the Balkans, it would be hard to keep Turkey out.

6. *The Soviet Danger to East-Central Europe*

The insecurity to the states of East Central Europe is less from within, more from without—from the Soviet Union. There are two types of danger—one is possible, but not likely; the second is comprehensive and almost certain.

(1) The first would result from an even sharper change of Soviet policy than has happened so far in the last few months, perhaps resulting from a military and/or hard line coup. Any new hard-line government in Moscow might try to reassert some influence over the East-European states involving restrictions in their freedom of action. (Perhaps "Finlandization" in the old sense, or worse). Obviously, Vilnius has increased fears of this, especially in Poland, which is also plagued by the Soviet troop withdrawal problem.

(2) The second danger would result, not from any show of strength on the Soviets part, but from further displays of weakness and evidence of disintegration:

(a) Threats to security arising from instability or disorder in the western parts of the Soviet Union, especially resulting from Ukrainian aspirations for independence. This would affect Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. (Romania could, in any case, be brought into confrontation with the Soviets over Moldavia.)

(b) The economic dimension. Either deliberately or through disorder, vital Soviet energy and raw material supplies for Eastern Europe could be affected. (In any case, the days of subsidized Soviet supplies to Eastern Europe are over.)

(c) Ethnic and national issues could become inflamed: Poles in Lithuania, in the Ukraine, and in White Russia; Hungarians in the Ukraine; Romanians in Moldavia.

(d) The threat of an "avalanche of emigration" from the Soviet Union. This is causing great fear in Eastern Europe (it is being reckoned, for example, that just a quarter of a million Soviet immigrants could wreck the Polish economy) and in Germany, where there are fears of an attempted influx of "millions" of Soviet migrants.

7. *The Stake and Role of the West*

Up to the end of the 1980s, Europe could conveniently be divided into three parts: Western Europe; Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union. This division is no longer appropriate. The line between Western and Eastern Europe is becoming, at least politically and in security matters, much harder to draw, as is the line between Eastern Europe and the Western parts of the Soviet Union. If the United States is concerned about "Europe," therefore, it has to be concerned about all three. In "Eastern Europe" the West is interested in promoting:

(a) stable, democratic governments

(b) peaceful international relations

It can best achieve these goals by:

(1) Increasing the volume of its economic help.

(2) Trying, mainly with economic aid, to mitigate the threat of massive migration from the Soviet Union.

(3) Allaying East European fears (valid, as opposed to paranoid) of the Soviet Union, by allowing informal ties with NATO until the distant day that some European security order can be established.

(4) Accepting or anticipating the disintegration of Yugoslavia, in its present form, by establishing legations, at the ministerial level (these two rankings should be revived), in each of the present republic capitals. Embassies in Belgrade should eventually be downgraded to the legation level.

(5) The European Community, especially Germany and Italy, assuming the major stabilizing role in the Balkans.

(6) The United States, especially with its direct influence over Turkey and Greece, seeking to stabilize the situation in both the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, and to prevent any instability there spreading to the Middle East. (Balkan instability could become just the Western-most link in a chain of instability extending not only to the Middle East but also the Caucasus and beyond).

Chairman NUNN. I can give you my question to think about. When we come back to you I would like to see what you think we ought to do about all of those potential problems if we do have a role to play, which I believe we do. Dr. Korbonski.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANDRZEJ KORBONSKI, PROFESSOR POLITICAL SCIENCE, UCLA

Dr. KORBONSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Perhaps I ought to preface my remarks by indicating that even though periodically I shall refer to East Central Europe, my comments will primarily pertain to three countries, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, three countries which I feel have essentially completed or at least have accomplished much more in terms of transition from the Communist system than, for example, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania and some of the Republics of Yugoslavia.

The point I would like to make above all is that the task facing the new ruling elites of East Central Europe is, in my opinion at least, to avoid repeating conditions that in a sense caused the downfall of communism. I think that in many respects these new leaders are facing problems that their predecessors, leaders of the Communist Party, simply could not cope with and were eventually forced out.

What do I mean by that? Well, I would say, first of all, the major task facing the new leaders is to close the gap between the rulers and the ruled. I would hypothesize that a major reason for the collapse of communism was the inability of the Communist Party to establish and to maintain what in fact, the Marxist/Leninist jargon refers to as links with the masses. There was a thin layer at the very top and essentially 90 to 95 percent of the population was simply outside politics, had no access, could not participate, could not articulate their interests and their demands.

So this, I would say, is priority number one and here I agree with my friend and colleague, Jim Brown. It is not going to be easy because, for example, if you look at the situation in some of these countries, what struck me—and I consider myself to be an observer of the Eastern European scene for the past 30 to 35 years—has been a very low election turnout.

I assumed, for example, that given the chance to participate in free elections there would be an overwhelming participation, 80 percent, 85 percent, rather than 60 percent. To me, it indicates, a tremendous distrust of politics. Something will have to be done to reestablish confidence. How do you reestablish credibility of the system if, let us say, given the freedom to participate, to express one's political preferences, 40 percent of the electorate are staying away? In Hungary, it was even more and I think my colleague probably will confirm it.

So this worries me, and it seems to me the new leaders will have to do something. There is a tremendous proliferation of political parties and interest groups. I can understand that after decades and decades of a single-party rule all of a sudden the bottom fell out and you have 50, 60, 70, 100 political parties. But that is not good because, again, I think all this leads to is instability, difficulty

in creating viable coalitions that could attend to a myriad of problems, economic, social, and so on and so forth.

What worries me is that there is this clear aversion to politics, and it seems to me that in the next several years something will have to be done to re-build political life. I can understand that. For 40 years there was no politics. There was the Communist Party rule to the exclusion of what we understand to be politics. That will have to be changed.

On economics, very briefly, I think there is now a pretty universal agreement that capitalism and a competitive free market system is the answer. The problem is how to get there. Here again, as I pointed out in my statement, one way is to adopt a sink or swim, a plunge, or a shock treatment, which so far only Poland and Czechoslovakia adopted. Other countries, including the Soviet Union obviously, are worried and concerned about this and they prefer an incremental, gradual, step by step approach.

I must say that I do admire the two countries for taking the bull by the horn and deciding that after, decades and decades of tinkering, of cosmetic changes here and there, they decided the only way to do it is to destroy 40 years of communism and ballast with a stroke of a pen and try to introduce a free market system.

Of course, it is going to be painful. It is painful, but at the same time it seems to me that some very remarkable successes have been scored. Inflation has been brought down. A positive balance of payments has been established. Budget deficits have been essentially eliminated. Subsidies are gone and even local currencies are becoming internally convertible.

Sure, there has been some unemployment. Inflation has not been fully eliminated. But, for example, the unemployment which was to a large extent caused by the decline in the output of the state sector is being absorbed by the private sector, which has been growing by leaps and bounds in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Still, the problem is how long this will continue. I notice, for example, that in my country of birth there is a danger of a major confrontation between the workers who so far have had to carry the burden of elimination of subsidies, inflation, unemployment and so on, and the government which, I guess, prodded by IMF and the World Bank is trying consequently to maintain the radically new system.

Another thing which worries me and which is something to which Jim Brown alluded is what I call the conflicts within and among major social segments, over and above the ethnic national conflicts. I think this has been pretty well illustrated, but I worry again about what may be called a class conflict or a societal conflict, rich against poor, workers against peasants, educated versus uneducated.

One thing the communist system has done was at least to maintain a kind of a quasi-welfare State with a safety net for employment, free education, medical care and so on and so forth. This is now going to change, and it seems to me it is not going to be done easily because while there may have been a hatred of communism, some of these gains are still cherished, and if from now on you have to pay for your drugs or you have to pay for your kid's education, if all that urban transport will cost the Hungarians or the

Czechs what it costs Londoners or New Yorkers, that is not going to be easy.

It seems to me, again, it will require a very skillful, smart kind of a leadership to overcome these consequences of 40 years of degradation, mismanagement, inefficiency and destruction.

Now I will not talk about so much the attitude of the Soviet Union on the one hand and Western Europe, including the United States, on the other. I hope that my colleague, Charles Gati, will discuss it. At some point, though, I would like to have a chance to say something.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Korbonski follows:]

AFTER A FALL AND WINTER OF DISCONTENT, CAN SPRING BE FAR BEHIND? EAST CENTRAL EUROPE IN FEBRUARY 1991

Andrzej Korbonski

According to all reports, the winter in East Central Europe, at least until the end of February, turned out to be quite mild which proved to be one of the few truly positive aspects of the overall situation in the region. In just about every other respect, the seven East Central European countries -- Albania; Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia; Hungary; Poland; Romania; and Yugoslavia -- were going through some rough sledding and forced to solve a variety of domestic and external crises. While some of the challenges appeared to be of their own doing, others were rooted in conditions and circumstances well beyond their control.

What follows is a discussion of the various crises and challenges under four broad headings: political; economic; social; and international. It should be clear that these categories are not independent of each other and were chosen simply to facilitate a more systematic analysis. As will be seen below, there is bound to be considerable overlap between them. Our discussion will try to analyze the reaction and response to the crises on the part of the individual countries in the region which may provide an answer to the question whether in the winter of 1991 does it still make sense to treat East Central Europe as a unitary actor on the international scene or whether the time has come to discard that concept and istead treat the former of the Soviet or Communist bloc as actors in their own right. Depending on the answer, the concluding part of this essay will try to sketch out the possible short-run future developments in both the region as a whole as well as in the individual countries.

I. The Political Crisis

The past several months illustrated rather well what may be called the growing pains of democratization of East Central Europe. The process of the systemic transformation of all Communist states in the region, which began in 1989, proceeded at such a fast pace in 1990 that many of the aspects of what may be called the democratic state or institution building were simply ignored. This in itself was not surprising since the principal objective of the various opposition leaders, to the exclusion of nearly all other considerations, was the overthrow and ultimate destruction and eradication of Communism, taking advantage of the policy of benign neglect adopted by the Kremlin.

Once the demise of Communism was accomplished in most of the East Central European states by the end of 1989, the new national leaders became faced with a

plethora of formidable tasks that required immediate attention. Not surprisingly, foremost among them was the problem of legitimizing the new political systems and in the course of 1990, just about every country in the region with the exception of Albania, held either parliamentary or presidential election in order to achieve popular approval of the revolutionary political transformation.

Considering the fact that the last time elections were held in many of these countries was during the interwar period, most of the Western observers expected a very large voter turnout which, however, did not materialize, testifying to a continuing mistrust of politics on the part of the East Central European electorate, not fully recovered from more than 40 years of Communist rule and its insistence on 100% voter participation.

The fact that the nearly total disintegration of the ruling Communist parties was followed almost immediately by a mass proliferation of political parties and interest groups of all hues, did not enhance the credibility of the new system. The result was that not unexpectedly the victory in the parliamentary elections in most of the countries was gained not so much by political parties in the Western sense of the word but by a kind of umbrella or front organizations, representing a broad coalition of smaller parties and groupings, linked together by a mutual hatred of Communism. Once victory was achieved and the Communist support reduced to about ten percent of the electorate, it was only a matter of time before the organizations such as "Solidarity" in Poland or "Citizens Forum" in Czechoslovakia developed deep fissures and cracks that ultimately led to the emergence of Western-style parties along the conventional Right-Left continuum. This is what happened in Warsaw prior to the 1990 presidential elections and in Prague less than a week ago.

In most countries it was the parliamentary elections that attracted most attention since the presidential elections tended, by and large, to be a foregone conclusion and to no one's surprise Vaclav Havel, Ion Iliescu, Arpad Goncz, and Franjo Tudjman were chosen in their respective countries. The only truly exciting race took place in Poland where a totally unknown interloper, Stanislaw Tyminski, succeeded in defeating the favorite, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, in the first round, only to lose to Lech Walesa, the well-known "Solidarity" leader, in the run-off. The Polish experience reaffirmed the view that after decades of Communist rule, an inexperienced and unsophisticated electorate was easily manipulated by Western-style election techniques utilizing symbols, slogans and promises, often at a very low common denominator.

It may be said that at the end of February 1991, the main foundations of future political systems have been laid in most East Central European countries. This

means that we are now able to take a look at the question raised at the outset: one East Central Europe or seven individual states?

The answer in the political context is not entirely clear. On the one hand, all signs suggest that it would not be correct to treat the region as a unitary actor. On the other hand, the record shows that despite the evidence of nationalist revival, the most recent tendency has been for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland increasingly to meet and discuss matters of common interest, thus laying the shape of a future regional alliance. Czechoslovakia and Hungary also joined the so-called Pentagonale group, which also includes Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia. One can speculate that the rapprochement between Budapest, Prague and Warsaw was rooted partly in geography and partly in history, but there is also little doubt that the common experiences of 1989-1990 helped to bring the three countries together.

For reasons beyond the scope of this essay, Bulgaria and Romania at the end of February 1991 represented examples of incomplete transition from Communism: both countries managed to oust their long-time leaders, Nicolae Ceausescu and Todor Zhivkov, but the parliamentary election victory in Bucharest and Sofia was gained by an alliance led by members of the former Communist parties rather than by the anti-Communist opposition. The third Balkan country, Albania, remained largely dormant in 1989 and 1990 but especially the past few weeks witnessed the appearance of demonstrations and riots in Tirana, not unlike those in Leipzig, Prague, Sofia and Timisoara, and if history is to repeat itself, the days of the Ramiz Alia regime may well be numbered.

This brings us to Yugoslavia. The events of the winter of 1990-1991 indicate that after 45 years of uneasy coexistence, trying desperately to preserve its unity, Yugoslavia appears to give up and finds itself on the verge of ultimate disintegration. While Western attention in the late 1980s has been mainly focused on the exciting changes in what used to be known as the "Northern Tier" of WTO -- Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland -- equally important changes have been taking place in several Yugoslav republics. Democratic electoral victories in Croatia and Slovenia, which, in turn, were fiercely opposed by the conservative Communist government of Serbia, practically terminated the Yugoslav Federation. Although the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army may yet try to delay the inevitable collapse, it is generally assumed that the unity of Yugoslavia can no longer be preserved by peaceful means.

To sum up, five months ago, in late September 1990, we could still count eight East Central European countries forming the region. After the absorption of East Germany by the German Federal Republic, there were only seven countries left but it looks like it that the next several months will see the addition of two,

possibly three new countries if the republic of Bosnia decides to follow the path chosen by Croatia and Slovenia.

The "balkanization" of East Central Europe on the ruins of Communist rule was probably inevitable, as it reflected both the revival of nationalism and the parallel strong resentment of Communism. A corrolary to that has been the growing differentiation of national political systems, testifying to the rising importance of national political cultures. While the future implications of this phenomenon will be discussed in the concluding part of this essay, it is clear that this alone makes it almost impossible for us to consider East Central Europe as a unitary political actor and that from now on our attention ought to be increasingly focused on the developments within the individual countries in the region.

II. The Economic Crisis

It is generally agreed that it was a rapid deterioration in the economic situation that was mostly responsible for the political crisis that brought about the downfall of Communism in East Central Europe. It is therefore not surprising that improvement in the economic performance became top priority for the new leaders of the various East Central European states.

At the risk of oversimplifying a complex problem, there was considerable consensus in the region that the most promising economic policy should focus on four main issues: combatting and eliminating inflation; introduction of a competitive free market system; comprehensive privetization of the economy; and improvement in the individual countries' international trade and finance situation. Although there was much agreement on the direction of the economic reforms, there was even more disagreement among the individual countries regarding the methods of implementing the changes. There were basically two possible solution of the economic dilemma facing the region: the "sink or swim" or shock treatment method and a more incremental, gradual and balanced approach.

In 1990, the only country that took the plunge was Poland, which on January 1, 1990, with a stroke of a pen, got rid of the 40 year ballast of Communist economic rules and regulations, by abolishing such things as price and wage control, subsidies and budget deficits, and restrictions on foreign trade, and establishing an internal convertibility of the Polish zloty. Historically, Poland has lagged considerably behind Czechoslovakia and Hungary in economic reform making and the government's decision to cut the Gordian knot of previous delays and indecisions was partly due to its being the first legitimate non-Communist regime in the area, and partly because of its desire to make up for the time lost in the past.

After the first year, the overall verdict on the Polish experiment remains somewhat mixed. On the one hand, there is little doubt that several of the goals of the reforms have been reached: inflation has been reduced to manageable proportion; budget deficits and purchasing power overhangs have been essentially eliminated; currency convertibility has been successfully maintained throughout 1990 and early 1991; and for the first time in years Poland managed to accumulate a sizeable hard currency surplus on its balance of payments. To be sure, the success was substantially offset by a large increase in unemployment, a distressing decline in industrial production and a failure to expand farm output. Still, on balance, the model of a rapid and radical economic transformation appeared to be welcomed by the Polish masses, long deprived of basic economic amenities.

The Polish experiment was watched with considerable interest by its neighbors, primarily Czechoslovakia and Hungary, both of them torn by a dilemma. Hungary, in particular, the regional leader in economic reform making since 1968, understood very well the benefits of a competitive free market mechanism. Of all the countries in the region, Czechoslovakia prior to the Communist takeover has had the only experience as an advanced industrial country and had its own, albeit small, capitalist class. Yet, in the final analysis, neither Budapest nor Prague found enough courage to emulate the Polish example. It may be speculated that despite their impressive election victories over the Communists, the respective Czechoslovak and Hungarian leaders did not feel secure enough to risk an adverse mass reaction to rising consumer goods prices and growing unemployment which, indeed, did occur in Poland as a result of the reforms. Ultimately, Czechoslovakia which in 1990 appeared to be in a better economic shape than most of the region, introduced Polish-like changes in its economy in January 1991.

The other countries in the region still preferred to tinker with their economies rather than initiate radical reforms. The most surprising among them was Hungary, which for 20 years prior to 1989 prided itself to be the most reform-minded state in the former Soviet bloc. Hungary's reluctance to follow the example of Poland and Czechoslovakia is not easily understood. It is possible that its leadership was under less pressure than that of the other countries because of sizeable Western economic aid and credit which partly alleviated the need for radical reforms. It is also possible that the example of the former German Democratic Republic experiencing considerable economic hardship in the wake of its incorporation into West Germany, served as a deterrent to the full and rapid acceptance of the capitalist model. However, keeping in mind Hungary's past record, its high per capita hard currency debt, and its dependence on foreign trade, its aversion to further reforms is puzzling.

While Hungary lagged behind in marketization, it led the pack in privatization and especially in attracting Western capital. As will be shown below, it also assumed the leadership in the drive to dissolve CMEA, to settle the region's trade with the USSR in dollars, and to seek rapprochement with the European Economic Community.

There is no doubt that the period of 18 months or so since the end of the Communist upheaval in the region, is simply not long enough to derive an objective and informed judgment of the success or failure of the post-Communist economic experiments. As always, there are two sides to the story. On the one hand, for the first time in decades, in several countries the supply of consumer goods either exceeds or balances the demand, with the result that the traditional long lines in front of meat and other food stores have virtually disappeared in most of the East Central European cities, with the possible exception of Bulgaria and Romania. There has also been a marked increase in the output of the private sector which absorbed large numbers of workers released by the declining state sector. Finally, there has been a significant rise in the degree of popular optimism and confidence in the ability of the new economic system to break out of the vicious circle of shortages and poverty, and to make up for the decades of Communist inefficiency, degradation and neglect.

However, the other side of the ledger appeared less inspiring. The removal of subsidies and the rise in prices forced many state enterprises to close down, swelling the ranks of the unemployed. The rate of inflation, although brought down from its astronomical heights in Yugoslavia and Poland, was still too high, especially when contrasted with household incomes which continued declining in real terms. While some countries, notably Poland, achieved remarkable success on their balance of payments accounts, this was much less due to their ability to export and to penetrate Western markets, and much more so to a drastic curtailment of their imports to the detriment of their economies.

On top of that, there was still the Damocles sword in the shape of the hard currency debt which affected all the countries in the region, with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia and Romania: the former borrowed relatively little in the expansive 1970s and one of the last tasks performed by Nicolae Ceausescu, prior to his demise in 1989, was to repay Romania's debt to the West, while bringing his country to economic ruin. While the debt issue will be discussed briefly in the concluding section, at this point it suffices to say that in addition to the purely economic burden of repayment, the existence of the debt is extracting a rather heavy psychological toll which has already negatively affected the entire relationship

between the new democracies of East Central Europe and their creditors in the West.

III. The Social Crisis

As it was suggested at the outset, the four analytical categories utilized in this essay are not mutually exclusive but tend to overlap with each other. It is therefore not surprising that each of the two crises or challenges discussed above either contributed to, or resulted in, what may be called a social or human crisis or challenge in the region. The latter can be divided in turn into three sub-categories, which, for a lack of a better word, I shall call, first, ethnic or national; second, class; and third, societal.

(a) The Ethnic or National Crisis. As is well known, throughout its history, East Central Europe represented a true mosaic of peoples, races, and national, ethnic and religious groupings, few if any of them living in peace and harmony. The record shows that the most recent effort to put some order and sense into the existing anarchy -- the Versailles Treaty of 1919 -- provided only a brief temporary relief and on the eve of World War II the cauldron was boiling again. The Communists, who seized power in East Central Europe in the postwar period, were themselves mostly members of national or ethnic minorities, and hence well aware of the strong centrifugal tendencies present in the region as a whole as well as in the individual states, and thus from the very beginning of their rule made nationalism their chief enemy and condemned all expressions of racial and ethnic prejudice. Although this seemingly strict policy began to show cracks soon after the death of Stalin in 1953, with some exceptions it managed to survive relatively unscathed until the early 1980s. The end of the Communist rule removed all the remaining obstacles to the revival of national and ethnic-racial chauvinism which soon emerged in nearly all the countries in the region.

Since the various cases of nationalist tensions and clashes are well known and have been described in Western media, there is no need to go over them in great detail. The most visible example of nationalist strife has been Yugoslavia which, as suggested earlier, in February 1991 found itself on the verge of national disintegration. In the final analysis, it is surprising that this artificial creation, born in the wake of World War II, managed to stay united for more than 70 years, thanks mostly to the successive royalist and Communist dictatorships. It took democratic victories in several of the republics finally to put an end to the largely fictitious unity of South Slave.

Yugoslavia was hardly the sole example of ethnic tensions in the Balkans. Romania has long been criticised for its treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and the exodus of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria provided another testimony

to the existence of sharp national conflicts in that country. Most recently, the movement of Greeks from Albania to Greece was still another example of the democratic changes contributing to another Völkerwanderung in East Central Europe.

Only two countries in the region -- Hungary and Poland -- emerged ethnically homogeneous from World War II, yet Hungary has been increasingly concerned with the discriminatory treatment of its nationals in Czechoslovakia and Romania. While the Hungarian-Romanian animosity has been well documented, much less has been known about the half a million or so Hungarians in the republic of Slovakia. Again, it was the recent rise in Slovak nationalism, accompanied by demands for additional autonomy within the Czecho-Slovak Federation, that has provided new impetus for anti-Hungarian sentiments among the Slovaks, themselves believing to be victims of Czech discrimination.

Opening the vent to nationalist pressure resulted also in the rise of two other phenomena: the growing importance of the Roman Catholic church and the revival of anti-Semitism, both of which often misunderstood in the West. Insofar as the Catholic church was concerned, its principal target was Poland, long before the election of the Polish pope. This in itself was not surprising since next to Ireland, Italy and Spain, Poland has been the most Catholic country in the world. The Polish church has always claimed to have been the chief bastion of anti-Communist opposition in Poland and today its status in the country has increased considerably. As a result it has become the leader in championing anti-abortion legislation and in making Catholic religion a required subject in public schools, both highly charged political issues. Although the behavior of the church in Poland may be an extreme case, it is not likely to differ greatly from the attitude of the Catholic church in Hungary or Croatia.

The problem of anti-Semitism in East Central Europe is both simple and complicated. No one would deny its existence in such countries as Hungary, Poland and Romania where it emerged particularly strongly during recent parliamentary elections. What can and should be argued is the widespread belief that the intensity of anti-Semitism in the region is much higher than in Western Europe, and particularly in France and Germany. The most vicious aspect of anti-Semitism in East Central Europe is the fact that it is present mostly in a country such as Poland where there are hardly any Jews left in the aftermath of the Holocaust.

(b) The Class Conflict. I am prepared to argue that the rapidly emerging class conflict in East Central Europe is also a by-product of the democratic transformation of the region.

The record shows that historically East Central Europe represented one of the most class-ridden and prejudiced regions in the world. This was principally due to the deep antagonism between the small ruling class composed primarily of aristocracy, landed gentry and haute bourgeoisie, and the peasant masses. The arrival of the Communists meant the destruction of the old order and the existing class structure, and its replacement by another one.

There is no doubt that in the course of the more than 40 years of Communist rule, the historical class antagonisms became largely submerged but not entirely eliminated. The process of vertical social mobility produced a new educated social class of peasant-worker origin which tended to be less class-prejudiced than its predecessors. From a purely economic viewpoint, both the peasants and the blue collar workers benefited relatively more from the Communist system than their white collar counterparts.

Although the workers' relative socio-economic status may have risen, in some countries at least, the workers still felt discriminated against and exploited, and, notably in Poland, beginning in 1956 led the fight first, for more bread, and then for more freedom. The birth of "Solidarity" in 1980 and its ultimate victory nine years later was the logical culmination of the process began by the workers some 35 years earlier. Its most recent crowning achievement was the popular election of the "Solidarity" leader, Lech Walesa, to the presidency of the country in December 1990.

It was Walesa's emergence in 1980 as the first Polish national leader of working class origin that first stirred up the historical class antagonism which many people assumed to be largely eliminated. Still, the next decade or so witnessed a strong mutual effort to bury the old class differences and to maintain a semblance of unity. What finally contributed to the latter's destruction was the official adoption of the competitive free market model which soon resulted in the rich getting richer and poor poorer. The growing income differentiation has already become responsible for a major restructuring of the Polish political scene and the same process is already taking place in Czechoslovakia. Similar changes are bound to occur sooner or later in Hungary and in the rest of the region.

(c) The Societal Crisis. What I call the societal crisis, resulting from the disintegration of the Communist socio-economic system, has affected all the countries in the region, albeit to a different degree. What I have in mind here is the consequences of an actual or imminent disappearance of the Communist welfare state with all its characteristic features.

One of these features has been the security of employment and a parallel

virtual absence of unemployment, which was most likely very highly valued by the industrial working class. Therefore, the growing unemployment has turned out to be a major shock that has greatly affected the psyche of the majority of East Central population and strongly influenced its attitude to the new political leaders. It can be easily shown that the industrial working class has been traditionally lukewarm about economic reforms that threatened to introduce unemployment, remove subsidies and insist on higher productivity. It was the workers who tacitly tended to sabotage the reforms efforts in some countries and hence it is hardly surprising that they were not enthusiastic about radical reform blueprints, even when they were supported by their leaders such as Lech Walesa in Poland. Considerable time is needed for the workers in the region fully to realize that their future lay with the reforms; the problem was that the reformers were in a hurry and could not afford the luxury of granting much time to the workers. Here also was the reason why so many of the East Central European leaders proved most reluctant to adopt the Polish economic model.

What was true for the security of employment, applied with equal force to such Communist secret cows as heavily subsidized prices of foodstuffs and other consumer goods; low housing rents; and practically free public health and education services; urban transport and summer vacations, all of which were bound, sooner or later, to be put largely on a pay-as-you-go basis. Here again, it was the lower income groups that were the main beneficiaries of the Communist largesse and the withdrawal or reduction of the above privileges was bound to affect the political attitudes of the masses against their new rulers.

While it was the workers that were most badly hit by the new or contemplated reforms, other segments of East Central European societies were also affected by the socio-political transformation. One of them were the members of the former ruling Communist parties, most of whom declined to join their party's successors, the various Social Democratic Parties. While some of them lost their jobs, others tried to hang on, taking advantage of their past experience and organizing the so-called nomenklatura companies under the banner of privatization. The other social group, which felt badly neglected by the new rulers were the peasants, many of whom felt hostile to the industrial working class.

Although it may be too early to view the above developments as auguring a major societal crisis, there is little doubt that the inevitable psychological shock, combined with growing class and national-ethnic antagonisms, was bound to make life much harder for the new leaders, bent upon rapid democratization and economic modernization of their respective countries.

IV. The International Challenges.

The region's international challenges will be discussed under three separate headings: relations with the Soviet Union; the policy toward Western Europe; and the relations between East Central Europe and the United States.

(a) Relations with the Soviet Union. An era in the region's relations with the USSR will have come to an end on February 25, when the leaders of the remaining six member states will meet in Budapest to initiate the process of dissolution of the two key instruments of Soviet control over the region: the Warsaw Treaty (WT), established in 1955, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) created in 1949.

While the details of the final agreement are not known as of the time of this writing, it is assumed that at least the military component of the Warsaw alliance will be dissolved, leaving only some of the political structures still in place. Even less is known about the future of CMEA. Be it as it may, the symbolic importance of the meeting cannot be underestimated and unless last minute obstacles prevent the Budapest meeting from being held, the two pillars of lengthy Soviet hegemony over East Central Europe are about to be dismantled.

If, indeed, the Budapest meeting will result in the dissolution of the military component of WTO, it will probably be none too soon for several of the alliance members, increasingly concerned about the internal developments within the Soviet Union. For a long time the East Central European countries paid little if any attention to the domestic changes in the USSR, their own interest being mainly focused on improving relations with the West. Many of them took Mikhail Gorbachev and perestroika for granted: they accepted the Kremlin's new thinking on East Central Europe with gratitude and they warmly welcomed Moscow's benign neglect of Communism's downfall in the region, followed by its agreement to German unification and its promise to withdraw forces from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland. All this was viewed as inaugurating a new era in the East Central European-Soviet relations.

However,this rosy picture soon became clouded and the current state of affairs is no longer viewed with much optimism, which has given way to a growing belief that the honeymoon with Moscow, which stretched over the past couple of years, is about over. The reasons behind the new perception include the rising conviction that Gorbachev, the friend of the region, has de facto become a captive of a conservative unholy alliance, composed of the military, KGB and conservative apparat, essentially hostile to the recent emancipation of East Central Europe. There were several corrolaries to that: first, the fear that the obvious Soviet attempts at

holding desperately to the crumbling empire, as illustrated by the recent violent encounters in Lithuania and Latvia, may eventually spill over to the neighboring countries. Secondly, the return to power in the Kremlin of the conservative coalition may spell either the end or a major delay in the evacuation of Soviet forces from the region, thus escalating tension in the area. Finally, the progressive economic deterioration in the Soviet Union may ultimately lead to a civil war, fueled also by the rising national antagonisms, and result in a mass exodus of Soviet citizens westward, across the East Central European frontiers.

Currently, the most immediate and controversial issue concerns Soviet troop withdrawal, which affects primarily Poland. While most of the Soviet forces stationed in Czechoslovakia and Hungary have already been withdrawn on the basis of bilateral treaties signed in 1990, no such agreement has yet been signed between Moscow and Warsaw, despite Polish pressure to do so.

To some extent, the existing impasse is Poland's own fault, compounded also by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's erratic behavior in 1990. During the complex negotiations leading to the "Four Plus Two" conference which was to settle the future of united Germany, in which Poland was vitally interested, Kohl engaged in several tactical delaying maneuvers, intended to keep Poland away from the conference table because of the sensitive nature of the Polish-German frontier. At some point, giving in to growing frustration over Germany's behavior, Poland's Prime Minister Mazowiecki alluded to the possibility of the Soviet troops remaining in Western Poland "for defensive purposes."

Whether this error contributed greatly to the Soviet reluctance to withdraw its forces from Poland is impossible to say. It is clear, however, that the recent pronouncements by the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces in Poland, tying the timetable of evacuation to the timetable of troop withdrawal from former East Germany, strongly suggests a stiffening of the Soviet posture. Not surprisingly, Poland retaliated by raising the possibility of disavowing the 1956 Polish-Soviet treaty, regulating the status of Soviet forces on Polish territory.

The deterioration in the Polish-Soviet relations should have been expected if only as a result of the growing attacks by the Soviet conservatives on those members of the Kremlin's ruling oligarchy supposedly responsible for the "sellout of Eastern Europe." The resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze, generally recognized as a supporter of East Central Europe's emancipation, was a major victory for the hardliners in the Supreme Soviet, clearly opposed to the dissolution of Soviet empire in the region. The expressions of support for Baltic national aspirations, emanating mostly from Prague and somewhat less so from Budapest and Warsaw, did

not help matters and in February 1991 it was abundantly clear to everyone that the relations between East Central Europe and the Soviet Union suffered a major setback, which, hopefully, can be repaired.

(b) Relations with Western Europe. Space limitation does not allow a lengthy discussion of the relationship between East Central and Western Europe. It may be argued, however, that even prior to the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis, the initially highly promising relationship was put largely on hold.

Among the reasons for the latter was a belief, held by both sides, that the early expectations of a much closer political and economic relationship were premature and that upon closer look, both the West and East Europeans concluded that a much closer rapprochement between the two parts of Europe will have to wait. The cooling off of the initial ardor came from Western Europe, and especially from Germany and France. Although Germany may have initially entertained some ideas about providing major economic aid to East Central Europe and was even talking about a new "Marshall Plan" for the region, the unexpectedly high cost of integrating former German Democratic Republic into a new Grossdeutschland, threw a damper on the earliar plans. Faced with rapidly diminishing resources, the Federal Republic chose to provide economic support for the Soviet Union, which, after all, was allowed to station 340 thousand Soviet soldiers, not counting their families and civilian employees, on German territory until 1994.

It appeared that France played an even more devious role vis-à-vis East Central Europe. Chagrined over being essentially ignored in the process of German unification, France decided initially to play a major part in the former Soviet bloc, as illustrated by its insistence on dominating the newly formed Bank for European Reconstruction and Development. However, it soon became clear to Paris that the sheer cost of restoring the East Central European economies to the level of Western Europe was simply too staggering and in recent months France limited its support for the region to verbal encouragements of closer economic cooperation on the ruins of CMEA.

Another factor, responsible for the change in West European attitudes, was the growing fear of mass invasion of people from the Soviet Union, resulting from the threat of a civil war, mass famine, or combination of both. Although East Central Europe was viewed as a first line of defense, West European leaders knew only too well that the ultimate goal of the millions of Soviet refugees would be Paris, Berlin or Rome. In light of the sheer magnitude of this threat, West European preoccupation with it at the expense of East Central Europe, is hardly surprising.

West Europe's changing attitude was well understood by the East Central European leaders who quickly realized that they could not count upon a massive injection of economic aid from the West. The early enthusiastic drive to apply for membership in the European Economic Community or the Council of Europe, was replaced by a much more realistic appraisal of the existing dichotomy between the two parts of the European continent. Although the East Central European countries remain strongly interested in economic aid from Western Europe, they understand that they will have to wait for the end of the Gulf war but that even then such problems as the economic reconstruction of Iraq and Kuwait may take precedence over helping the poor cousins in the East. One visible sign of growing disappointment with Western Europe and the United States has been an effort to seek better relations with the Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

(c) The Relations with the United States. The relations between East Central Europe and the United States in early 1991 can be described as "business as usual" or "more of the same." This is not really surprising in light of the experience of the entire post-World War II period.

Very briefly, the United States played a key role in the liberation of East Central Europe in the second half of the 1980s and the contribution of both the Reagan and Bush administrations to the Communist downfall in the region, has been widely recognized in both East and West. However, once President Bush and Secretary of State Baker paid their obligatory visits to several East Central European capitals in 1989 and 1990, the region was put again on the back burner.

There were good reasons for that. To begin with, as stated with considerable regularity by authorities in this particular field, the national interest of the United States was historically marginally affected by East Central European considerations, in contrast to the attention paid to the Soviet Union. Having witnessed the disappearance of Soviet hegemony over the region, there was really no good reason for Washington to maintain its presence in the area. Economically, the United States had few if any resources that could be allocated to help East Central Europe, especially in the face of the savings and loan crisis and the Middle East war.

I am prepared to argue that after being initially disappointed with American indifference, the new East Central European leaders understood the United States predicament the same way they understood the changed attitude of Western Europe. In contrast to their Communist predecessors, the new ruling elite in the region is much better educated, frequently in the West, and much more sophisticated

about Western policies and intentions. One of their jobs is now to educate their citizenry about the new world order which, at least for the time being, does not seem to include a "common European home or house," so dear to the ousted Communist leaders.

V. The Future.

The most immediate task facing the new East Central European leaders is to maintain political stability in the region as a whole as well as in their individual countries.

This may be easier said than done, if only because of the continuing difficult economic situation. Unless the new economic system, emphasizing the competitive free market and private ownership, begins soon to yield visible returns, the possibility of mass strikes and riots which, among others, brought down the Communist regimes in several countries, cannot simply be ignored. Already one begins to encounter in the region statements to the effect that "in the past we had few democrats but many jobs, now everyone is a democrat but jobs have gotten scarce." The implication of the above for the future of the democratic order is clear. The failure of the existing parliamentary democracies significantly to improve the economic situation of the masses, may end up in a savior of the country appearing on a white horse, leading the striking workers in the name of getting rid of parliamentary anarchy. The resemblance of this, admittedly, worst case scenario to the various interwar military-authoritarian regimes in the region is too close for comfort.

As suggested above, one way of helping East Central Europe would be to provide significant amounts of Western economic aid. This is clearly not in the cards, certainly not in the immediate future. However, there is an alternative option which could prove most helpful, even though it may prove to be just as difficult to obtain as a new "Marshall Aid." I have in mind here the Western agreement to cancel the hard currency debt owed by the region to banks and governments of Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. Controversial as it may be, the cancellation of the debt would be both much cheaper for the Western creditors who have already collected billions of dollars in interest payments, and much helpful for the East Central European debtors who could then divert their hard earned dollars and marks to the purchase of necessary inputs from the West. It may be assumed that the new leaders learned their

lessons from the credit disaster of the 1970s and that this time they would utilize the hard currency balances to the true benefit of their economies. I strongly believe that this initiative, however controversial and risky, is certainly worth trying.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Doctor, very much. Dr. Gati.

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES GATI, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNION COLLEGE

Dr. GATI. Mr. Chairman, I trust it is proper to mention that I have had the pleasure of meeting you and Senator Warner at Aspen Institute seminars on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe over the years, but this is the first time I appear before your committee. I would like to say that, although my knowledge about this committee is limited, I do know how much you have done over the years to educate the American public about the complexities of defense and foreign policy. I am delighted that you have turned your attention to Central and Eastern Europe.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Dr. Gati. I have always benefited every time I have heard you.

Dr. GATI. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. It is good to hear you again.

Dr. GATI. That is very generous of you, sir. I was asked to discuss new trends in Soviet attitudes toward Central Europe, the region of Central Europe being defined for our purposes here as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and perhaps the Eastern part of Germany. My prepared statement offers evidence and analysis about the present and a bit of speculation about the future. Some of the trends I discuss are disturbing, even ominous. I would like to use the next few minutes to highlight a few points.

With respect to Mr. Gorbachev, I believe that we face a problem that psychologists call cognitive dissonance. For years we saw him as a dedicated reformer at home and abroad. Today, despite indications that he is not the reformer he used to be, we are so conditioned by his past that we cannot easily accept the new evidence which runs contrary to what we knew to be true and what we expected of him.

It seems to me that there is no more urgent and more difficult task for all of us than to overcome this perceptual divide and recognize that the Gorbachev we knew and respected is history. For the time being, we are dealing with Gorbachev II, not Gorbachev I.

Under Gorbachev II, the Soviet Union is in the process of reversing the aims of perestroika and glasnost. Under Gorbachev II, the Soviet Union has already reverted to the use of force against its own people. Hundreds of advisers to Gorbachev I, including Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Shatalin and many others have lost their influence. Ligachev, who was ousted by Gorbachev I, is now rumored to have quietly reclaimed his old office in the Kremlin.

As the 1985 Gorbachev I quote on page 1 of my written testimony suggests, Soviet foreign policy reflects domestic trends. It always has. The Soviet military once again appears to prevail in the arms control area. Moscow has been fishing in troubled waters

in the Middle East. I think that Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh's recent comment about President Bush to the effect that the President's rejection of the Soviet plan was something that "did not belong to him" was uncalled for and, indeed, quite nasty.

I would like to cite some other developments as well. Gorbachev did not stop the conservatives in the party, the Army and the KGB from forcing Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to resign. The military, as you know a lot better than I, is sabotaging the implementation of the recently signed conventional force reduction agreement. Prime Minister Pavlov now blames "an anti-Soviet plot" by Western banks for his country's hyperinflation.

Lieutenant General Dubinin, the Soviet commander in Poland, has refused to set a date for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country.

Guided almost completely by political consideration, the Soviet Union keeps reducing its energy deliveries to the new Central European democracies.

With 350,000 Soviet troops still in Eastern Germany and with the Soviet parliament yet to ratify the German peace treaty, Western Europe is very anxious, too.

I concede, of course, that all the evidence is not in to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that Gorbachev II has replaced Gorbachev I, but it seems to me that by the time all the evidence is in it may well be too late for the West to respond thoughtfully and effectively.

Now as far as Central Europe is concerned, there is, as I mentioned, growing nervousness in the region about Gorbachev II. No one expects new Soviet troops to march in tomorrow. The revival of the Brezhnev Doctrine is not on the agenda. But as I report on pages 2 and 3 of my prepared statement, there is deep concern there about Soviet tactics of pressure and intimidation. Such tactics could destabilize the region.

If Moscow does not set a date for withdrawal from Poland or if it politicizes trade by further reducing energy deliveries, then Moscow's old communist supporters in Central Europe, responding to these signals, will regain their composure and engage in acts of troublemaking to spark chaotic conditions.

Now you may ask: why would they want to do that? The answer is that, however harmful such tactics might be to Soviet relations with the United States, with Europe and some other parts of the world as well, such regional chaos nonetheless would be great news to Soviet hardliners for whom the road to power at home is paved with instability in Central Europe. Especially if the Polish experiment with pluralism and the free market fails, the Soviet hardliners will gain further momentum.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the conclusion to be drawn by the West is that we should use our resources, our energy and our attention where we can make a difference. We can make a difference in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary and possibly in Yugoslavia. This is the area where World War I, World War II and the Cold War began. This is the area where the Cold War ended. It seems obvious to me that we should do a lot, as much as we can, to make sure that this is not the area where the Cold War is revived.

Once the Gulf War is over, Central Europe and the Soviet Union, including domestic developments in the Soviet Union, should reassume their position at the top of this country's foreign policy agenda, as Senator Warner hinted at in his comments at the beginning.

To do otherwise would be an historic blunder comparable to the 1930s when England and France paid more attention to Italian aggression against Ethiopia than to the rise of Nazi Germany. Today, the history of this decade and the history of the next century is being shaped in the Soviet Union and in Central Europe.

As I suggest on page 7 of my prepared testimony, particularly under point 3, the main problem we face is not the lack of adequate resources but the lack of understanding of and conviction about the historic opportunity at hand in Central Europe. As long as we look at this region as a problem rather than an opportunity, we will make little headway.

Members of Congress in particular should recognize, I think, a persistent if skillfully obscured attitude of bureaucrats who appear to depreciate the historic opportunity in Central Europe. Although public discussion seldom reflects their skeptical and even defeatist mentality, it does find expression in casual comments about "those little countries" in the region whose striving for independence they see as an inconvenient obstacle to better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, countries whose chance to build a democratic future is so slim, as they see it, as to make any Western effort to help a waste of time and energy, countries, in short, which offer problems rather than opportunities.

A less insidious version of this view is that the United States need not do much because Western Europe has assumed "primary responsibility" for Central and Eastern Europe and that the United States must remain in what they refer to as a reserve position. But reserve position translated into English means that we should do nothing.

Let me conclude by saying that for 40 years or so we have been telling these countries to get rid of their Communist rulers. They have done that. While we did not tell them that they would live happily ever after, we did promise that they could count on us. I sincerely wish I could say to you now, Mr. Chairman, that we are doing all we can to live up to that promise. Unfortunately, I cannot say that. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gati follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY PROFESSOR CHARLES GATI

THE IMPACT OF SOVIET DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS ON CENTRAL EUROPE

Mr. Chairman: The issue I have been asked to discuss is Soviet policy in Central Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and what used to be eastern Germany. It is an issue that has profound implications for European stability, and for this reason it deserves the attention of the U.S. Government.

My point of departure is an interview given by Mikhail Gorbachev to Time magazine in September 1985, more than 5 years ago. He ended the interview with these words:

"In conclusion I would like to express an idea which can be regarded as cardinal to our entire conversation. It was said justly that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy. Since this is so, I would ask you to give some thought to the follow-

ing: since we are undertaking such challenging domestic plans, what external conditions can we be interested in? I leave it to you to provide the answer."

Five years later, with the hopeful processes of perestroika and glasnost apparently coming to an end, President Gorbachev, trying to assure the West, says that such Soviet domestic developments as the resignation of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will have no bearing on Soviet foreign policy.

The Gorbachev of 1991 vintage does not sound convincing—particularly to Central Europeans who are once again anxious about Soviet intentions. They remember that the region became free and its several countries independent at a time when momentous domestic changes were underway in the Soviet Union. Although Gorbachev the reformer did not introduce pluralism and free-market economics in Central and Eastern Europe, he did make these historic changes possible. Hence the Central Europeans ask: Will an increasingly conservative Soviet Union, under the leadership of Gorbachev or his successors, now attempt to regain its lost empire?

The question matters to the United States not only because it was so refreshing to witness the end of Soviet domination over Central and Eastern Europe in 1989–90. That change, and the change it signified in Soviet foreign policy, was of course significant in itself. But what made it so relevant to the United States was that it also signified the end of the cold war, for the Soviet willingness to remove the Soviet Army from Central Europe effectively removed the Soviet threat to Western Europe too.

As Michael Mandelbaum explained so well in early 1989 and thus several months before the region's transformation:

"The core of the cold war in Europe is the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. . . . This is an affront to American values.

"More important, Soviet domination of Eastern Europe threatens American security. The American military commitment to Western Europe is based on the fear that without it the Soviet Union would do to France, Italy, the Benelux countries and West Germany what it has already done to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany. The threat to Western Europe is credible because it has already taken place . . . against Eastern Europe.

"Ending the cold war requires ending the Soviet threat to Western Europe, which requires ending Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe, which means allowing the people of that part of the world to decide freely how to govern themselves. The principal requirement for the end of the cold war, in short, is self-determination for Eastern Europe."

Hence the geopolitical significance to the United States of Moscow's intention to withdraw from Central Europe.

It should be added and indeed stressed that the Soviet Union, having committed itself to that course in 1989, has since agreed to remove all of its troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary in mid-1991 and from eastern Germany in 1994. In fact, most Soviet troops have already left Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and President Mikhail Gorbachev has also announced that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact would be formalized later this spring. If these agreements and announcements are implemented on schedule, and if they are followed by an agreement to withdraw some 40,000 Soviet troops from Poland as well, there is little or no cause for concern.

Yet recent Soviet developments have sparked considerable anxiety in Central Europe about Soviet intentions. In Warsaw, President Lech Walesa sees a "deadly threat" on the horizon. In Budapest, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall says the significance of Moscow's policies in the Baltics "transcends the borders of the U.S.S.R." In Prague, Deputy Minister of Interior Jan Ruml is worried that the Soviet military and adherents of the former Czechoslovak communist regime will try to exploit Western preoccupation with Iraq to destabilize his country. Speaking on TV, Mr. Auml said:

"We must also monitor the possible sudden activation of the forces of the former totalitarian regime and developments among foreign troops on our territory. We must not forget that at present we are endangered by the state terrorism of the Soviet armed forces, which—under certain circumstances—could destabilize the situation in the former Communist countries.

The Central Europeans' concern about Soviet intentions was echoed earlier this month by German Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, who was quoted to have observed that Mr. Gorbachev's "reliance on the military casts a shadow over the [region's] young democracies, including Poland."

These statements should not be interpreted to imply that the Soviet Union is about to intervene militarily in Central or Eastern Europe and crush the region's fragile democracies. For the time being, it would be unwise and certainly premature

to replace last year's euphoria about "new thinking" in Moscow with fatalistic pessimism about the revival of the notorious Brezhnev Doctrine.

There are nevertheless several reasons for serious concern:

1. In both the economic and political realms, the Soviet Union is retreating from the policies of perestroika and glasnost. Rejection of the so-called Shatalin plan and reintroduction of one-sided reporting on Soviet television and the press suggest that the processes of reform have been arrested. That such domestic trends have serious implications for Soviet foreign policy as well was shown when Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov blamed the West for his country's financial problems, accusing Western banks in particular of pursuing "an anti-Soviet plot" aimed at "artificially creating hyperinflation" in the Soviet Union.

2. The Soviet crackdown in the Baltics contradicts one of the important promises made in previous years—that Moscow would not resort to the use of force at home or abroad.

In this connection, the point should be made that the use of force by Moscow against the republics is not comparable to the hypothetical use of force by Washington against states that might seek to leave the Union. The two countries are basically different. The American States are not distinctive units ethnically or culturally; their histories are not fundamentally different from one another's; with minor exceptions here and there, all Americans speak the same language. By contrast, the Soviet Union is made up of several nations, each with its distinctive culture, language, and at times independent past. Most of them did not join the Soviet Union voluntarily and would leave if allowed to do so.

Therefore, Moscow's crackdown in the Baltics is an imperial act against legitimate governments seeking independence. For this reason, the use of force against the republics is neither legally nor especially politically different from the use of force against foreign countries.

3. Relatedly, there is anxiety in Central Europe about Soviet behavior in the Baltics because of Western, especially American, preoccupation with the war in the Gulf. This is so partly because of the assumption that the coalition needs Soviet support and will be therefore reluctant to confront and alienate Moscow over other—presumably secondary—issues. In addition, Central Europeans are keenly aware of the fact that in the past the Soviet Union found it convenient to intervene militarily while the West was distracted. Cases in point are the 1956 intervention in Hungary during the Suez crisis, the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia during the height of the Vietnam war, and the 1979 intervention in Afghanistan during the Iranian hostage crisis. Worried Central Europeans ask: Will Moscow use the war in the Gulf as a cover to reclaim its lost influence over their region?

4. Closer to home, there is uncertainty in Central Europe about whether and when Soviet troops will actually leave the region. It is generally assumed that they will leave Czechoslovakia and Hungary this year. There is some concern about 1994 when they are scheduled to leave Germany. Most troublesome, however, is Moscow's unwillingness so far to sign an agreement for withdrawal from Poland. The Poles want the Soviet military to go home this year. Last month, Lt. Gen. Viktor Dubinin, the Soviet commander in Poland, refused to set a date, and then angrily complained that Poles view Soviet soldiers as "occupiers and international criminals."

5. Finally, what, lends particular credence to Central European concerns is the ongoing—and ominous—Soviet debate about who "lost" eastern Germany and the rest of what was until recently the Soviet bloc.

In this debate, the genuine reformers—such as Andrei Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Republic—still maintain that the Soviet Union is better served by stable and mutually beneficial neighborly relations (as with Finland) than by old-fashioned domination producing enforced respectability and thus persistent instability.

What appears to be now the centrist majority believes that Moscow should have demanded, and could have received, a better deal for its unilateral withdrawal from Central Europe. One Soviet specialist on the United States told me: "If [Secretary of State] Jim Baker had done the bargaining for us, we would have got a lot more aid from you for handing over Germany, Poland and the other countries to the West."

Because of their growing power, however, what matters most is how the conservatives in the party, the army and the KGB feel—and what they want. They feel betrayed. Col. Viktor Alksnis, the ultra-conservative deputy, has complained that "for the first time in its history the Soviet Union has no more enemies, but neither has it any allies." Chiming in, 97-year-old Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin's henchman and a ranking Politburo member from 1930 to 1957, has warned: "We are in retreat. What is happening in Poland and Hungary is but a prelude to what is coming about here."

But what do the conservative old-timers want? Above all, they hope that the Central European experiment with pluralism and the free market fails because that would fortify their case against perestroika at home. If Poland is mired in strikes, Hungary consumed by nationalist passions and Czechoslovakia torn by strife between Czechs and Slovaks, the conservatives could say to the Soviet people in general and to their political opponents in particular: Is this what you want?

Having experienced nothing but upheaval at home and retreat abroad; the hardliners also want the Soviet Union to be treated with "respect." They want no more anti-Communist and anti-Soviet rhetoric from their former allies, no more declaration of support for Lithuania, no more talk about joining NATO. To heal their country's wounded pride, the conservatives' old-fashioned prescription calls for a large dose of Soviet assertiveness abroad.

If the conservatives had their way, Moscow could try to pressure and intimidate the Central Europeans by holding threatening military exercises in eastern Germany, by refusing to withdraw all of their forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary on schedule, and by staying in Poland until 1994 or beyond.

If the conservatives had their way, Moscow could further slash the amount of energy it has promised to sell its former allies, and thus raise havoc in the region's economies already reeling from Soviet price increases and the consequences of the Gulf war.

If the conservatives had their way, Moscow could even hold up ratification by the Soviet legislature of the German peace treaty.

What would be achieved by pursuing such seemingly self defeating policies?

The obvious answer is that these policies would harm Soviet security interests, causing incalculable and possibly irreparable damage to Soviet relations with the United States. Moreover, although the Central European countries might experience major upheavals as a result of Soviet-inspired crises, it seems unlikely that Communist elements could gain power anywhere in the region in the foreseeable future.

However, the less obvious and more troubling answer is that Soviet diehards want more confusion more tension, more disorder. Their road to power at home is paved with Central European instability. Therefore, the future of Central Europe once again depends, though to a far lesser extent than before, on the vicissitudes of Soviet domestic politics.

What are the implications of this analysis for American foreign policy?

1. Once the Gulf war is over, if not before, Central Europe and the Soviet Union—including domestic developments in that country—should reassume their position at the top of Washington's foreign-policy agenda. To do otherwise would be a historic blunder, comparable to the 1930s when England and France paid more attention to Italian aggression against Ethiopia than to the rise of Nazi Germany. Today, the history of the 21st century is being shaped in the Soviet Union and in Central Europe.

2. American and indeed Western support for Mr. Gorbachev should be contingent—as I believe it is—on whether or not he employs peaceful means to advance his country's interests at home and abroad. To do otherwise—to support him as Soviet tactics of intimidation and pressure in Central Europe continue—would be to cling to old hopes and dismiss new realities.

3. Members of Congress, in particular, should recognize and then confront the persistent if skillfully-obscured attitude of bureaucrats in Western capitals who appear to depreciate the historic opportunity at hand in Central Europe. Although public discussion seldom reflects this overly skeptical and even defeatist mentality, it finds expression in casual comments about "those little countries" in the region whose striving for independence is but an inconvenient obstacle to better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, countries whose chance to build a democratic future is so slim as to make any Western effort to help a waste of time and energy, countries, in short, which offer problems rather than opportunities. In a less insidious version of this view, the United States need not do much because Western Europe has assumed "primary responsibility" for Central and Eastern Europe. To what extent this condescending and defeatist mentality is widespread, I do not know, But I do know that it is contrary to American and indeed Western interests in promoting the democratic transformation of Central Europe.

4. Finally, in order to obtain a stable and secure Europe, the United States should vigorously aid the Central European economies. Nothing would make a hard-line Soviet effort to destabilize this region less likely to succeed than prosperity. Nothing would give democrats in the Soviet Union a better chance to win their political battle at home than success in Central Europe.

Contrary to what may be the received wisdom of the moment, a more attentive and vigorous American policy does not require a blank check on the Treasury. If Washington could squeeze $9 billion out of Japan to help with the allied effort in the Gulf, surely it is possible to find sufficient resources to forgive Poland's and Hungary's foreign debt, which was accumulated by previous Communist governments. Such timely and relatively modest forms of assistance, aimed at overcoming the legacy of the Communist era, would make the countries of Central Europe strong enough to meet the domestic and foreign challenges that lie ahead.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Gati.

Let me lead off with a question to the panel. Each of you has laid out different aspects of what looks like a series of very significant problems in Eastern Europe with different emphasis by each member of the panel. Let me start with Dr. Gati and work backward here and ask what do you think we should specifically do, we being the United States, we being NATO, we being the European Community? What program would you advocate to address this, as you call it, opportunity? I will ask each member of the panel the same thing in dealing with the problems you identified. Dr. Gati.

Dr. GATI. The list is long, and what I would like to emphasize first is that the issues are not only economic.

Usually what you hear is, well, we have no resources, we cannot give them more and so on. On that issue, let me say that a country that can squeeze $9 billion out of Japan in a few weeks for the Gulf War certainly can do better than we have been doing.

More specifically, I think in the Polish case, because that is the country that has done most and has taken the greatest pain to make the transition to the free market and pluralism, it seems to me that forgiving Poland's debt should be at the top of our economic agenda.

Now in the area of security, it is obvious to me that those three countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, would like to find some association with NATO. That association obviously is not something that we should embrace immediately. The NATO umbrella is one that the U.S. ought to extend with the greatest care indeed.

Having said that, though, there are steps that can be taken that do not signal acceptance of these countries into the councils of NATO on the one hand, and yet, on the other hand, would not signify turning them away either. Some steps along the way, therefore, could be and, in my opinion, should be taken.

I realize that there are concerns about how the Soviet Union would respond to that, and those are concerns that are legitimate. Yet, it is time to recognize that these countries are independent, and our policies should be toward an independent Central Europe rather than an area that somehow or another might still find itself under the Soviet shadow. We have to liberate ourselves. Having helped liberate, perhaps, these countries, now we ought to liberate ourselves from the old view that these countries somehow or another still belong to the Soviet Union, and our policies should reflect that.

Politically, I think I cannot go beyond the vague generalizations that I said at the end. I believe that if your committee and some other committees of the Congress would question some of our people in the various departments of the executive branch and ask specific questions about what it is that they are doing, what it is

that they are concerned about, bring into the open the sources of their condescending and defeatist mentality, nail them down, pin them down, I think that would be very useful, so that the region would assume, as Senator Warner suggested, a central role in our diplomatic efforts.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Korbonski, your prescriptions for dealing with the challenge?

Dr. KORBONSKI. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I guess I sort of beg to differ a little bit with my friend of longstanding. I tend to look at the relationship between the United States and what we are now calling East Central Europe in historical terms, and it seems to me that it would be terribly difficult to make a case that we do have really vital interests in that part of the world.

This is not something that suddenly dawned upon me. I have read a good deal over the past 20 to 25 years and looked at the trials and tribulations of U.S. administrations vis-a-vis that part of the world starting with President Eisenhower in 1956.

It seems to me that, really, if you look at the various global commitments, this country has had since the end of World War II—I do not want to imply that the part of the world I am interested in is of a marginal significance, but it seems to me that a case would have been made that it is vitally important for the United States to make sure that Bulgaria, say, has successfully overcome the difficulties and has joined the family of democratic nations.

Well, one can argue that a super power or a global power such as we should be interested in even Bulgaria or Albania, but, on the other hand, in your position when you have to deal with certain hard choices, I wonder about that. I simply do not want to imply that yes, indeed, East Central Europe is a very vital area.

Now in terms of practical prescriptions, I do agree with Professor Gati that, rather than talk about a new Marshall Plan, which has gotten to be a favorite buzz word that was used by various people over the past 2 or 3 years, if we could do something, you, the Congress or the executive branch, about reducing the hard currency debt, I think that in many respects this would help the Poles and Hungarians much more than any other kinds of initiatives that may sound good but have little substance.

The fact is that by now both banks as well as the governments did collect a lot of interest over the past, say, 20 years, and it seems to me the time has come for proclaiming some kind of a moratorium.

Finally, with reference to what I said about the need to teach these people politics, to overcome the legacy of communism, here again I think this country should, if anything, expand its educational programs, its exchange programs and so on. I am not saying that Poland will become a Jeffersonian democracy overnight. It will take a long time, but I think this is perhaps the area where we could do something, our universities, our research institutes, Congress and so on. So that would be my prescription.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think that we should redefine what we mean by Europe these days. It is out of date now to divide Europe into Western Europe and Eastern Europe as Europe gradually, inexorably I think, comes

together. It is going to take a long time, but I think it is a trend that one cannot stop.

I think, therefore, that if the United States is interested in Europe, then it is interested also in Eastern Europe. I think that this is the main thing that I would want to stress. I agree with what my friends say about economic aid, economic health. I do not think it has been sufficient so far, partly because I do not think it has been understood or comprehended just what the enormity of the problem is. I think that the economic help has largely got to come from Western Europe, not from the United States.

What I think the United States needs to do and what I think Eastern Europe needs from the United States most of all is, if I may term it, psychological reassurance, an assurance that the United States is concerned, to a very considerable degree concerned. I think this is best done by some of the things that my friend Korbonski has talked about, educational programs, scholarships and so on.

I think nowhere in the world is the stock or the prestige of the United States higher and the affection for the United States higher than it is in Eastern Europe. I think this is a tremendous asset which ought to be developed, and I think that if it could be arranged that more and more of the younger elite of the Eastern European democracies can come to the United States, then I think that will have a tremendous spinoff for the United States in terms of good will amongst the people who are going to take over these countries in the very near future. I think this is a thing that should be stressed.

I think that a continued U.S. military presence in Western Europe is also important for East Europeans. Again it is psychologically important in a time of such vulnerability, particularly regarding apprehension about what is going to happen in the Soviet Union.

Eastern Europe, even if it were to try—and it is trying very hard—cannot in many important respects get away from the Soviet Union. Just as the Soviet Union overshadowed Eastern Europe for 40 years with its strength, so it will be overshadowing Eastern Europe in its disintegration and its weakness also.

With regard to the number of U.S. troops in the western part of Europe, that, of course, is something that has got to be decided between the United States and the European allies concerned. Obviously the strength of that contingent has got to be, I would think, large enough to be credible and small enough to be tolerable.

I think that any formal Eastern European connection with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—and some of the East Europeans are asking for it or hinting strongly at it—I think this would be unrealistic at the moment. But I think there are all kinds of informal ways, political ways, ways regarding military advice and so on, that could be explored.

Senator WARNER. Could I interrupt at this juncture?

Chairman NUNN. My time is expired. I will yield to you.

Senator WARNER. You would like to have the U.S. maintain forces there for such reasons of security to Eastern Europe?

Mr. BROWN. Well, obviously there would be other and probably more important reasons for maintaining U.S. troops in Western

Europe, but I think that would have a very important psychological assurance for the Eastern Europeans.

Senator WARNER. Correct, but let me take off from that point. The Eastern European countries are experiencing tremendous financial problems right now. What about their own independent armed forces? Should each of these nations try to maintain expensive armed forces? We have seen in this recent battle that it is high tech, the most expensive of weapons which apparently are——

Senator THURMOND. Most effective.

Senator WARNER[continuing]. Most effective is right, Mr. Thurmond. Given the economies of these nations, should they attempt to have their own independent armed forces?

Mr. BROWN. I take your point, sir, but I think that inevitably as these States have just reemerged from 40 years, a half century of Communist rule, as they have just regained their sovereignty and independence, then I think it would be too much to ask them to dispense with their armed forces. They still need them.

Senator WARNER. For what? For national day parades? What are you going to do with a very small limited force? It would be useless in an East-West conflict. Then I draw your attention to possibly old animosities on border conflicts and so forth.

I just put this question to you because I do not have the answer. I think they should not. If I would offer the answer, I do not think you should stretch your economy by trying to buy M–1 tanks and F–16 aircraft, as much as we would like to sell them; and they are working a jolly bit better than any of the Soviet military equipment that was sold to Iraq. I think the world will take notice of that pretty shortly.

Mr. BROWN. Yes. I think there is a great deal in that, sir, but I think each of the countries concerned and I think a large majority of the populations of those countries would concur, that some armed forces are needed.

Senator WARNER. For what purpose?

Mr. BROWN. To ask the Eastern European States to do without any form of armed force, any form of armed service, this they would consider to be very much an affront. I think some armed force strength for each of the States is essential almost from every angle, especially, I think, the terribly important psychological angle that is now so strong when they have just emerged from sovereignty. Perhaps 10 years down the road, 15 years down the road it might be different.

Senator WARNER. Should you stress the economies with the purchase of relatively small amounts, which is all that could be afforded?

Dr. KORBONSKI. Senator, my understanding is that all these countries are subject to the decision taken in Vienna. For example, the country that I know best, Poland, is reducing its armed forces from about 350,000——

Senator WARNER. You mean the CSCE group.

Dr. KORBONSKI. Yes.

I will suggest that one possible reason why they would want to keep it is the Soviet Union. To my knowledge, most of the troops have now been moved to the Soviet border from facing our troops in NATO. I understand that half the Czechoslovakia troops are

now on the border with the Ukraine, and so are the Polish troops, partly, I guess, to prevent refugees from Lithuania, Ukraine or Russia from entering the country.

I agree with Jim Brown that it would be hard to ask the Poles all of a sudden to completely disarm while the Soviets are still maintaining 3 million plus army, excluding the tanks and the troops that were moved across the Urals, representing a major conventional power. To let the country become completely disarmed is inviting trouble.

Senator WARNER. Could those military forces do much more than the courageous calvary of Poland that charged forth in September 1939?

Dr. KORBONSKI. I think that if the various military balances are to be believed, most of the Warsaw Pact conventional troops were, until recently, Eastern European troops and they seem to be reasonably well trained and reasonably well armed. All these countries, especially Czechoslovakia and Poland, have produced a fair amount of Soviet weapons under license and, in fact, were major exporters of tanks to Iraq.

So the way I see it is that simply as a line of defense against the Soviets, not against NATO.

Senator WARNER. That is good. I understand. Dr. Gati.

Dr. GATI. The question probably should be addressed to the leaders of those countries, and I hope you will do that.

Senator WARNER. But they will turn to you for advice.

Dr. GATI. No, they do not. You turn to me for advice. They do not turn to us for that.

I would have to say that, one, defense expenditures are coming down in every one of these countries, and that, I think, is good news.

Two, as my colleagues suggested, you cannot deprive these countries or any country in the world of some armed forces, especially in that part of the world where suspicions of neighbors at times border on paranoia for good historic reasons. So they are going to have some armies.

When you talk about F–16s, are you suggesting that they are trying to buy some of that from us?

Senator WARNER. I am just suggesting that with the enormous cost of these weapons and with the economic problems these nations are struggling with, I question whether or not investment in the armed forces is a wise one.

I made my point, Mr. Chairman. I thank the expert panel.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my written statement be included in the record.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Gati, I have to leave here in 3 or 4 minutes, and I have just a few questions for you to answer very briefly, if you can.

The regression of the democratic reforms in the Soviet Union is a tragic turn of events and should raise a caution flag in our relations with President Gorbachev.

What are the chances that this setback to freedom could spread to the countries in Eastern Europe? If so, what countries are most vulnerable?

Dr. GATI. Senator Thurmond, these countries have achieved independence. Those countries in Central Europe that I discussed, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and, of course, Germany, have achieved independence. They are free countries today. The military is not under Warsaw Pact command. There is freedom of religion and freedom of the press in every one of them. I no longer have to go around town to find a copy of an American magazine to find out what is happening. If I know the local language, I can find out. A lot has been achieved in these past 15 months or so.

This has been achieved because the people were courageous enough and because Gorbachev made it possible.

If changes of the type that you refer to take place in the Soviet Union, it seems to me that these countries can continue to survive as independent and free countries but under much more difficult conditions. The local Communists will no longer play a critical role in any of these countries. Having suffered major setbacks and defeats in free elections, I believe that some of these Communists will be activated and could cause instability, tension, provoke strikes and things of that sort.

But it seems to me that all of these countries will manage to retain their independence.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brown, in your prepared statement you indicate that nationalism threatens the integrity of several countries in Eastern Europe. Do you see any indication that the Soviet Union is exploiting these nationalistic movements?

Mr. BROWN. Not at the moment, no. I do think, though that there is an important informal bond, identity of views in several respects between the Yugoslavian army, the senior officers in the Yugoslavian army, and the senior officers in the army of the U.S.S.R.

It is very interesting that as Yugoslavia disintegrates and as the army or the senior officers of the Yugoslavian army seek, one, to hold the country together and, two, to hold what they call socialism together, they have become more and more conservative and have become more and more supportive of those Soviet elements——

Senator THURMOND. When you say conservative, let me ask you something. Now I call myself a conservative, but when you say conservative do you mean adhering to the socialism or communism?

Mr. BROWN. No, I am talking about the different political environment altogether. I am referring to conservative in the sense that neo-Stalin hardline Communists.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

Dr. Korbonski, who do you believe should play the major role in the revitalization of Eastern Europe, the United States or the European Community?

Dr. KORBONSKI. Well, since you asked me to choose, it seems to me that if only for historical and geographical reasons it should be the Western Europe-European Economic Community, OECD, whatever entity you have in mind.

As I said, as the Europeans tell us, the difference is that the United States has global responsibilities rather than regional ones. I think Western Europe right now ought to be taking the lead. They are not. My understanding is that they took one look at the horrible mess left after 40 years of communism, and whatever ideas they had—and I mentioned the Marshall Plan, the new bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development—probably the sheer bill for cleaning up the environment, for improving the economy and so on and so forth, we are talking about hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars.

So all this, I think, cooled the ardor of the Western Europeans. On top of that, when they start thinking, as Jim Brown said, about 20 million Russians or Ukrainians descending upon Western Europe, then Eastern Europe becomes almost a small potato as viewed from Paris or London, because they are much more worried about Rumanians, Russians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and others who in the event of a famine or a civil war are not going to stop off in Poland or Hungary but are going to go all the way to Bonn and Paris and Rome. That is really the problem.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brown, what influence are the new democracies in Eastern Europe having on the independent movements within the Soviet Union?

Mr. BROWN. I think there has been considerable interaction. I think in fact the independence of the Eastern European States in 1989 did have a considerable effect on furthering the independence nationalist movements within the U.S.S.R. So I think my short answer to that is that there has been a considerable interaction.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Gati, I understand the Soviets have agreed to a specific date for the withdrawal of forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. They have not yet agreed on the final withdrawal date from Poland.

What is the significance of this Soviet hesitancy?

Dr. GATI. Well, the stated Soviet hesitancy, if that is what it is—I would call it refusal—is that the Polish Government is asking for too much money for allowing troops to cross Poland from the eastern part of Germany back to the Soviet Union. There is a lot of haggling going on about which way they are going to go, how much they are going to pay, and so on.

There are also a lot of differences between the Polish and the Soviet Governments with respect to any possible repair of the land that the Soviets used, on the one hand, and on the other hand demands by the Soviets that the Polish Government pay for some of the barracks and stuff that the Russians are leaving behind.

So on the face of it, there are a lot of financial differences here between the two governments, but underneath it all I suspect that that is not the critical issue. The critical issue is that the Polish Government wants the Soviet troops to leave this year, period, while the Soviet Government does not want to remove those troops until after their troops from Eastern Germany have left.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses, and want to express my appreciation to them for sharing their expert views on Eastern Europe—a region that will, in my judgment play a pivotal role in East-West relations.

For the past 40 years, the countries of Eastern Europe have been totally dominated by the Soviet Union. Despite this domination, the seeds of democracy flowered in the region and resulted in the overthrow of the Communist dictators over the last 2 years. However, although democracy is flourishing, poor economic conditions are threatening the progress that has been made.

In my judgment, the United States and its allies will all benefit from, and thereby must ensure, the economic survival of the former Warsaw Pact countries. Just as West Germany's economy influenced political reform in East Germany, so can the economic well-being of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary influence political reform in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, 2 days ago, the Warsaw Pact officially came to an end as a military alliance. This historic event was lost in the euphoria over the success in the Persian Gulf. We cannot allow the future of the fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe to become secondary to the events in the Middle East, for they are the key to peace in Europe.

Chairman NUNN. Let me ask each of you this question. We had testimony on this from some of the Soviet experts who appeared before us yesterday, and I will say in advance they each thought it was very important. I will ask you. How much importance do you attach to the success of the economic experiment going on in Poland, number one, but also Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for the Soviet Union itself?

In other words, if Poland, which is the country that is sort of taking the biggest steps, the most radical I would say, falls on its face economically, or on the other hand if Poland succeeds or begins to show some signs of success economically, how important do you think that is as a factor in the Soviet Union itself? Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. I think it is very important. I can recall 1¼ years ago I was in the Soviet Union talking to some youngish students, academic people, and the question arose how can the West best help the U.S.S.R? Two of them answered you can best help us by helping Poland and Hungary, helping the reforms there. So I think that gives you some idea.

I think that if the experiment, if the shock therapy in Poland succeeds, it will give a tremendous fillip to reformers in the U.S.S.R. and other reformers perhaps more hesitant in other countries in Eastern Europe.

If it fails, then it will be a tremendous blow to reformers both in the Soviet Union and in other parts of Eastern Europe.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Korbonski.

Dr. KORBONSKI. I agree, but let me perhaps add a couple of dimensions. It seems to me to begin with the economic situation in the Soviet Union today is much worse than it has ever been in Czechoslovakia or Hungary or even Poland. So while, indeed, success of Polish, Czechoslovakian and Hungarian reforms might help, it may not be enough because of the degree of destruction of the Soviet economy after 70 years of communism. So that this ought to be kept in mind.

Second, I also notice that sometimes the conditions cannot be duplicated. For example, in Lithuania, if you will recall, the lady prime minister was an economist who tried, in fact, a few months

ago to introduce Polish-style reforms, and she was ousted even though she was viewed as the leader of the liberal anti-Soviet faction.

It seems to me that the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians succeeded in implementing unpopular reforms because their governments were legitimate. They really were regimes that were elected as a result of parliamentary elections or presidential elections, and this is not yet true for the present Soviet Union. My understanding is that at some point Gorbachev came pretty close to either adopting the radical Polish model or a so-called 500 days plan and yet at a certain stage pulled back because of the expectation of rioting, strikes and other things.

So yes, I think it would be important, but it seems to me conditions are really not quite the same.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Gati.

Dr. GATI. Well, I would say that historically the West has always reached Russia by East Central Europe, and this pattern continues.

Second, I would say that if the Polish experiment in particular is a great success or a great failure, it will have a tremendous impact on the Soviet Union. Great success would pull the rug out from under the hardliners' positions, and, of course, great failure would strengthen them.

Chairman NUNN. I know the Eastern European countries have to be examined one by one, so let us just take Poland for example. What do you think the chances of their moving back toward some real socialist model or even lining up more closely with the Soviet Union would be if they fall flat, economically speaking? Dr. Gati.

Dr. GATI. That depends on what you mean by socialism. If you mean socialism as in Austria, where 30 percent or so of its economy is controlled or owned by the State, to that extent this is definitely a strong possibility.

Chairman NUNN. Let us call it Communist model, the old model.

Dr. GATI. The Communist model does not have a chance as far as I can tell under any circumstances. It has no appeal.

There are certain social practices introduced during the Communist era, which are in existence in some Western countries as well, and I think many of such practices and programs will be kept. However, the return of communism in any shape or form is not possible. Anarchy is possible, decay is possible, a military takeover is possible, demagogue populism is possible, and, of course, pluralism is possible, but not communism.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Korbonski.

Dr. KORBONSKI. I agree 100 percent. It seems to me the demonstration effect of the success in Western Europe and the fact that all of these countries are now moving toward privatization one way or the other would make it difficult. Privatization is difficult if 95 percent of your industrial capital is owned by the state, and it will take a long time. Still, the fact that the various countries are doing it would suggest to me very strongly that communism has absolutely no chance of coming back.

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned Poland. If you add to it the growing importance of the Catholic Church, which has always been important, now it is really able to come into its own. That further diminishes, I think, any possibility of kind of a pullback.

I agree with Professor Gati. We may end up throughout Eastern Europe with some kind of a mix. After all, in France, Great Britain and so on, a fairly sizable share of some of the industries are in state hands.

I find it inconceivable that a return to communism is likely.

Mr. BROWN. If the economic transformation in any of the Eastern European countries does not succeed, then the hopes of democracy are gone, too. The result of that will not be any return to communism. The result of that will be fascism, nationalism, populism of the worst kind. I think the stakes are very high here. The stakes are very high with regard to this question of economic success because the whole future depends on that.

Chairman NUNN. Let me ask each of you to comment on what I have listed here as several different proposals you have from the panel in terms of the things that we ought to emphasize in our own foreign policy vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. Let me get each of you to comment on these and see if we can get some idea of priorities or disagreements if there are any.

There was one suggestion of debt forgiveness, and I believe that was directed particularly to Poland. Do all of you agree that there ought to be some form of moratorium or some kind of debt forgiveness worked out?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Dr. KORBONSKI. I suggested it in my written submission. It seems to me that after years and years some of these countries are now able to generate surpluses on their balance of payments. Frankly, not necessarily because they were successful in penetrating the Western markets but mostly by sharp curtailment of imports, very much to the detriments of their economies. If these billions of dollars are now going to be transferred to satisfy interest payments of banks which lent in the 1970s absolutely indiscriminately without any kind of condition I find it almost reprehensible. These countries, as Jim Brown suggested, which are trying very, very hard to develop some kind of economic basis for democracy may fail to do so because of the need to satisfy interest payments of some Japanese or French banks. It is France actually which is now creating most of the difficulties. I think, judging from what I heard, Germany, for example, might get along, even Britain, the United States, but for some reason the French decided that it would create a bad precedent, and debt forgiveness should be limited perhaps to 30 percent as opposed to 60 or 70 or 80 percent of the total.

So I feel very strongly that rather than to have Marshall aid or some other kind of an aid, a simple debt forgiveness would greatly benefit Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland. The example of East Germany, which we have not even mentioned, provides a lesson: you may have read that Chancellor Kohl was forced to raise taxes because the cost of integrating with West Germany what appeared to be the most advanced economic system in Eastern Europe was prohibitive.

So we are talking about horrendous, horrendous amounts of money. Every little bit would help, and I think in this case debt forgiveness is the only answer.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Gati.

Dr. GATI. I agree with that. I was the one, I think, who originally mentioned it in my presentation. I think also Hungary could make a very strong case for the same.

I realize that there is concern about debt forgiveness as a matter of policy because so many other countries in the Third World could also say, well, if you do it for Poland and Hungary why not for somebody else.

I think there is a special circumstance here. The special circumstance has to do with a change, not of regimes in Eastern and Central Europe but, rather, a change of systems. So the Polish Government especially, which has done so much to make this transition work, is now paying not for another regime's mistaken economic policies but for the debts of another system. At least in my book, this makes for a rather special case.

Chairman NUNN. Would all of you agree that this would be at the top of the list of things that we could do in the next 2 or 3 years?

Dr. GATI. It is not for the United States to do, really, because as far as Poland is concerned we can only exert leadership here. The money is not held by U.S. banks.

Chairman NUNN. I am using "we" in the broadest sense. I am talking about the Western world.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, because it strikes me, Mr. Chairman, as the easiest thing to do. Of all the things that need to be done, this, difficult though it may be in certain quarters, this is the easiest. This is a thing which can be done in a relatively short time. The other things are very much long-term things.

Chairman NUNN. Would it be possible to have some kind of debt to equity conversion that would give out stock over a long period of time so that if these countries succeed over 20 or 25 years, the money could be recouped in some form of stock that the banks would take?

Mr. BROWN. I think so, Senator. This has been talked about. It has been talked about with regard to Hungary. Czechoslovakia hardly applies, really, but it applies to Hungary and Poland. This, I think, is a serious subject of discussion by economic experts, and the feeling is that, again, difficult though it is, it could be done.

Chairman NUNN. Who is taking the lead in this, and who should take the lead?

Dr. KORBONSKI. Well, I guess the United States, probably. We always seem to end up taking the lead.

Before I continue, yesterday, for example, I noticed the Wall Street Journal in an article, bemoaned the fact that Western interest in Eastern Europe was declining and less was invested in 1990 than in 1989. Again, it seems to me that a decision to forgive 80 percent of debt would be crucial. I think the Eastern Europeans would be happy with an 80 percent or 75 percent cut which would act as a kind of confidence building measure for, say, Western bankers, joint venturers and so on.

Right now, if the Wall Street Journal is to be believed, there has been kind of a disillusionment and a decline in interest. So I see it not only in terms of providing a very important economic injection but also as kind of a sign of confidence on the part of the West that

these are viable entities and not states on the verge of economic collapse.

Dr. GATI. Senator Nunn, I do not know exactly how you meant your question when you asked. Did you refer only to economic things? If you ask the question what is the single most important thing that we could do——

Chairman NUNN. I am including everything.

Dr. GATI. If you include everything, then I would not say that this is the most important thing to do.

The most important thing to do is something that is intangible. It is leadership by the United States, by the President and the Secretary of State to keep saying again and again these countries are independent, they are free, they do not belong to the Soviet sphere of domination or the Soviet sphere of control. They keep expecting to hear this again and again from us and they do not hear it often enough. This is what would encourage businessmen the world over to keep investing there.

It is leadership by the United States that is needed to keep the issue on the agenda, and, yes, it is a central issue, a central area, because we do not want the Cold War to come back.

The second most important thing, in my opinion, still would not be economics. It would be to work in such a way with the Soviet Union, too, to make sure that the Soviet troops still in Central Europe leave.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. Broadly on this issue, Mr. Chairman, if I could just say a word about Southeastern Europe. I think we have been rather East Central Eurocentric here. As important as these East Central European countries are, I think that Southeastern Europe in terms of security, in terms of stability, has an urgency perhaps that the East Central European States do not have at present.

I am referring to Yugoslavia, the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Here, I think with regard to the West and to the United States, I think it is important to keep abreast of events. It is essential to take into account the fact that in 2 or 3 years time what was once Yugoslavia may well be a very different place. You will have, the chances are, an independent Slovenia, an independent Croatia and perhaps an angry independent Serbia also.

I think one of the tangible things that can be done to reflect the interest and the concern that the United States feels about this is to establish consulates in each of the State capitals in Yugoslavia. We have one in Zagreb. There is none in Ljubljana. There is none in Sarajevo. There is none in Skopje.

I think this would be an indication that the United States in particular and the West as a whole do understand that an evolution, hopefully an evolution without violence, is going on there.

Further south, I think, the danger point over the longer term is this Islam-Eastern Christian Orthodox confrontation. I do think this is something that the United States should—and only, I think, the United States has the influence on Turkey to try to preempt or contain this development. If it did begin, it could start up a whole chain of instability and extending through to the Caucasus, and into Asia and beyond.

So this, I think, could become in the next 5 or 10 years or so one of the most important trouble spots on the globe.

Chairman NUNN. Does the Persian Gulf War play into that in any way?

Mr. BROWN. Indirectly, sir, in the sense that it is going to have some effect, or at least the aftermath of the Gulf war, is going to have a very considerable effect on the behavior and the future attitudes of Turkey. Turkey is going to become very much a key player in this whole area in the next 5 or 10 years or even earlier.

Chairman NUNN. What happened to the European Bank or the Western bank concept? I think the French were originally proposing that. I have seen some things about it, but it does not seem to me it has really gotten very far along, has it?

Dr. KORBONSKI. If I may, I think the passivity of the bank after the initial hullabaloo in my opinion is simply related to what I tried to suggest earlier namely, the enormous cost of trying to bring Eastern Europe to the level of let us say, Western Europe. We are really talking about hundreds of billions of dollars. I read an estimate somewhere, I think, either in a German or a French newspaper, that it is $1,200 billion over a period of the next, let us say, decade or so.

Some things we have hardly mentioned. Regarding environment, you are talking about probably the most polluted region where the environment has been badly destroyed. The triangle of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and to some extent Hungary is a case in point and, you should go and see it for yourself. That alone would require a tremendous cleanup, not to mention antiquated steel plants, coal mines, comparable to our rust belt industries.

I think, simply having taken a look at the cost, the French director of the bank I guess, is trying to pull back.

It is my understanding from talking to contacts I have had in Poland that the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is dead, and that a new organization to replace it, was supposed to have been created today or tomorrow. I think the meeting was canceled because the Soviets were not ready for it. Maybe the Eastern Europeans should pull themselves up by their own bootstraps with some help from Western Europe.

The sheer cost is probably something that the West has not anticipated. As my comment about East Germany suggests, East Germany was supposed to have been the number one economy in the region, and look at it. It is a disaster. It is a basket case. I think you can multiply this example six or seven times.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Gati, any other comment on the bank?

Dr. GATI. Not on the bank but on the Yugoslavia issue, if I may go back to that.

Chairman NUNN. Yes.

Dr. GATI. It really relates to one of your earlier questions about the impact of developments in Central Europe on the Soviet Union. If the success or failure of the Polish economy will make a big difference for the debate in the Soviet Union, what happens in Yugoslavia, how the issue among the nations of Yugoslavia is solved, makes a big difference for the Soviet Union, too. It is the only major multi-ethnic country in this region, and Soviets are watching

the independence movement by the Croatians and the Slovenes in particular.

After all, what is happening in the Baltics is very, very similar to that except the Croatians and particularly the Slovenes are ahead of their Baltic brothers and sisters.

Dr. KORBONSKI. What about the Czechs and the Slovaks?

Dr. GATI. There is a better chance for them to stay together for the time being.

Chairman NUNN. Let me thank you all for being here today. The reason we have not had more Senators here is because Secretary Cheney started a briefing on developments in the Persian Gulf at about the time this hearing started. But we have staff who are following this and will get an excerpt for everyone about your testimony. Then we plan to have a summary of this testimony that we will distribute to the Senate as a whole when we complete it.

I would like to stay in touch with you as we go through this, because we feel in this committee that what happens in Eastern Europe and what happens in the U.S.S.R. indeed will have a profound effect on our security in the future.

Over the last 40 to 45 years, depending on how you count the dollars, we have spent about $4 trillion in defending Western Europe and allowing Eastern Europe eventually to become free and independent. I think it would be a real tragedy if we get to this point and drop the ball.

It seems to me that we—and I use "we" in the broadest sense—cannot do it just with the United States, but it seems that we have really sort of let the situation deteriorate.

I know one thing that has happened, and you have alluded to this in your testimony. I visited with some of the Polish leaders and also President Havel of Czechoslovakia in approximately the late August or September time frame. They were counting on the repayment of Iraqi debt that had been incurred because of military equipment their previous regimes had sold to Iraq to help compensate for the increased price of Soviet oil and the decreased supply of Soviet oil. They were counting on that beginning in January. I think in Czechoslovakia it was about $3 billion and in Poland about $1 billion.

Of course, when they participated in the embargo, unlike most countries who said we will not buy any more of your oil, they were in effect put in a position of saying we will not take the oil you were going to give us to pay back debts that you owed us.

So they have been saddled on the one hand with the debt of that previous regime, and on the other hand they have not been able to collect what was owed. Based on the condition of Iraq after the war, that country probably is not going to come close to being able to pay the debt it owes for a long, long time to come.

I think what happens in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and you have mentioned Yugoslavia, but I would say particularly Poland because they are out front in the reform, what happens in the next year or so is of profound importance to our national security.

It is very hard to figure how to deal with these problems now because of our financial situation. We just do not have the funds in

the U.S. budget, and we are going to have to have a lot of help from other countries.

Of course, as you said, we have gotten a huge amount of money for the Persian Gulf conflict from the Japanese and to some extent the Germans and others. That is good, and we needed to do that. But on the other hand, it is going to make it a lot harder to get money from all these countries to help in Eastern Europe.

So it may be that the money part of it is going to be very hard to get, and we are going to have to think of other ways to deal with it in terms of money. The sums that you have mentioned are not going to be there.

I would invite any other comments which any of you may have about what has been said, questions, or any other thoughts you might have that we need to hear.

Mr. Brown, do you have anything else?

Mr. BROWN. No, I do not think so, sir. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Doctor.

Dr. KORBONSKI. I just simply would like to express my total agreement with your last comments and in a sense also echo what Professor Gati said. Sometimes money is not all that important. We do not have the resources. It is clear. Germany, who I think we counted on, is now saddled with its own Eastern part, so I do not really count much on Germany picking up the slack.

But as I said, all these other intangibles or sometimes tangibles like the economic exchanges, management training courses, Peace Corps, whatever, I think we should by all means support.

Mr. BROWN. Could I perhaps take that on for just a minute?

With regard to Germany, I think that it had been hoped that, with regard to Eastern Europe Germany would play a major role economically, certainly, and, as Germany became more self-confident, politically also. I do not think that we can be so sure of either thing now. Economically, I think that East Germany is proving much harder to digest than was originally thought.

I think in the political sphere also, what one has seen very strikingly with regard to German attitudes toward the crisis in the Gulf is a lack of the kind of political self-confidence a great nation needs.

I think Germany was expecting in Eastern Europe a reasonable peaceful evolution. It was also expecting a democratizing, stable, benevolent U.S.S.R. It has gotten neither of those things, and this is not calculated to improve German self-confidence. So I think that with regard to the political role which we did expect from the Germans and which I think would be so essential in Eastern Europe, this, I am afraid, is not going to happen.

Chairman NUNN. Any other closing thoughts?

Dr. GATI. Since you mentioned the Gulf, I would only add an editorial here, sir, to point out the difference between the behavior of the Soviet Union during this extraordinary crisis on the one hand, particularly referring to the last few weeks, and its former allies in Central Europe on the other.

There are Czechoslovaks there, there are Poles there, and there are Hungarians there and others also, I think, from Southeastern Europe, shoulder to shoulder with Americans and Saudis and the Brits and the French, while the Soviet Union even at the last

minute somehow or another tried to carve out a position for itself at our expense. I think this is something we ought to remember.

Chairman NUNN. Any other comments? [No response.]

Chairman NUNN. We thank you for being here. We are going to continue these hearings. We may branch out and have witnesses from some of the Eastern European countries. It may be that this will be much later on in the year, but we would welcome any suggestions you might have about who those witnesses should be or who are the key people from whom we ought to hear; probably not so much, although we would not exclude this from the governmental sphere, but people who would be knowledgeable about the area who probably are not in the government. We could have governmental officials, too, but it is sometimes a little awkward to have them appear before another government's legislative body.

I would like your comments on that. If you have any as we go along, you could just submit them to us.

Dr. KORBONSKI. If I might just simply express my personal appreciation for being here. You know, for the three of us in the field of Eastern European studies, ever since August 2 and particularly since January 15, when you read the New York Times, Los Angeles' Time, Washington Post, you would not think that there was an Eastern Europe. So I am very grateful that——

Chairman NUNN. I have said probably in 40 speeches since August 2 that what happens in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the next year or so is, if anything, more important than what happens in Kuwait, although that is not to diminish the importance of the events in the Gulf. I just believe in the long term that these Eastern European countries hold the key to an awful lot for our security in the future.

Dr. KORBONSKI. Anyway, I want to thank you very much for having us here.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

NATO SECURITY

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator J. James Exon, presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Dixon, Warner, Cohen, McCain, Lott, and Mack.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; and Richard D. DeBobes, counsel.

Professional staff members present: Robert E. Bayer, Robert G. Bell, and Creighton Greene.

Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, George W. Lauffer, John E. Mansfield, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., Mark B. Robinson, and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Camden Jones and Mary J. Kampo.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Phillip P. Upschulte, assistant to Senator Glenn; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Leon S. Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Marshall A. Salter, assistant to Senator McCain; Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats; Saul H. Singer, assistant to Senator Mack; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR J. JAMES EXON, PRESIDING

Senator EXON. The committee will please come to order. The committee meets today to continue a series of hearings with the commanders of the unified command. This morning we are pleased to have back again Gen. John Galvin, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command, and to welcome Gen. Leon Edney, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command.

This hearing will focus on issues related primarily to European security and NATO strategy, including the question of whether the

Soviets' use of force in the Baltic and its recent reversals on domestic reform have undercut previous planning assumption. The two CINCs will also outline their commands involvement in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and their preliminary thinking about their planning for the post-Gulf war era.

It is a pretty full plate. Gentlemen, Senator Nunn was unavoidably detained this morning. And Senator Warner is on the floor on an important matter. They will be here shortly as will other members of the committee. We consider this a highly important briefing.

And with that, we will start out with you, General Galvin. Welcome back before the committee once again.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN, USA COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General GALVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted a statement. I would like to make a few general comments to begin with.

Senator EXON. Without objection, your full statement is accepted for the record, and we are pleased to recognize you for any period of time you would like, General.

General GALVIN. Thank you, sir. I would like to start off by saying I was a supporting Commander in Chief for Norm Schwarzkopf. And from that position in Europe, I have just a tremendous admiration for what he was able to accomplish in the Gulf. I think that if there was one lesson that I learned from that, it is the lesson that you must have high-quality equipment and high-quality forces, and you must have the ability to orchestrate that force in the three-dimensional battle—different from the kinds of battles Nelson fought at Trafalgar or that Wellington fought at Waterloo, those were two dimensional, there was no electro-magnetic spectrum. But in this case, Norm Schwarzkopf was able to orchestrate that perfectly and to de-orchestrate Saddam Hussein—to dismantle his electronic and electro-technical capabilities, to shut him down immediately in terms of his radars, his communications, his ability to manage air space. And that could only be done with the outstanding training that we have seen in recent years in such things as Top Gun, Red Flag, Green Flag, The National Training Center, The Warrior Preparation Center, and then all the way down through the computer simulation in turrets and in cockpits, which from the lower enlisted ranks to the senior officer ranks provided the kind of capabilities to use the technology.

We have often said that when you learn the lessons of World War I, you have to make sure your generals and admirals are at least as well trained as your privates and your sailors. This new capability to use the computer to practice our forces against a computer enemy that is very tough has paid off enormously. Things like Top Gun and Red Flag and the National Training Center give our forces the first 15 days of combat. Those are the times when, if you are untrained, you suffer terrible losses.

I think that the support of this committee in creating that kind of quality equipment for the military and the training environment that goes with it—because that training is not inexpensive—has

enabled us to orchestrate in the way that Norm did in Desert Storm.

In my own supporting roles I worked the through-put—26,600 for sorties of support coming across Europe through a number of different airfields such as Torrejon, and Zaragosa, and Frankfurt and Rhein-Main, and Ramstein, and Incirlik, and many, many others, we served as an intermediate base for supply and maintenance; we shipped the VII Corps and elements of eight tactical fighter wings, and the carrier battle groups through to Desert Storm, and then kept up the sustainment and provided the forces in Turkey and the Patriots to Israel. I am proud to say that from the time we were alerted to move Patriots out of North Germany, out of Gissen to Haifa and Tel Aviv, the first one was operational in 28 hours and 35 minutes. In looking at all of that, my conclusion is that you need fast deployment ships, and you need aircraft such as the C–17, but you also need friends. You need allies who will give you blanket airspace usage and provide ports and logistics for you in a network all the way across.

All of the NATO nations which had naval forces sent ships to the Gulf—a total of 70. Also the NATO nations sent 390 aircraft, 40,000 troops. When I sent VII Corps, I made 360 requests for fuel, maintenance, billeting, loading, port management, and so forth from our allies when I was using the ports of Bremerhaven, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Livorno, and all of those requests were answered.

Of course, one of the things that was very helpful to us was the fact that in the Gulf we had the support of all the Arabs, of course the good response of the United Nations, and Soviet support.

But with reference to the Soviet Union, as I look over the past years since 1985 when President Gorbachev came in, a window opened up in the Soviet Union, and Germany was able to get out, and the Warsaw Pact was able to get out. But Mr. Chairman, that window is closing now, and I think that is regretful.

There are problems with CFE. There are indications that the President, President Gorbachev, has to depend more and more now on the military, on the Ministry of the Interior, MVD troops, and on the KGB, and therefore, the military is stronger and conservatism is taking a much more powerful role. And at the same time, we realize now that in Eastern Europe, and in the Middle East, and in Southwest Asia, and in the southern littoral of the Mediterranean, nationalism, and ethnicism, and fundamentalism, and terrorism look strong as we look into the near future.

So the collective security that we have enjoyed since the end of World War II is something that we need to try to preserve. We need to stay with NATO. And if NATO itself learned a lesson in all of the war, this Desert Storm, it has been the lesson of crisis management. We must be able to manage a crisis and do it well. And I think there were some good examples within Desert Shield and Desert Storm. One of those was the Patriots to Israel. There was a crisis where actions by Israel could have greatly disturbed the prosecution of the war. The quick move of a protective force there helped to stave that crisis off.

There was another crisis in Turkey where Turkey could have been attacked. But the move of non-provocative, non-offensive military capability such as the AWACS, the Air Defense Fighters, Pa-

triot, Hawk, Roland, chemical protective equipment and so forth to Turkey, served to stabilize the situation and deter war in that crisis.

I think that the idea of dividing the elements of the strategy into peace, crisis, and war—the response in peace, the response in crisis, and the response in conflict—which is the way the new NATO strategy is coming out, is very, very good. In the future, I hope we are going to be able to depend on arms control as a part of our strategy.

And that's why I believe we should try to make it clear to the Soviets that this recent move of resubordination—of moving army units into the naval forces, and then not counting approximately 3,600 pieces of fighting equipment that are limited under the treaty, and assuming that it simply does not apply anymore—is not in accordance with the letter or the spirit of the treaty. If that were to be allowed to stand, then the treaty would have a flaw that would make it very difficult to apply later on. I hope, and my feeling still is that maybe there is a chance, that we can talk to the Soviets and make them realize that this was a bad move and must be corrected.

The NATO strategy as it was laid out in the London Declaration, including smaller forces and the idea of force generation, and also mobility and multi-nationality, and high-quality forces, and modern munitions, all of this has been borne out in the example of the Gulf.

And so I think the NATO strategy is on the right road. Within that strategy, our own United States force structure in Europe in the future, I believe, will be reduced, but still a quality, competent, adequate force. I would see that force as one United States ground corps, with two divisions. Three to four wings of the U.S. Air Force, and the 6th fleet in the Mediterranean, consisting of a carrier battle group and a Marine amphibious unit.

So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would say we need NATO. We need the forward presence of the United States. We need the modernization that has proved itself so well in the Gulf. We need the capability to operate in the Southern Region of NATO. And that is why especially we need the base at Crotone that has been under study and deliberation for the last couple of years. And I hope that this committee will support the continued construction of that base at Crotone in Italy.

We need a well-organized drawdown. And I think our planning is good for that. We need to watch our quality of life for our people. We need to enhance our strategic mobility and protect the theater nuclear forces.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to make a few comments above and beyond what I said in my statement.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Galvin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, last year I testified before you with guarded optimism that the future looked promising, but that we should remain cautious until the arms control treaties have been ratified and imple-

mented and the region had stabilized. I come back to you today still hopeful, but facing a very unstable Soviet Union in crisis, an alliance in unprecedented transition, a major force drawdown, and not least, regional war in Southwest Asia placing a heavy demand on all of our resources, including those in Europe.

CHANGE CONTINUES IN EUROPE

— The virtual disintegration of the Warsaw Pact coupled with ongoing Soviet withdrawals from many Eastern European countries are long-awaited political and military accomplishments.

— The vast majority of the eastern Europeans want the Soviets out. In a search for political freedom and economic prosperity, they are turning toward democracy and capitalism.

— A unified Germany stands as a crowning achievement of steadfast policy of maintaining forward deployed forces.

There is optimism that the security situation for NATO is changing for the better, but I caution that the transition may not be as quick or smooth as we would like. Recent observations highlight the uncertain nature of the Soviet future.

— The economic and military turmoil in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself produces an unstable atmosphere for reform.

— The Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe face the reemergence of nationalism, and the intensification of ethnic differences.

— The Soviet Union is modernizing its significant standing forces including large nuclear forces.

These observations illustrate the need to broadly define our security needs. The decline in the direct Soviet military challenge to U.S. interests in Europe does not mean that a security requirement no longer exists. The Soviet Union, even after a fully implemented CFE treaty, would remain the dominant military power in Europe and should be the yardstick against which we measure the adequacy of our security. As the latest events in the Baltic Republics and elsewhere illustrate, it is not yet clear which course the Soviet Union will take over the long term.

ENDURING STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES

In this time of uncertainty and transition, the Secretary of Defense has articulated a new defense strategy which sizes our forces principally against major regional contingencies that threaten American interests while keeping a watchful eye on Soviet military power. In applying this to Europe, the main elements of the U.S. defense strategy are:

— *Deterrence* still requires a credible nuclear and conventional capability, second to no other nation.

— *Collective security* is more economical and effective in the long run. We should continue every effort to support NATO as the organization with demonstrated capacity for leadership and crisis management.

— *Forward presence* contributes to deterrence, crisis response, regional stability, and influence. New operational concepts include highly mobile multinational forces.

— *Power projection* involves moving forces from the U.S. and European locations to the crisis rapidly and in sufficient size to meet the objectives.

— *Reconstitution* capacity depends on protecting our infrastructure and industrial base.

— *Arms control agreements,* where possible, reduce military threats and provide greater predictability in military relationships.

— *Technological superiority,* proven by Desert Storm, relies on quality to overcome any quantitative advantage of an adversary.

— *Maritime and aerospace superiority* guarantees control of the necessary sea, air, and space lines of communication across the Atlantic and through Europe.

NATO REMAINS ESSENTIAL

NATO has successfully faced past threats through collective strength and flexibility, and now the Alliance faces the most pronounced changes since World War II. The NATO of the future will continue to:

— Provide the Trans-Atlantic security link.
— Serve as a crisis manager.
— Act as an agent for change.
— Enable an integrated, affordable defense.
— Provide stability.
— Ensure against unpredictability of the U.S.S.R.
— Make renationalization unnecessary.

NATO is adapting its strategy, forces, and initiatives to the emerging new world order. The key points of the London Declaration, highlighting this adaptability, include the following:

— Support for a unified Germany, a more integrated European Community, and a stronger European Pillar.

— Extension of its initiatives with the East in a spirit of political cooperation and military openness.

— Reaffirmation of its support of the CFE process and recommendation of a follow-on round.

— Commitment to a force structure and strategy that are responsive to Soviet withdrawals and arms control implementation. This includes support for a new multinational force operational concept.

— Assertion that nuclear weapons will continue to play an important role in alliance strategy, but that NATO can reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons as Soviet forces withdraw and upon implementation of the CFE treaty.

In the London Declaration, we also identified a need to develop a strategy to deal with peace, crisis, and war. We did not think we would soon be involved in all three at the same time. While NATO as an alliance is not directly involved in the Gulf, the principles of its emerging strategy from the London Declaration can be seen—force generation, multinationality of the coalition, modern munitions, logistical infrastructure, and strategic mobility.

The Gulf crisis has reinforced an old lesson. Strategic mobility is more than aircraft and ships. It is airfields, seaports, trains, fuel lines, and prepositioned stocks. This requires good friends. Without friends you cannot double the number of aircraft previously permitted in a country, or get automatic priority on a nation's entire rail system, or get whole piers cleared of lucrative commercial shipping, or have governments canvassing their own bases to find facilities for more aircraft—none of that happens without friends. We must continue to nurture these mutually supportive relationships.

I am convinced the best response to the uncertainties of our times is to maintain a healthy, cooperative, vigorous North Atlantic Alliance.

CFE

The signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty reflects an unprecedented opportunity for improving security and stability in Europe. The treaty seeks to achieve parity in tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft, with an additional limitation on armored vehicle launched bridges.

We must make every effort to get a good, workable, verifiable, honest Conventional Forces Treaty. I still think the Soviets are people with common sense, and they are able to read the treaty. And the treaty very clearly says that all limited items have to be counted. By shifting equipment from the army to the navy and excluding other navy equipment, the Soviets are leaving out roughly 3,600 pieces of treaty limited equipment. I think we have to urge and encourage the Soviets through every means possible, right now, to relook their position on the treaty and especially this single point.

If the treaty is implemented, the chance for war would be greatly reduced following the very large reductions in treaty limited equipment levels the Eastern states would have to make to achieve parity with the West. Very capable forces would remain, however. For example, the Soviet Union would retain 13,150 battle tanks in the ATTU alone. Only NATO as a whole can deter a force this size.

Verification

The success of CFE would depend on its verification regime. The regime must compensate for the security previously provided by larger in-place forces. Collectively the Alliance members and the former Warsaw Pact have worked out a structure and plan for verification that is practical and workable.

In carrying out this verification effort, we must stay the course in two ways. First, we must execute our rights under the treaty for the life of the treaty—for many years we hope. Second, we must have the will to react with solidarity to treaty violations and demonstrate Western resolve to hold firm on CFE provisions. It is important to resolve Soviet discrepancies now, before proceeding.

Harmonization

To retain the most capable post-CFE force possible, NATO has developed a plan to protect its most modern equipment. This plan, called "harmonization," means nations with excess equipment, or equipment requiring destruction under CFE, will

transfer modern equipment to nations with older equipment. The recipient will then destroy the older equipment in order to meet the Alliance's reduction objective.

I fully support this plan because NATO must possess a force which, although reduced in size and quantity of equipment, must be as competent and well-equipped as possible.

NON-EUROPEAN RESPONSIBILITIES

A number of African countries are beset with challenges, many of which cannot be solved by the U.S. military. However, we can play a constructive, if modest, role in addressing some of these problems through nation-building programs such as the African Coastal Security program and others under the African Civic Action umbrella. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) should continue as well. The established and emerging democracies of Africa need our support and we need theirs. For example, the successful evacuation of Americans and members of the foreign community in Liberia can, in large part, be attributed to the support our forces received from neighboring Sierra Leone.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

The Gulf crisis was not one we had prepared for. USEUCOM is accustomed to being a supported command prepared for short warning attack. Now we are responding to an entirely different situation of being a supporting command for USCENTCOM.

— One third of EUCOM's combat forces have redeployed forward to the Persian Gulf, Turkey, and Israel.

— Thousands of airlift flights have transited U.S. facilities in Europe, carrying troops, equipment, and sustainment supplies.

— EUCOM has provided intermediate repair, maintenance, and other logistics support, reducing cycle time and stockage level requirements.

— We have also provided large quantities of ammunition, supplies, and vehicles as well as medical and combat engineer support.

USEUCOM Deployed Forces

Our deployed units include Headquarters VII Corps, 1st Armored Division, 3rd Armored Division, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Division (Forward), the 11th and 12th Aviation Brigades, and the 2nd COSCOM. In addition, elements of 10th TFW, 36th TFW, 48th TFW, 50th TFW, 52nd TFW, 401st TFW, 42nd Electronic Combat Squadron, 37th Tactical Airlift Squadron, and the 17th Reconnaissance Wing have deployed in support of the operation. The U.S.S. *Saratoga* carrier battle group was redeployed from the Mediterranean to the CENTCOM area. All told, about 90,000 personnel from USEUCOM are currently in the combat zone.

Although the mission of our forces in Europe had never before been to redeploy to another theater, the years of preparing to receive reinforcements (with exercises such as REFORGER) served us well in our move. The air forces executed their deployments with expected speed and flexibility. The ground forces were up to an unprecedentedly large and rapid deployment because they are well-trained, mobile, and innovative.

We reaffirmed two lessons in the move. First, the high states of readiness, coupled with the many contributions by our allies, made the air and ground movement a success—over 440,000 short tons and over 34,000 major pieces of equipment. Second, capable forward based forces and established infrastructure in Europe can be critical elements of our national strategy for dealing with contingencies in and beyond the USEUCOM area of responsibility.

Allied Nations' Support for Desert Storm

Our NATO allies have assisted substantially in our successful operations.

— Approximately 90 percent of airlift and deploying aircraft were supported as they transited through bases in Germany, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the U.K.

— All NATO members except Luxembourg and Iceland have had combat forces responding to the Gulf crisis.

— Canada, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have sent combat air units that have are participated daily in operations against Saddam Hussein.

— France and Britain have also deployed large ground forces to the Gulf.

— The Dutch have provided air defense batteries to help defend Israel.

— Every NATO member with naval units has been providing naval support.

— Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany provided outstanding transportation assistance to our deployment of the VII Corps.

— We are still moving sustainment supplies out of seven major ports in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands as well as smaller quantities from British, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, and Greek ports.

The attached map depicts the scope of deployment activities in this theater required to move over one-half million U.S. combatants and their equipment to the Persian Gulf. A total allied effort has been essential and forthcoming.

NATO Response

Within alliance boundaries, NATO has undertaken its most comprehensive crisis management action ever. Recognizing the threat posed by Iraq to its eastern borders, Turkey requested assistance from NATO. The Alliance responded by sending the air element of the ACE Mobile Force, comprised of aircraft from Belgium, Germany, and Italy, which joined the NATO AWACS already in Turkey. Air defense for these forces included Patriot, I-Hawk, and Roland units provided by Germany and Holland. U.S. provided F-15 interceptor alert force to NATO at Incirlik AB. NATO also responded to the potential terrorist threat in the Mediterranean Sea by calling forward the Standing Naval Force Channel, the NATO On Call Force Mediterranean, and the Standing Naval Force Atlantic to perform mine sweeping and surveillance missions. This was a force of over 40 ships. Additional NATO AWACS were deployed to Italy and Greece for 24-hour surveillance of much of the Mediterranean.

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

Our early views of the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations seem to confirm the resource priorities that EUCOM has put forward in the past few years. The clearest lesson of all has been that our investments in a quality force—trained, motivated and equipped with modern weapons—are paying dividends in the deserts around the Persian Gulf.

High technology, "smart" munitions have made our interdiction campaigns more successful than any like operations in the past.

The need for a deep strike capability, including the ability to identify, target, and attack forces in the rear echelons has been a long standing program package strongly advocated by my command that is proving invaluable in its initial use in Southwest Asia.

The Patriot missile system has greatly reduced the threat of the SCUD terror weapons.

We have suggested for several years that modern strategic airlift aircraft like the C-17 are needed, along with more and better strategic sealift. On numerous occasions over the past 6 months, lift has been the pacer on how quickly we could deploy or reinforce critical capabilities.

We, have repeatedly advocated investments in theater reserve and POMCUS stocks.

Desert Storm is proving how essential all of these capabilities are.

Top Priority: People

The resource requirements of the U.S. European Command continue to be headed by the need to take care of our people. They deserve a decent place to live and work, a community that meets their basic needs, reasonable health care, and quality education for their children. It is the individual spirit and will of our people that has made possible our peacetime and crisis successes, and now characterize our wartime effort. Our people willingly make the sacrifices necessary for a successful defense establishment; we should treat them as, well as we can afford. We should continue to be a nation that meets its responsibilities to its volunteer service men and women and their families.

Congressionally directed reductions in fiscal year 1991 RPMA, European Base Operations and O&M, and foreign national hires have reduced our ability to execute our mission, lowered support to our troops and their families, and increased the costs of repairing and maintaining our facilities.

Readiness and Training

Our second priority is the readiness and training of our existing forces. The high state of readiness of USEUCOM forces sent to Desert Storm was a major factor in their rapid deployment and entry into combat. The wide range of missions that our future reduced forces may have to execute requires us to capitalize on modern training technology at higher echelons while continuing to conduct skill training at unit level.

The Warrior Preparation Center is key to quality and realism in training while we reduce the requirement for large scale live exercises. It has become an increasingly important component in the mix of live and simulated exercises for European based forces. As a joint facility, it allows us to conduct large-scale-operations training through realistic computer simulation, eliminating the need for actual maneuver of forces. Costs are reduced as is the burden on local populations.

The need for well-trained forces also underscores the continuing need for the Combat Maneuver Training Center. This facility is the only place in Europe where our combat forces can train in battalion strength. We must maintain our ability to train and exercise at this maneuver unit level.

In peace, crisis, or war, an effective Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence capability is especially important given the wide variety of missions and geographic coverage the forces remaining in USEUCOM must assume. The upgrade of the communications and decision support systems in the HQ USEUCOM Command Center is required to meet the challenges that lie ahead.

My number one intelligence priority for the European theater is the Joint Analysis Center at Molesworth in the United Kingdom. It is the heart to my consolidated theater Intelligence Architecture Program for the future.

Crotone

The third priority, moving the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing to Crotone, is an operational necessity. The ability to provide responsive, flexible and highly capable air power in the potentially unstable Southern Region will assume increasing importance in the years ahead. The member nations of NATO are fully committed to the operational necessity for Crotone and have funded construction of people support facilities and housing, as well as their normal funding of operational projects.

During the December 1990 North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting, NATO responded to the four congressional questions and reaffirmed that retention of the 401st in the Southern Region is even more important now than before. With fewer forces deployed, those remaining must be located in the most advantageous positions. NATO also confirmed there were no existing bases that would permit the 401st to fully meet its responsibilities to NATO. NATO affirmed that continuation of construction of a new base at Crotone was the best course of action and that recent events have shown the Southern Region is close to many potential threats. Lastly, the NAC confirmed that use of Crotone for military missions outside the European theater would be considered on a case-by-case basis, there would be no restrictions that would preclude the U.S. from exercising its authority to withdraw or redeploy these aircraft outside the European theater. It is clear that NATO needs this base and I urge you to provide full support for completion of the project.

The Air Force has made significant reductions in the overall cost of the facility while still maintaining its operational potential. We are stripping the original planned facility to a smaller, more austere plant. The Air Force has achieved overall savings of one third.

The base has the added benefit of being a valuable supply and en route staging base for U.S. forces transiting the area, much as Torrejon is now.

In short, current operations clearly underscore the urgent need for such a strategically located base. Construction is underway, we still enjoy full support of the Italian Government, and we are in the process of satisfying all aspects of congressional concerns and the direction included in last years' hearings.

Modern Conventional Forces

My fourth priority is modern conventional forces. The key to the modern, and future, battlefield is the capability of the operational commander to locate, identify, outmaneuver, and outshoot enemy forces.

The current operational concept of Follow-on Forces Attack (or FOFA) was designed to break the mass and tempo of a numerically superior and technologically inferior enemy prior to engagement in a close-in ground battle. While this concept is still germane in other theaters today, force parity and technological advances on both sides in Europe called for a refinement of the FOFA concept into what we call Joint Precision Interdiction, or JPI.

We are faced with an increase in territory to defend and fewer forces to defend it with. A successful deterrent to aggression and, if necessary, defense of the territory in a force parity situation will ultimately hinge on mobility. Not just mobility created by fast-moving vehicles, as one might think, but by generating and maintaining an overall mobility advantage which will permit us to mass and maneuver decisively while inhibiting the enemy's maneuver capability. This mobility differential is produced by accomplishing two tasks simultaneously: preserving and enhancing friendly mobility while selectively attacking enemy mobility.

Friendly mobility is protected by going after the potential source of attack (enemy air) by providing an umbrella of coordinated air defense artillery and defensive counterair missions. Offensive counterair and deep fire operations also enhance our mobility by blinding enemy sensors and stripping away his long range fire capability.

The second half of the equation is attacking enemy mobility to deny him the ability to mass, move, communicate, and sustain. We cannot attack all enemy movement, so senior commanders must set priorities and be selective. To do this, the commander must see enemy movement deep, identify priority targets, and attack selected moving targets in near real time. This is the heart of JPI, and it centers on Joint STARS. We see the effects wrought by rudimentary JPI being accomplished in Southwest Asia today. This concept clearly provides the mobility differential necessary for success on any battlefield for the foreseeable future.

Modern, *multi-role aircraft* provide fast, flexible firepower when and where needed and are a key component of U.S. combat power. Combined with sophisticated target detection and command and control, our advanced tactical aircraft must be able to seek out and destroy enemy forces day or night under all weather conditions. This requirement will not change in the foreseeable future.

Maritime forces will assume an ever increasing role as we reduce our land based forces under a CFE agreement. The need for modern, multi-role, naval units will not diminish. Surface combatants are critical to providing carrier battle group flexibility and power projection capability. The ability to introduce U.S. power at a time and place of our choosing requires us to continue to maintain a robust amphibious warfare capability, sized to carry all levels of amphibious forces.

Strategic Mobility

Strategic mobility is my fifth priority. It must remain capable and responsive, particularly as we reduce our forward presence. The ability to introduce combat forces into any region will remain a strategic priority in the years to come. The first part of the mobility equation is to have basing and overflight rights with friendly nations. Our ability to deploy to many areas of the globe depends on our allies. For the rest of the equation, we need capable airlift and sealift forces combined with both land and sea based prepositioned equipment to ensure our ability to project U.S. power worldwide.

Desert Shield and Desert Storm have again validated our often stated mobility requirements:

— Airlift aircraft rapidly flew the initial waves of troops and equipment to the Gulf region to strengthen Saudi defenses.

— Airlifted marines quickly married up with their seaborne equipment from Maritime Prepositioning Ships.

— Large quantities of land-based, prepositioned stocks in Europe were deployed.

— An armada of sealift ships shuttled our heavy equipment from the U.S. and Europe to complete the buildup.

This combination of airlift, sealift, and prepositioned equipment allowed us to assemble sufficient combat power necessary to succeed in the mission. In the future we will require enhanced strategic flexibility.

In addition to procuring the C–17 airlift aircraft as soon as programmatically possible, we also need to improve our strategic sealift program. Based on Desert Shield/Desert Storm requirements and the continued declining trend in U.S. merchant marine, we need to obtain shipping assets to meet our strategic sealift requirements. In particular, our experiences paralleled those of USTRANSCOM in that we also found that strategic sealift RO/RO ships offer exactly the kind of capability we need. These RO/ROs cost less than the fast sealift ships, yet are about as capable. We also should adhere, to the President's national security sealift policy. This includes following a balanced approach of building strategic sealift ships in U.S. shipyards and purchasing ships from worldwide open markets for the Ready Reserve Fleet.

Theater Nuclear Forces

In the London Summit Declaration, NATO affirmed the need for the Alliance to "maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up-to-date where necessary." However, the Declaration also states there will be a "significantly reduced role" for nuclear systems of the shortest range. The NATO leaders proposed that nuclear artillery would be removed from Europe once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, and in exchange for reciprocal Soviet action. It remains essential for the Alliance to retain a reliable, effective dual-capable aircraft force, armed with modern delivery systems.

THE WAY AHEAD

In order to bring all of these thoughts into perspective for the future, I would like to emphasize a few final points.

First, applying the new U.S. defense strategy of forward presence, we must plan our force structure in a manner which ensures a credible deterrence, promotes regional stability, and provides a viable crisis response capability.

Second, to sustain this new strategy, we need to continue to place our highest emphasis on taking care of our people. This includes providing the equipment our forces need to fight and win on the modern battlefield, the best training we can devise, and decent places to work and live.

Third, collective security remains central to our strategy. We were able to rapidly and effectively deploy forces to Southwest Asia from the United States and Europe because of the friends we have in Europe. The overflight and landing rights our allies provided us were indispensable and will continue to be. We obtained those rights because we have been forward deployed in Europe for over 40 years; our commitment to, Europe was absolutely clear. The allies' commitment was equally clear; they came through.

Fourth, an observation that should temper every U.S. security decision is that the Soviet Union has taken a decided step away from glasnost and perestroika toward reconsolidation of authority and greater central control. While the Soviets are not necessarily embarked on fully reverting to past norms, we can draw the lesson that, where our national interests are concerned, we should proceed with reasonable caution.

Europe remains a vital element in U.S. national defense, both in and of itself, and because security and stability in Europe contribute to the security of the United States. Our forward presence in Europe not only serves to protect America and American interests; it provides us a relationship with Europe that fosters solidarity—the Atlantic link—and gives us Americans the opportunity to be of influence as important decisions are made in collective defense. We need to remain involved and influential in European affairs with a competent, credible, operationally significant force in Europe ready for a multi-faceted mission.



Senator EXON. General, thank you very much.

Before we go to questioning, if it is acceptable to the committee, we will be glad to hear at the present time from the Admiral or any comments that he has to make. Without objection, the full text of the Admiral's written statement will be accepted for the record.

I am very pleased to welcome you and recognize you at this time, Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM. LEON A. EDNEY, USN COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

Admiral EDNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My full statement, submitted for the record, answers in detail the questions that you posed to both General Galvin and myself from my responsibilities in the Atlantic Command.

It is a pleasure for me to provide for you this morning a personal overview of the current defense responsibilities as viewed by the Atlantic Command.

Atlantic Command forces played a prominent role in the successful execution of the U.S. foreign policy in the recent Gulf crisis. We are extremely proud of the magnificent performance of all of our armed forces, which in concert with the forces of 31 allied nations brought the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. We did this with a minimal loss of life, which was amazing under the circumstances.

We look forward with all Americans to providing a proper welcome as our forces return home.

We also reach out with prayers and with support to all those families who have suffered the loss of a loved one in the defense of the principles of freedom.

The realities of the rapid changes taking place in the world creates an environment of instability and unpredictability among the shifting power centers as General Galvin covered. The amount of change and turmoil can lead to miscalculation on the part of those who seek to take advantage of this situation for their own personal gain. Saddam Hussein made just such a miscalculation.

Another reality is that the risks of global war with the Soviets have been greatly reduced. As a result the nations of the world want lower expenditures on defense. And they will accept reduced capabilities based on negotiated arms control, arms control agreements which must be verifiable. I have no fault with this direction. The world is changing in our favor. And as the free world superpower, we must take the lead and be responsive to such change.

The challenge in defense planning, however, is to avoid a downward slope that is so steep that we would be unable to contain an unforeseen future major regional crisis, such as we have just completed successfully or a deteriorating world scene based on a reversion to intransigent policies of the Soviets.

I believe the 6-year defense plan put forth by Secretary Cheney, which represents an approximate 25 percent reduction in our force levels addresses these realities. And I believe they address them with acceptable risks that allow for mid-course corrections should our crystal ball not be as clear in 1993 as it seems to be now.

Clearly, it is difficult to make predictions 2 months in advance, let alone 6 years in advance, which this defense plan covers. While war with the Soviets appears less likely, and I agree with that, the

principles of peace through strength based on deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and force reconstitution as stated by President Bush, will remain the linchpins of our national strategy and the strategy of the Atlantic Command.

The size of the Atlantic Command, covering over 50 million square miles of ocean that reach the shores of over 50 countries, as well as the requirements to supply all the naval forces, Navy and Marine, for General Galvin in CINCEUR, General Schwarzkopf as CINCCENT, and General Joulwan as CINCSOUTH makes naval assets a game of numbers. Oceans are not occupied permanently. Distance between areas is great. There are no boundaries and there is no permission required to transit these areas.

Presence by naval forces can be passive or intrusive. Naval battle space management requires superiority 500 miles around the task force with intelligence and warning out to 1,000 miles. Naval operations are joint operations. The naval force levels projected at the completion of this current 6-year defense plan is approximately 450 ships and 180,000 man Marine Corps. This force provides an adequate balance between Trident submarines; Aegis cruise missile equipped carrier battle groups; Marine expeditionary forces with associated lift; ASW frigates; attack submarines; maritime patrol aircraft; and mine warfare capabilities.

This size of force is acceptable for a world that does not face an intransigent, non-cooperative, aggressive Soviet foreign policy. I would expect, in my judgment, that access to overseas bases with freedom to unilaterally represent U.S. interests will continue to decline, both as a result of our own reduced force levels and the dynamics of national policies to which General Galvin referred.

The result will likely be an increased dependence, in my judgment, on naval and Marine forces to provide a peacetime forward presence. We must stabilize at the 450- to 475-ship level in order to meet these maritime requirements.

Even so, this force level will require us to change our way of doing business. The naval presence of the future will need to be tailored to the threat and world political environment at the time. But we must retain the capability to surge in times of crisis as we have just done.

The President's fiscal year 1992 defense budget represents a difficult balance with many tough decisions between the Department of Defense's war-fighting requirements and available resources.

I recognize these realities, and I recognize the toughness of those decisions.

This morning I would like to share with you a few of my top priorities within the Atlantic Command. My highest priority is for programs that support people. People are our most valuable asset. These programs include such direct incentives as pay and benefits, child care, medical care, and family housing. But they also address the quality of living programs that support our morale, welfare, and recreation requirements.

No better proof exists of the value of this investment in high quality people than the splendid performance exhibited by the thousands of men and women who directly or indirectly supported our efforts in Desert Storm.

I therefore ask the continuing support of this committee for the 4.2 percent pay raise submitted in the President's budget. And I ask for your continuing support for enlistment and retention bonus programs, as well as quality of life programs across the board.

Second, in order to maintain the highest levels of readiness with the smaller forces that we are discussing here, in the future, full funding, I emphasize full funding, for spare parts, maintenance, overhaul, and depot-level repair will be critical. We cannot manage a backlog of repair. When you go smaller, that is unacceptable.

I want to address one other tough decision. The decision to cancel the A–12 was a difficult one for the Secretary of Defense. However, the fact remains that the requirements for an extended range, stealthy, all-weather, day-night, precision carrier bomber to replace the A–6 is my most urgent military requirement. The flexibility of being able to precisely deliver four to six individually targeted weapons on one flight against high-value, fixed, and mobile targets is an essential element of our power projection requirements.

Should we not have the luxury of major air bases being opened to us on foreign soil adjacent to the threat, with plenty of petroleum available, the need for carrier-basing this capability is self evident. We need to define the aircraft to meet this requirement with a sense of urgency and introduce this aircraft to the fleet as early as operationally possible.

A major lesson of Desert Storm is that the high technology works. Tomahawks go where we said they would go, right down the smoke stack. The stunning success of the Patriot missile, the Tomahawk cruise missile, the F–117 and other formerly untried weapons in the battlefield have proven that our continued investment in research and development is essential.

We must maintain this advantage and insure that the weapons programs of the future provide us with the edge we need to dominate the battlefield with fewer, but technologically superior weapons. Clearly, these smart weapons for use against other-than-area targets will be the weapons of choice in any future engagement.

We will require a balance between cruise missiles and aircraft-delivered weapons. This is obvious because of reasons of volume, cost and flexibility in targeting mobile, quick-response targets. You cannot address a mobile or a quick-response target with a Tomahawk missile.

Other programs of importance in my area of responsibility, are those that make up assistance to Caribbean nations. These programs provide us positive leverage in an order of magnitude that is greater than the relatively small dollars invested. Our assistance enables nations to develop an indigenous security capability and strengthens the ties between these friendly countries in the Caribbean and the United States through equipment and training.

In addition, humanitarian and civic assistance programs also provide these tools. I recently visited two field projects in Jamaica where Army and Air Force National Guard units were building a medical clinic for one town and a school addition to another. If you could have been with me during discussions with the local councilmen and the school board director, you would be convinced of the high return of these projects.

Guard commanders were uniformly enthusiastic about the quality of the field training they received as well as the job satisfaction realized in meeting the glaring humanitarian needs of children in that area. We cannot do enough of this.

Clearly, a commitment of $15 to $20 million, dedicated to security assistance will help to counter perceptions among Caribbean nations that we have a policy of benign neglect and take their freedom and friendship for granted.

This type of a commitment would provide a 10 : 1 return in support of our U.S. counter narcotic efforts and security and support for stability of the democratic process which is making headway in the Caribbean.

So I say this morning that security assistance is a good investment. And I request your assistance, the distinguished members of this committee, in ensuring that programs of the Caribbean are clearly identified and funded.

In conclusion, the realities that have led us to make the hard decisions to cut the defense budget and reduce our force structure to their lowest levels in over 10 years are clear. Equally clear is that the world is still a dangerous place. And that our national interests will not be protected by good intentions.

A reduced force structure without an attendant reduction in commitments will only lead us back to the hollow forces of the 1970s. Further, a reduced force structure without modernization will deny us the capability we require to meet our nation's defense interest.

Clearly, we must adjust to all these realities and change our way of doing business.

In order to deploy credible, viable forces in the future, we must maintain our qualitative lead in research and development. We must ensure the material and training readiness of the assets we have, and most importantly, we must support the absolutely superb people we have serving today with programs that promote the retention of the very best in our Armed Forces.

The men and women of the Atlantic Command stand ready on the front line of defense. With your continuing support, our Nation's defense interests will be met as well in the future as you and the entire world have seen them met in Desert Storm.

Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the privilege of appearing before this committee today and I stand ready to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Edney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM. LEON A. EDNEY, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee: This is my first appearance before you as Commander in Chief Atlantic, and it is my distinct pleasure today to discuss the Atlantic Command and the important part it plays in our National Security. During my appearance, I hope to provide you an overview of current defense responsibilities as viewed by the Atlantic Command; explain our concept of operations as well as priorities for employing forces in defense of our national interests; and discuss areas of concern in the Atlantic Command.

The past 12 months have seen a continuing series of rapid and frequently unpredictable changes in the political-military arena that influences U.S. defense interests. We are in a state of transition from the Cold War to a new world order. A year

ago we were debating how to spend a peace dividend. No one even the most conservative among us would have predicted that today the United States would have over one-half million servicemen and women fighting in one of the most treacherous and volatile regions in the world. Yet today, a year later, we have been involved not only in a major regional war in the Middle East, but fighting alongside what 1 year ago would have been considered a highly improbable coalition of nations. A year ago, the Soviet Union appeared well on its way to fundamental reforms which promised lessened tensions between East and West with high hopes for cooperative endeavors leading to a Europe whole and free. The ensuing year has seen Germany reunited, and Eastern European countries move out from under Soviet domination to the point the Warsaw Pact is no longer a military alliance. The Soviet leadership, for the most part, has acted responsibly on the world scene with a new spirit of cooperation rather than confrontation. The immediate threat of conflict with the Soviet Union has been significantly reduced, however, recently internal ethnic, economic, and social unrest as well as significant discrepancies in Soviet reported treaty limited equipment levels within the recently signed CFE agreements, have undermined Soviet reforms, and threaten to bring on a resurgence of repression and an attendant increase in international tensions. Thus, while the Soviet Union's decision to pull back from Eastern Europe as well as progress on arms control in the form of CFE is very encouraging, the fact remains that Soviet military capabilities are still very formidable and they represent the only nation capable of posing a direct threat to U.S. territory and world peace. The modernization of their forces continues at a high rate of production which requires credible counter force capabilities in view of the uncertainty of their intentions.

Positive changes have also occurred in areas other than the relationships between the free world and the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe, Central and South America, Africa, and the Caribbean, more and more governments are based upon electoral legitimacy reflecting the voice of the people. These emerging governments, based on democratic values and principles, and pursuing free market economies are advancing a new world order. An order that brings with it the hope of resolving conflicts and differences through cooperation, consultation and government-to-government negotiations. Events in the Persian Gulf demonstrate that when an individual or a nation resorts to brute force and flagrant military aggression that threatens world peace and the rule of international law, the new world order will not tolerate this action.

These changes on the world scene have happened so fast that in many areas, the hopes and dreams of people starving for freedom have produced greater immediate expectations than the world economy and leadership can fulfill. The realities of rapid changes taking place, the rumblings of shifting power centers and the continuing proliferation of hi-tech lethal weapons combine to convince me we are entering one of the most unstable, unpredictable, challenging and dangerous periods of international relations since World War II and perhaps in our history. The amount of change and turmoil can lead to miscalculation on the part of those who seek to take advantage of this situation for their own personal gain. Obviously Saddam Hussein made just such a miscalculation.

Another reality is that since the risks of global war with the Soviets have been greatly reduced, the nations of the free world want lower expenditures on defense and lower stockpiling of military capabilities based on negotiated arms control agreements. I have no fault with this direction, the world is changing in our favor. As the free world superpower we must take the lead and be responsive to change. The challenge in defense planning is to avoid a downward slope that is so steep you will have to expend a great deal more if you have to surge to meet an unforeseen crisis or a deteriorating world scene based on a reversion to intransigent policies by the Soviets. I believe the 6 year defense plan put forth by Secretary Cheney, which represents an approximate 25 percent reduction in force levels, addresses these realities with acceptable risks. I believe this is an acceptable downward slope that allows for mid-course corrections should our 1994 crystal ball prove cloudy in 1993.

STRATEGY FOR THE ATLANTIC AOR

While war with the Soviets appears at this time less likely, the principles of deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and force reconstitution as stated by President Bush in an address of August 1990 will remain linchpins of our national strategy and essential elements of my strategy in the Atlantic AOR. The central elements of operations in my AOR are the supremely independent Trident Nuclear Deterrent Force and the highly mobile Carrier, Aegis, Cruiser, Tomahawk Equipped Battle Groups together with combat ready amphibious marine expeditionary forces.

Complementing these naval forces are the Strategic and Mobile Tactical Air Forces plus contingency army forces apportioned to the Atlantic Command.

These combat-ready forces provide the Atlantic Command the capability to serve one basic purpose: to maintain peace and stability while guaranteeing U.S. vital interests as well as the safety of our citizens. To achieve this purpose, I see my command as having four essential missions:

First: to provide a deterrence against an attack on the United States and nations that have security ties with the United States. Should deterrence fail, I must have the capability to prosecute a war—across the full spectrum of conflict—to a successful conclusion favorable to U.S. interests.

Second: is the ability through forward presence and power projection capabilities to respond to regional crises that threaten our vital security interests or those of world peace.

Third: aggressively pursue drug surveillance and interdiction within my area of responsibility.

Finally: to provide stability and assistance to enable fragile democracies to prosper through humanitarian and nation building efforts.

Let me elaborate upon these missions by using specific examples.

Deterrence and Power Projection: The United States maintains peace through strength. Our force structure includes balanced joint strategic, conventional power projection and low-intensity conflict capabilities. This strength has provided peace and stability for the NATO Alliance for 45 years; it continued to do so even with the end of the Cold War while the alliance adjusts to the changing world around us.

Alliance Support: Notwithstanding the future changes in adversarial intent and capabilities, we cannot change or ignore geographic imperatives. As a maritime nation, we are inextricably tied to the security and access to the sea lanes of communication and via these to our friends and trading partners. For nearly a half century we have pursued maritime forward defense in support of NATO—an organization that remains credible and necessary for world collective security well into the future. Events since August have clearly demonstrated the benefits to our membership in the alliance, even beyond the obvious benefits of collective security. The individual nations of our NATO allies have made significant efforts to support U.S. leadership in the Gulf crisis, through military deployments, financial assistance to front line states and other allies, and critical support of U.S. deployments by granting overflight rights and the use of landing, port, and maintenance facilities. In addition, NATO's preplanning, established accounting system, consultation procedures, prepositioned equipment, and considerable interoperability have enhanced our collective effort in the Gulf. Our history amply demonstrates that collective security works, and recent events point to NATO as a cornerstone in partnership that will serve as a model for the new world order.

Support for Fragile Democracies: Let me take the Caribbean region as a case in point. With the exception of Cuba, the countries in the Caribbean are friendly toward the United States. All are small with austere economies and limited defense resources. As events in Haiti recently demonstrated, positive trends are evidence for growth of the democratic process. The combination of drug trafficking, crime, and struggling economies generates counter-productive factors and the potential for regional instability. It is in the American national interest to help these governments and prevent the above elements from destabilizing these Caribbean governments.

The Atlantic Command works closely with the nations of the Caribbean. We administer admittedly limited security assistance funds to selected Caribbean island nations. This assistance permits these nations to develop their law enforcement and security capabilities and to train and equip their personnel. Security assistance is an essential tool of American foreign policy—as well as a key part of our defense strategy. I urge you to support a level of funding for security assistance that is spelled out and dedicated to our neighbors close to home.

A final aspect of my strategy is the strengthening of ties with the island nations in my AOR through programs such as humanitarian/civic assistance, and military to military contacts through the developing countries exercise program. These low-cost programs are a critical element of Atlantic Command strategy for promoting regional stability; excellent political-military ties with our friends in the AOR; and counternarcotics interdiction cooperation.

Contingency Operations: During the Civil War in Liberia, the factional fighting endangered not only the lives of the Liberian people but also of foreign nationals. For over 6 months, the U.S. Atlantic command in support of CINCEUR provided 3–5 amphibious vessels with combat ready U.S. Marines for Operation Sharp Edge to ensure the safe evacuation of American citizens from Monrovia while representing U.S. diplomatic interests. This operation was typical of the flexibility and staying

power of both Navy and Marine forces and was executed simultaneously with Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

Counternarcotics: The 1989 Defense Authorization Act assigned the Department of Defense the responsibility as the lead agency for the detecting and monitoring of illegal drug traffic entering the United States. The Department of Defense was tasked to coordinate command, control, communications, and intelligence assets (C^3I) into an effective network. In this way, the U.S. Government is able to use skills that already exist in the Department of Defense. These skills are in use today to: stem the tide of illegal drugs flowing into the United States; to increase the security of U.S. borders; and to reduce the 100 billion dollar U.S. illegal drug business. We continued to aggressively pursue the drug war on all levels. Obviously we have diverted some forces as the result of Desert Shield/Storm. Until Desert Shield/Storm, the counternarcotic effort gained more of my attention than anything else. We are working very hard on the integration of the assets of all agencies involved. It is a very sophisticated and complex merging—it is jointness on another scale that merges assets of our Armed Forces with those of Coast Guard, Customs, DEA, CIA and allied countries. Commander, Joint Task Force Four, VADM Jim Irwin of the Coast Guard has done a superb job in a very difficult environment pulling all this together in the Atlantic AOR. We are all communicating better, sharing limited assets and developing close, more effective end games with Columbia and other countries. We are making an impact and getting better every day. The fact is that drugs inflict heavy damage to our society in terms of lost lives; in the rise of violent crimes; and in the destruction of the basic fabric of our society.

AOR Perspective: The size of the Atlantic Command covering over 50 million square miles of oceans that reach the shores of over 50 countries makes naval assets a game of numbers. Oceans are not occupied permanently. Distances between areas of interest are usually great but these are not boundaries, no permission to transit is required and presence can be passive or intrusive. Battle space management seeks superiority within 500 miles of our own forces with intelligence/warning out to a 1,000 miles. Naval operations are joint operations. The numbers of naval forces projected in the current Five Year Defense Plan is approximately 450 ships with an adequate balance between Trident Submarines, Carrier/Aegis/Cruise Missile Battle Groups, ASW Frigates, Attack Submarines, Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Mine Warfare capabilities. This size force is acceptable for a world that does not face an intransigent, non-cooperative, aggressive Soviet foreign policy. A force level of this nature is only adequate to meet the following defense realities:

DEFENSE REALITIES

— Soviets only nation that can seriously threaten CONUS
— Soviets remain cooperative on international scene
— Risk of Soviet attack—low
— Risk of multiple crises—low
— Force levels must sustain ability to support
  — Guaranteed nuclear deterrence
  — One major long-range contingency—SWA
  — One minor hemisphere contingency
  — Global presence
  — Alliance interdependence
  — Counter terrorism
  — Counter narcotrafficking
— Allies must meet more of the defense burdens

In addition to these realities, the permanent access to overseas bases is expected to continue to decline both as a result of reduced force levels and the dynamics of national politics in such places as the Philippines, Okinawa and Greece as examples. The net result will likely be an increased dependence on maritime forces to provide a forward presence. Naval forces were the first on the scene in the Persian Gulf crisis and will likely be the last to leave due to their flexibility and mobility. For this reason we must stabilize at the 450–475 ship level in order to meet requirements with an acceptable surge capability in time of crisis. Even so, this force level will require us to change our way of doing business. We can no longer support, nor do we require, continuous presence of a seven ship CVBG in the historic post World War II location as an example. Naval presence of the future could be a four ship CVBG sufficient to meet the conditions and risks at the time. I envision some periods where there may not be a CVBG in the Mediterranean. The naval forces and presence of the future must be tailored to the threat and the world political environment with the capability to surge in times of crisis.

PRIORITIES

The President's Fiscal Year 1992 Defense Budget represents a careful balance between Department of Defense requirements and resources. The budget reflects some very difficult decisions about our future force structure as well as weapons programs needed to support our warfighting requirements. While recognizing the realities behind many of these decisions, I would like to share with you my top priorities for the Atlantic Command which I feel are critical to maintaining our warfighting capability in the future:

Personnel Readiness and Quality of Life: My highest priority is for programs that support people—our most perishable resource. These programs include such direct incentives as pay and benefits, childcare, and family housing, but also the Quality of Life programs that support our morale, welfare and recreation requirements. These programs not only help provide our people with a working environment that is commensurate with their skills and talent, but succeed in maximizing their potential. No better proof exists of the value of our investment in high-quality people, than the splendid performance exhibited by the thousands of men and women who directly or indirectly support our efforts in Desert Shield/Storm. Recruiting and retaining high quality people is critical if we are to maintain the level of readiness and capability we need to perform our mission to defend our interests.

Pay and allowances remain a serious concern. Fair and competitive levels of military compensation are essential to our ability to recruit and retain skilled, dedicated and productive people. We need to pay our people in uniform, wages that are commensurate with what they can earn in the civilian sector. Despite the 4.1 percent pay raise approved for fiscal year 1991, we still have a 11.7 percent comparability gap as a result of military pay raises being capped below the average private TOR wage increases. We must maintain a military compensation program that is comparable with other employment alternatives. I ask for your support of the 4.2 percent fiscal year 1992 pay raise submitted in the President's budget.

As our military forces are reduced in size, compensation programs become even more important to shape that smaller force with high quality, technically competent personnel who have the critical skills needed for the advanced systems of this decade and into the next century. *Bonus Programs* have helped address the recruiting and retention problems experienced in many areas requiring special skills.

Material Readiness: In order to maintain the highest possible levels of readiness with the smaller forces of the future, funding for the maintenance/replacement of aging facilities as well as the depot level material of our major equipment end items (ships and aircraft) will be critical. The full effect of inadequate funding in these areas is not reflected in short term unit readiness, but rather in an insidious degradation of our overall capabilities. With fewer assets at our disposal to carry the fight to the enemy, we must ensure that those assets are in the highest state of material readiness.

A–6 Replacement: The decision to cancel the A–12 was a difficult one. However, the fact remains that the requirement for an extended range, stealthy, all-weather night precision carrier bombing capability is more urgent than any other. The flexibility of being able to precisely deliver six-eight weapons on one flight against fixed or mobile targets is an essential element in our power projection requirements. Should we not have the luxury of major air bases being opened to us on foreign soil adjacent to the threat, the need for carrier basing this capability is self evident. We simply do not have the staying power or fuel for repetitive long range strikes of this nature from CONUS, and the political accord may not always be there to utilize foreign bases within theater to represent uniquely U.S. interests. We need to define the aircraft to meet this requirement with a sense of urgency and achieve the earliest initial operational capability feasible. I am convinced whatever numbers of CVs our POM force levels can support, the requirement to arrive on station with 12–16 stealth aircraft capable of ranges to 800 NM is essential. The ability to surge CVs as we have done in the Persian Gulf to provide 72–100 of these aircraft on station for a major crisis response is essential to long-term U.S. security interests and world stability.

Research and Development: An ancillary lesson of Desert Shield/Storm is that high technology works. The stunning success of the Patriot missile, the Tomahawk Cruise missile, the F–117 and other formerly untried weapons on the battlefield has proven that our continued investment in Research and Development is essential if we are to maintain a qualitative edge in such areas as ASW, Laser Guided weapons and Air-to-Air Munitions for our air forces. I fully support continued development of these and other programs in order to maintain our technology base and ensure that the weapons programs of the future, provide us with the edge we need to dominate

the battlefield with fewer, but technologically superior weapons. Clearly, these systems, for use against other than area targets, will be the weapons of choice. We will always require a balance between Cruise missiles and aircraft-delivered weapons for reasons of volume, cost, and flexibility in destroying mobile or quick response targets

Sustainability: Desert Shield/Storm has graphically validated the predictions of high munitions usage rates under modern warfare conditions. It is essential that we examine inventory shortfalls as a result of the war and ensure that required inventories are replenished and older, less effective munitions replaced.

Security Assistance: Security assistance is one of our best means of promoting our interests around the world. In my area of responsibility, the programs that make up security assistance to Caribbean Nations provide us positive leverage, an order of magnitude greater than their relatively small dollar investment. Our assistance enables nations to develop an indigenous security capability and strengthens ties to the U.S. through equipment and training. Additionally, these programs provide us with one of the few tools we have to enable cooperative nations to support us in the war on drugs. I recently visited two field projects where Army and Air Force National Guard units were building a medical clinic for one town and a school addition for another. Discussions to the local councilman and school board director served to reinforce the high return from these projects. All Guard commanders were uniformly enthusiastic about the quality of field engineering training they received as well as the job satisfaction of meeting glaring humanitarian needs. We cannot do enough of this. Clearly a dedicated commitment of $15-$20 million in security assistance for the Caribbean Nations would provide a 10 to 1 return in support of U.S. counternarcotic and security support for stability of the democratic process in the region.

Security assistance is a good *investment,* and I request your assistance in ensuring that programs for the Caribbean are clearly identified and funded.

Goldwater-Nichols: The committee requested me to comment on the effectiveness and compliance with all aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation as it applies to the Atlantic Command responsibilities and Desert Shield/Storm operations in particular. This legislation has been of significant benefit to me as a unified CINC. My involvement in the Defense Planning and Resources Board process provides me the necessary forum to state requirements and voice budgetary priorities. As a result of Goldwater-Nichols, we have seen a significant improvement in the quality of assigned personnel on the staff—the services are sending us some of their very best. The promotion rates attest to this. CINCLANT and Subordinate commands are all within 1-2 percentage points of full compliance with Joint Duty Assignment and Joint Specialty Officer designation requirements which I consider within the normal officer detailing tolerance. The impact on our interoperability and joint operations has been equally impressive. I give Goldwater-Nichols on its totality a strong plus. The chain of command is simple, straight forward and understood by all. That chain for Desert Shield/Storm is CINCCENT to CJCS to Secretary of Defense to the President. Supporting CINCs like CINCLANT come on line as required either directly to the supported CINC or to CJCS. I talk directly to CINCEUR 2-3 times a week, I talk to Colin Powell on the average once a week and he is never too busy to talk to me. I have open access to the Secretary of Defense and write him a personal letter unfiltered by anyone setting forth my views on any subject I desire once a quarter. I would say communications among our top leaders are working better than ever. The chain of command within a theater is also simplified. General Schwarzkopf as CINCCENT has all assets working for him in a truly joint command. The best part of all this, in contrast to the Vietnam war, is the President is allowing those he selected to provide him military expertise and to do that he is depending on their judgment rather than micro-managing the war from Washington. I believe the Nation, and the world, can see that it has been well executed and is extremely appropriate.

Another plus contributed by Goldwater-Nichols is the transportation command. From a dead start we have moved 6 million tons of equipment, and half a million people. We have moved equipment out of the United States as well as much of what we have had in Europe for over 20 years. We have moved it in a coordinated manner and integrated the use of foreign-flag ships and our U.S. flag ships. It is a tremendous accomplishment. CINCTRANS was one of the unified commands that Goldwater-Nichols created. I think, too, that the special operating forces have performed well, particularly in this time of the terrorist threat, so I give Goldwater-Nichols good grades here also. In summary Goldwater-Nichols provided the proper direction, which generally, in a broad spectrum, was that we want the Armed Forces of this Nation to be more joint and less parochial. Congress has directed us to develop an Officer Corps that acknowledges jointness, trains in jointness, and

even effects promotional opportunities within that atmosphere. Clearly everything we do these days is a joint evolution. I don't mean "joint" just because the law made it so. We have gotten to a complexity of combined arms warfare that you can't conduct without being interactive. So I think Goldwater-Nichols was good. Clearly the ability of our Nation to respond to a crisis like Desert Shield/Storm is strengthened by having a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who is as strong militarily as Colin Powell, and who has credibility within the administration, the Congress, and his own military. He no longer has to get a consensus among his four Service Chiefs in order to make a decision or act. General Powell is a particularly effective leader. He interacts very openly with all of his Service Chiefs and Unified Commanders—the communications are good. But when he has to make a decision, he has the authority, and doesn't need a consensus. I think that is a plus. Forming Unified Joint Commands to coordinate all space and special operating forces in addition to transportation was also a plus as their performance in Desert Shield/Storm has indicated. The ability to have the Unified CINCs provide a clearer voice in the operational requirements and budgetary priorities of what is needed to carry out the military missions of the Nation, gives them added influence over their own destiny.

Sealift: I'd like to make a few comments on sealift. The Military Sealift Command has done an outstanding job meeting sealift requirements in Desert Shield/Storm. There is no question about that. We are looking right now, 7 months from a dead start, at having moved over 6 million short tons of equipment, supplies and POL to Saudi Arabia, 95 percent of it is going by sea. None of this effort was given prior notice, and all of it had to go immediately and heavier than anyone had anticipated. I give sealift extremely high grades. It is a very complex issue. When Desert Shield/Storm is over, and in the coming budgetary reviews, I expect a focal point will be that sealift needs fixing. I think we can improve sealift considerably, but we have to keep in perspective what we have done. Right now we have over 200 allied ships carrying cargo and POL across the ocean. One success story was the Maritime Prepositioning Ships, so that we had Marine forces, with all of their fighting equipment, on scene early on in this crisis, and they were a total fighting package.

I would predict that after this crisis is all over maritime prepositioning will be recognized a winner and that the Army will become more interested in afloat prepositioning because it works. It is unobtrusive, you don't have to negotiate with a lot of countries to move it, it just sits out there in international waters ready to be used. It isn't cheap however.

The Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) also were winners. Those large roll on/roll off ships can steam up to 32 knots. What we have learned from them, and put to bed, in my judgment, is that you don't need to put money into R&D for 50-knot Fast Sealift Ships. Twenty-five knots, 24 hours a day, gets you there as fast as you need to get there. I think we have learned that, when this is all over, the administration, DOD, and Congress are going to have to decide how many Army divisions they want delivered rapidly overseas and within what timeframe, then have the FSS to support this. We have eight now, I expect some number like 12-16 would suffice if we use warning time effectively.

As for sealift propulsion, I would prefer to be in either diesel because that's where the Merchant Fleets of the world are, or gas turbine. Anyone who has operated a steam plant knows that it is difficult to maintain. Steam plants run best when operated routinely. It doesn't help it to be sitting in the James River for some number of years before you use it. On the other hand, if you do have steam plants, there were plenty of things we could have done to improve reliability of the Ready Reserve Force. We have to take a look at the maintenance and interaction of responsibility for those ships between the maritime administration and the Navy.

I would say that in the future we probably would be looking at the options of buying some selected number more of the roll on/roll off ships for the Ready Reserve Fleet. We have studied the sealift issue extensively during the last 15 years. We simply need to execute a balanced sealift policy and it should be tied to a national plan to revitalize our Merchant Marine.

CONCLUSION

The realities that have led us to make the hard decisions to cut the defense budget and reduce our force structure to their lowest level in over 10 years are clear. Equally clear, however, is that the world is still a dangerous place and that our national interests will not be protected by good intentions alone. A reduced force structure without an attendant reduction in commitments or changing our employment of forces will only lead us back to the hollow forces of the 1970s and a reduced force structure without modernization will deny us the capability we require to ensure our Nation's interests are served. Clearly we must adjust to all

these realities and change our way of doing business. We in the Atlantic Command stand ready to do this and can operate within the boundaries of the budget before you.

However, in order to deploy credible, viable forces in the future: we must maintain our qualitative lead in Research and Development; ensure the material readiness of the assets we will have; and most importantly, support the absolutely superb people we have serving today with programs that allows us to retain the very best.

The men and women of the Atlantic Command stand ready to serve our Nation. With your support we will continue to ensure that our Nation's interests in the Atlantic are protected now and in the future.

DESERT STORM

Senator EXON. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you both for very well thought-out statements. We are excited as we now look to the future.

Let me just make an editorial comment. Of all of the magnificent things that happened with the great victory over Iraq, and everyone deserves applause on that from the highest general and the President, to the privates, I guess I was most amazed about the crisis management, as you referred to it in your remarks—the fact that everything went so smoothly such as the number of hours that you mentioned, General Galvin, that it took to get some Patriots into Israel. It is truly an outstanding accomplishment.

That is only the most visible. There had to be plenty of other logistical problems that we touched on in hearings yesterday. Let me ask this question: there was, I suspect, no in-depth rehearsal or planning, was there, months ahead, of the Persian Gulf campaign? In other words, such a massive logistics effort was not a top-drawer consideration of your's, General, 8 months ago, was it?

General GALVIN. No, Senator, it was not, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I went to a computer supported war game about a year ago and I walked into a big table such as we have in this room. There was a large map laid out, and it was the whole map of Europe. The war game was an attack which was taking place in the southern region of NATO—in other words, the Mediterranean region.

But when I looked over into the Central Region on this map, the markers all showed that the forces in the Central Region were still arrayed right there, as if an attack was taking place also in the Central Region, but there was not any attack, and I said what are we doing? What do we want this force here for if the attack is down in the south?

Well, basically the answer was, that is the plan we have always had. So I said, that is a plan we cannot go with now. We have got to be able to move, and when I said we have to be able to move a corps from the central region to the southern region, everybody looked at everybody else and said, that is a tough one.

So we did not have a plan to do that, but what we did have was a management arrangement which had come about over the years from doing Reforger, where we brought the American troops over each year in fairly large quantities. At one point in recent years we brought the III Corps out of Texas into the north German plain. What we did was take Reforger and worked it in reverse. Only we worked it fast. This shows some of the assistance that the Germans provided. Normally, to plan Reforger takes about 6 or 8 months. We planned it in reverse with the Germans in 3 days—all of the

port management, 600 trains which would have to move the corps, 117 ships. The whole management of that was using the old Reforger contracts in reverse.

So we had the management. We did not have the plan, but as it turned out we were trained for it, because it was the sergeants and Navy chiefs who already were trained from years and years in their careers of doing this. So we moved the III Corps, which contained 25,000 fighting vehicles and 15,000 more administrative vehicles like trucks and jeeps, a total of 40,000 vehicles and 90,000 people starting on November 19. It was in place, give or take a couple of pieces of equipment by January 15 in the Gulf.

Senator EXON. Is it fair to say then, General, our forces, because of our training, were more versatile than we maybe thought we were?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir. That is exactly right.

Senator EXON. Do you have anything to add to that, admiral, as far as the Navy is concerned?

Admiral EDNEY. Yes, I do. I agree with the assessment, but I think we oftentimes do not give ourselves credit either in this room or what we do over in the Pentagon. If I had listened to the newspapers before Desert Storm, and all of the so-called "defense experts" in this town, I would have gotten the impression; that we were buying too much equipment; that we were buying the wrong equipment; that the high technology was too high tech; that it would not work; that we did not have a strategy; and we did not have a plan.

Now, I want to assure you and the Nation that this was not an ad lib, ad hoc, pull-it-out-of-the-sky execution. We did have a strategy, we bought the right equipment, the high tech worked, the all-volunteer force was highly trained, and any plan—any contingency plan that you have on the table, is one that you pull out as a starter and then you adjust to the realities of the factors confronting you.

Three years ago, we pulled out what was the toughest contingency to address; and the toughest contingency to address was a major crisis in Southwest Asia. We had a plan, and General Schwarzkopf and General Johnson pulled out what they call the TPFDL, the time-phased flow of logistics and deployment, to support that plan. That is what they executed.

We also had a President who listened to his advisers and General Powell got one commitment out of the President: "Mr. President, if you want to do this, let us do it right with a coalition of forces that gives us minimal loss of life."

Now, we have just executed that, so that when we got into the position where we went from defensive to offensive they executed that commitment, and they went to General Galvin without a specific plan, but they executed it, and executed it magnificently.

And this is because for the last 15 years we have been doing something called Bright Star, an exercise where the Army and Air Force forces fly out of bases in our country and go into Southwest Asia where they plan and work with moderate Arab States supporting the foreign policy that you helped develop. Additionally we go up to the Norwegian Sea every 2 years and we put Marine forces ashore in a different environment.

All of those things were elements that went into the planning and was executed by bright military commanders in the field. So I do not agree with anyone that says that there was not a plan of action. There was an overall strategy, the strategy was right, and the execution of it was superb.

Senator EXON. Given the recent developments, do you think we should be pursuing aggressively the START proposal at this time coupled with treaty discussions on conventional forces in Europe?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir. I think we should pursue the START negotiation aggressively and get the START treaty. I think we should continue to push the Soviets to clear away the obstacles to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

I think we should then move on, once we get that cleared up, to the shorter-range nuclear forces negotiations. I think we should keep trying to get some kind of treaty with reference to chemical weapons. Then I think we would have a matrix of treaties on which we could base a part of our overall security strategy, the collective security strategy.

Treaties do not mean that nothing can ever happen, but what they do mean is that if there is some violation, there is a collective response. There is solidarity. There is a clear evidence of the violation. It also means there is a chance to verify and inspect and visit and therefore communicate with the other side. So I do feel that pursuit of that matrix should be worked hard as a top priority, absolute top priority.

Senator EXON. Admiral, my time is up, but I do want to get your comment on it.

ARMS CONTROL

Admiral EDNEY. I would agree that we should pursue the START process, that we can afford as a superpower to go down that road. What we have to do, though, is recognize what we have learned and what has been successful in the past, and that is peace through strength, standing up to the requirements. If you make an agreement, you have to live up to it.

If in the first stages of an agreement you come in with what appears to be a facade with numbers that differ from what we know as reality, then we must address those facts. However, we should pursue the short path, we should continue to offer the hand of friendship to the Soviet Union, we should take advantage of the window that General Galvin described, and try to open it up and let the breeze of freedom come through.

Senator EXON. Thank you. Senator Mack?

Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to pursue some thoughts with you with respect to where we are going in this 5- or 6-year plan.

One of the comments that you made kind of focuses me back on discussions that we had in this room with Secretary Cheney and General Powell—actually, it was in a different location—and the question was if under this 5- or 6-year plan we would be able to put the forces together that we did in this last few months, and I sensed some real skepticism as to our ability to do that in the year 1995 or 1996, and would just like to get your reaction.

Do you think that we could put together such a force, given the scenario that is developing—the budget proposals that are being worked out for 1995 and 1996? Could we put together such a force?

Admiral EDNEY. It would not be as easy, and it was not easy today, but it would not be as easy to do that, if I understand where we will be in 1996. In 1996 we will be at 12 carrier battle groups, as an example, whereas today we stand at 14. We had 6 carrier battle groups over there on station and we had 3 others ready to go. In fact, *Forrestal,* and *Nimitz,* and *Independence,* were sitting back here. You will not have those forces in 1996, so it will not be as easy.

I believe we have gained something by this tremendous trauma we have gone through in the Middle East and that we will go forward and benefit and the world will benefit. But what I have said if the trends continue, if the Soviet Union remains cooperative and not intransigent, if we move towards what President Bush was talking about last night, towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, those things, then, make this plan, which is a risk-taking plan, one of acceptable risk.

However, each year that we go through this force reduction process, if we see indications that the Soviets are moving further to the right, that they are getting intransigent, that they are not moving out of Germany, that they are not moving their forces out of the old Warsaw Pact countries, and that there are further problems in Southwest Asia in addition to what may be going on in the Pacific, then no, we cannot continue to reduce our forces to the future year defense plan level.

So I think you have to look at your crystal ball every year and make those tough judgments that the combination of the legislative process and the executive process goes through yearly.

Senator MACK. General, I will get to you in just a minute, but I want to follow up with the Admiral.

It does appear to me that things look a little different today with respect to the Soviets than they did a year ago. Clearly, there has been that movement back towards the old guard, if you would—the KGB, the military—that there is a sense of, without making a judgment on Gorbachev himself at this point, that clearly he is paying attention to that portion of Soviet society.

When we see the use of force in the Baltic States, we see censorship reappearing in Soviet reporting, we hear comments by Boris Yeltsin as to dictatorship and others making those statements, that sounds to me what you are saying is that maybe we ought to be a little bit more concerned at this point than we were a year ago.

Admiral EDNEY. Well, obviously I believe that the recent trends that you identified in the Soviet Union should be raised—we talk about this thing called indication and warning.

Senator MACK. I also forgot to mention the CFE.

Admiral EDNEY. That is correct. Concerning the CFE, the initial presentation of what the Soviets came in with was so far short of what we expected, that intelligence predicted, and the world understood, that they have to be addressed. They are being addressed now, and it will affect the cooperative process until that is resolved.

The other issues that we are talking about are measured issues. So that when I say that we have to be ready to change our way of doing business, I am speaking as a supporting CINC. I am a maritime-oriented CINC who supports General Galvin, General Schwarzkopf, and General Joulwan. So when General Galvin says that he wants a carrier battle group in the Mediterranean, if we go down to these force levels, we can have forces present there, but they are going to be different in composition than they are today.

So in 1995, if I have two *Arleigh Burke* destroyers, an Aegis cruiser, and an aircraft carrier, that is an acceptable 4-ship carrier battle group sufficient to replace the current 7-ship carrier battle group as long as the crisis and the world environment remains at the current level and continues in a positive trend.

Then we can surge to meet a crisis that grows, because in that future carrier battle group we have to take advantage of what we are buying. The *Arleigh Burke* destroyer brings with it 90 cruise missiles. Aegis provides the air defense, and the carrier provides those capabilities of which you are well aware.

If underneath I have one submarine with that group, that brings another 27 cruise missiles. That is a strong, potent force for General Galvin if we are in a peaceful, cooperative environment.

If we are in an antagonistic, intransigent environment, then you are going to have to surge additional assets. If the world situation continues to go in the direction that he describes, the non-cooperative area that the Soviets have taken a corner on, then, as I said before, it becomes a numbers game.

So if you start having additional concerns up in the Kola Peninsula because he has got more naval forces in the Kola Peninsula now than we had last year, and they are higher quality and better, and he is not cooperative but he is intransigent, then you do not have enough numbers.

But the way I see it going now, within the risks we have to take, it is an acceptable budget, one that has to be adjusted every year to make sure the direction matches your funding.

Senator MACK. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could just get the General to respond to that first question I raised.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Yes.

General GALVIN. Your question about what we could do, say in 1995, if we had a crisis like the Gulf. In 1995 my command will be much smaller. If we go along the route we have planned, where I now have two corps in Europe I will have one, and where I have about eight wings of air, I will have three to four. And on the Navy side I may or may not at times have a carrier battle group in the Mediterranean. That depends on what Admiral Edney is able to do with the reduced number of carriers and other ships.

So obviously whatever we do we are going to be doing with less standing force. Now a lot depends on our ability to generate and project power. Generating that means the mobilization capability, the reserves, their training. Projecting it means bases like Crotone. If we have something like that, it is going to be helpful. Crotone is about half- way to a lot of danger areas in this world.

But we are going to be able to depend less on the standing force and more on force generation, and that takes time. So if the crisis builds slowly and we manage it well, maybe we will do all right.

But we will not have the same assets at that time and not have the same capabilities that we have today.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my welcome.

General, can you tell us what the current plans are in terms of troop reductions in Europe this year, 1991, 1992-proposed, and the 5-year plan, and how that has been affected by the Persian Gulf? I am talking about our troop level.

General GALVIN. Well, we are trying right now, and I have been continuing the reductions. When I leave here I go back to a ceremony reducing another battalion out of the 1st Infantry Division in Stuttgart. We are continuing the reductions there.

What we are trying to see now is, given what has happened in the Gulf with the move of VII Corps and Air Force units whether or not we can stay on the same schedule to get down in the mandated vicinity of 261,000. That is still a matter that there is still some water that has to go over the dam. We are doing the best we can do to make those moves in an orderly fashion.

But that is still the peg on the wall. That is the figure that the Congress has given us. That is the figure that we are aiming at. We have been fighting a war at the same time, so if we can still manage, fine, but I think there is going to have to be some relief in there while we try to play catch-up here in these days right now.

Senator LEVIN. The 261,000 figure was for the end of the fiscal year?

General GALVIN. I believe that is correct—the end of fiscal year 1991.

Senator LEVIN. Is there any plan for the next fiscal year?

General GALVIN. Well, the overall idea is to come down to a level of one corps instead of two corps and three to four wings instead of eight wings.

Senator LEVIN. Translate that into the overall troop level number.

General GALVIN. I cannot do that because I do not know. A corps is a corps. I do not want to sound like Gertrude Stein, but a wing is a wing is a wing and so forth, and a fleet is a fleet.

I do not know what those final numbers will be. That is in fact where I get a little bit of flexibility here as I try to do my planning for my force structure. I think the corps will contain two divisions, but I do not know how many corps troops—cavalry squadrons and artillery brigades and so forth—there will be.

Senator LEVIN. What is the timetable for that reduction from two corps to one?

General GALVIN. We do not have a final timetable. We are looking at 1994–1995 as the general goal. I do not want to make it sound as if nothing is happening. A lot is happening in terms of the reductions, but I do not know myself. That had not been mandated. I do not know what the final timetable or the final numbers would be.

Senator LEVIN. Can you tell us what our NATO allies have announced or are planning in terms of troop reductions?

General GALVIN. Yes. In the central region of NATO, first of all, Senator, the NATO allies have shown in their 5-year plans that ba-

sically by 1995–1996 they will be down somewhere in the vicinity of half the forward-deployed force in the Central Region that they have there now. I am talking about what the Germans have, the Belgians, the Dutch, the British and so forth.

In the Northern Region, the forces there are basically reserve forces, and I do not see much change there. In the Southern Region, I am not too sure. That is a very mixed region—what the Greeks and Turks might do compared to what the Italians or the Spanish and Portuguese might do. But the Central Region is where I think your interest is mostly.

My idea about this is that we will come down to about half the forward-deployed force that we have had there, and so will the other nations—about the same. So basically we will be proportionately what we were before, and I think that is a good thing.

Senator LEVIN. Are the Germans making deeper cuts than the others or faster cuts?

General GALVIN. No. They are not making deeper or faster cuts in the planning that they have laid out for the next five years.

Senator LEVIN. Will the troops returning from Saudi Arabia in any case be returning very briefly to Europe and then immediately picking up their families and coming home?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir, they will, because, whether they are married or not married, they have all of their personal belongings, all of their gear, everything they own, in Europe. So they will come back, pick up their families and come back to the United States with new assignments.

One of the problems is, we did not know what those assignments would be, and we still do not know in some cases now.

As you know, we told the families it was up to them. They could go home if they wanted to, but that we were ready to provide them community services if they stayed. One percent of the families came back here to the United States, and of that one percent about half returned again to Europe during this time.

Senator LEVIN. We have about 90,000 troops that went from Europe?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. That is a public figure now, I think.

General GALVIN. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Do you have any idea what percentage of those troops, roughly, will be redeployed to Europe and then almost immediately pick up families and come here? Is that a large percentage or will that be a small percentage?

General GALVIN. No. That will be a fairly large percentage. That will be the part that we reduce in this fiscal year, that we continue to reduce. The reductions have already been going on. So we will just continue that.

Senator LEVIN. Can you comment on the way in which Soviet equipment fared in the Persian Gulf war compared to ours? Is it that our equipment was significantly better or that they were operated poorly by the Iraqis? We bested them so clearly. Give us your assessment of that.

General GALVIN. First of all, whether Army, Navy and Air Force, the first thing you have to look at is not the individual equipment but how we put it all together—in other words, how we

orchestrated that. We did a beautiful job of that. Norm Schwarzkopf deserves a lot of praise for that, a lot.

On the other hand, we dismantled the electronic spectrum and all the other things that would allow Saddam Hussein to utilize his equipment as packages, as something that was put together as an organization. This is one of the things we get into when we say the Bradley vehicle or something else is vulnerable. The Bradley or the AWACS may be vulnerable by itself, but it is not by itself. It is in this whole package.

But, to return specifically to the equipment, the T-72, for example, the Soviet export equipment which they send to other countries like they sent to Iraq is not the same. It is not the same T-72. It is stripped of some of its capabilities. Nevertheless, if Saddam had been able to orchestrate well, if he had been able to synchronize his efforts both on ground and in air, he would have done pretty well with that equipment. That was good equipment.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Thurmond is in South Carolina today attending the funeral of a friend, and he has asked that I include his statement in the record.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection. Senator Dixon also has a statement he wishes to be made a part of the record.

[The prepared statements of Senators Dixon and Thurmond follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN DIXON

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have such a distinguished panel before us today to examine the security requirements relating to NATO.

I welcome the proposed military force reductions called for in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. I welcome the announced formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact military bloc.

I am very concerned, however, about the continued use of force by the Soviet Union within the Baltic Republics. Are we seeing a reversion to the old tactics of oppression?I am also concerned by the persistent Soviet military modernization programs. It doesn't make sense for the Soviets to be modernizing their military forces at a time when they can't feed, clothe, or employ their people.Finally, I am concerned about the reported Soviet non—compliance with the letter and spirit of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. If it turns out the Soviet Government is truly not in compliance, then there will be an obvious delay in the reduction of military forces in Europe. The completion of the START Treaty will be in jeopardy.

Perhaps we can still pull troops out of NATO. But the pace and extent of those troop reductions are now, unfortunately, more of an issue and a concern than they were just a few short months ago.

I am hopeful that this distinguished panel will provide those of us on the committee with valuable insights into these issues and any other matters bearing on the security needs and requirements of NATO in the ever-changing world in which we find ourselves.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Mr. Chairman: I join you and the ranking member, Senator Warner, in welcoming General Calvin, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, and Admiral Edney, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. General Calvin has appeared before this committee on numerous occasions and has always presented us with thoughtful and incisive testimony on the military and political situation in Europe. Admiral Edney is making his first appearance as the Commander of the Atlantic

Command and I expect that he will follow in the great tradition of his predecessor Admiral Kelso.

Mr. Chairman, General Calvin and Admiral Edney represent the commands which played the key role in checking Soviet expansion over the past 40 years. Despite the fact that the Warsaw Pact has dissolved, the Soviet Union still has powerful military forces that continue to modernize in both conventional and strategic arms. For those reasons both the European Command and the Atlantic Command must remain powerful forces in the defense of freedom.

I have stated repeatedly that I am concerned that the planned reductions in our Nation's defense budget need close scrutiny. We cannot allow—despite the Soviet Union's economic chaos and internal strife—our forces to be reduced to such a point where we cannot meet the Soviet threat in Europe and on the high seas.

Our forces must be based on capability not intentions. Today, the Soviet intentions are peaceful, can we be assured that President Gorbachev's successor will be inclined in the same direction?

Mr. Chairman, the victory over the tyrant Saddam Hussein was the result of good leadership, good soldiers, and good equipment. It was also the result of this Nation's commitment during the last decade to rebuilt our forces. We can not afford to waiver from that commitment. The world is too unstable and whether we like it or not, we are the only nation that has the economic, political, and military power to lead the World into the coming century.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN. Also Senator McCain could not stay. He would like to have asked both of our witness a leading question as to whether or not one of the lessons of Desert Storm is we need more sealift and airlift. I assume that both of you would say yes to that, as well as more prepositioning.

Admiral EDNEY. We need to fix those lessons that we learned on sealift and airlift, and I think the general answer is yes.

FFG–7

Senator COHEN. Admiral Edney, perhaps you could give us some guidance on this. The new plan for a 450-ship Navy would include about 150 guided missile ships. Could you discuss in open session perhaps some of the shortcomings of the frigate class guided missiles that we have over there—the FFG–7—compared to, let us say, the Aegis destroyer or cruiser?

Admiral EDNEY. Well, certainly the FFG–7 was built for a limited capability. It is an escort type frigate that emphasizes ASW, with the LAMPS Mark-3 system, and it has a minimal anti-air capability. It is also an ideal type ship to protect transiting logistics ships. It is also an ideal ship as a force multiplier within a carrier battle group. But it does not have the total combined arms and air defense capability of an Aegis system.

Senator COHEN. Nor the phased array radar?

Admiral EDNEY. Nor the phased array radar.

Senator COHEN. What is the likelihood that stealth technology is going to be incorporated in anti-ship missiles being distributed throughout the world? In other words, what kind of a threat are we going to face or are we likely to face in the next five or ten years? Is it going to increase in terms of anti-ship technology being potentially directed against American ships?

Admiral EDNEY. Clearly I believe the answer to that is yes. I have expressed to the Secretary of Defense that we crossed several thresholds in this war, and one of the thresholds is that zero CEP weapons—that is, precision delivery of accurate weapons—is the

wave of the future. The other is that stealth works, and allows you to minimize your loss and maximize your effectiveness.

Anyone who understands the art of warfare understands. My response to that is that not only do we need those things, but we need to be looking at anti-stealth technology. So clearly I agree with you that those people who can afford it are going to be seeking stealth, and we need to be looking at anti-stealth technology.

Senator COHEN. But does that mean that we ought to be looking at more of the Aegis type of defense systems than we currently have on the frigates?

Admiral EDNEY. Well, clearly the Aegis phased array radar that is on our 27 Aegis cruisers and will be on our Arleigh Burke destroyers are the way you should go to defend fleet forces in the modern era, yes, sir.

Senator COHEN. General Galvin, last year the Committee expressed some concern that proceeding with the advanced tactical fighter might preclude the timely modernization of other tactical aircraft, such as close air support and multi- role aircraft. The Committee ordered a comprehensive review that would include a consideration of developing a modernized air superiority fighter that would be less capable than the ATF in order to free up funds for modernization of those close air and multi-role aircraft.

Do you think the committee's concerns were justified last year?

General GALVIN. Well, what I am primarily concerned about is to make sure that I have multi-role capability. That is the most important thing to me in this. That is more important to me than aircraft that are going to be designed for a specific role and that are not flexible to be re-roled in the operations.

Senator COHEN. On page 11 of your testimony you did mention the air superiority factor, and I guess what you are saying is that that is of less consideration to you than having a more capable, all-around, multi-capability?

General GALVIN. That is correct.

Senator COHEN. So you think that we can in fact have something less capable than the ATF, maybe the F-15XX, that might be adequate for the job?

General GALVIN. Really, I set a requirement, and I do not know how that requirement is going to be met, with what specific aircraft. What I am concerned about is multi-role capability.

Senator COHEN. Admiral Edney, what do you think about that?

FUTURE AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS

Admiral EDNEY. I think it is obvious the delta in what we have just accomplished is air superiority. So air superiority is essential to carry out fleet operations today. Air superiority is also essential to carry out land battles with minimal loss and minimal attrition of equipment.

So I would not trade off air superiority. But what General Galvin is talking about is that we establish requirements. General Galvin did not say that he does not have a requirement for air superiority. What he said was that he has requirements, and if there is not enough money to pay for all of those requirements he has to have a dual mission capable system that does several jobs for him.

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I believe that that is why we are going to the strike fighter. Clearly when you develop a strike fighter there is no free lunch in life. You compromise; you give up a little bit of your air superiority capability and you give up a little bit of your air-to-ground capability. I agree that the wave of the future, with what I understand is our budget environment, is to seek dual-capable aircraft.

Senator COHEN. I take it you agree with the committee's recommendation of last year, both of you?

Admiral EDNEY. What was that recommendation?

Senator COHEN. The recommendation was that we look toward a modernization of the air support and multi-role aircraft, that we have something less than the most advanced ATF and look to see whether we could not accomplish the same job or come closer to accomplishing the same job with something less capable than the ATF, given the fact that we are facing diminishing funding.

Admiral EDNEY. You cannot answer any of these questions devoid of the world around you. So if you accept that you are not going to fight the Soviets, that the Soviets are going to be at some level cooperative—they might be difficult to deal with, but you are not going to fight them—then I would agree with that answer.

If you tell me we are going to fight the Soviets, then I would give you a different answer.

Senator COHEN. What I am telling you is you are going to have less money, period.

Admiral EDNEY. If we are going to have less money, then I agree with you.

Senator COHEN. Could I ask just one other question, Mr. Chairman?

I would like both of your opinions, if you could, about the potential for EUCOM and CENTCOM being made components of a new Atlantic Command. Could you tell me what you think the benefits would be and the costs involved if that were to be the case?

General GALVIN. I have not looked at that, and I could not tell you that on the idea of the Atlantic Command, I have had a few chats with Colin Powell. That is very much a broad conceptual idea, I think, in his mind. It has not been something that I have gone into in any detail. So I really do not have an answer for you on that.

Senator COHEN. Are you going to give that some thought in terms of making any recommendations to General Powell?

General GALVIN. I would say that if General Powell begins to move along on that idea and if it becomes part of workups to the unified command plan, which is a periodic study that we do, as you know, then obviously I will get very interested in that.

UCP

Admiral EDNEY. Well, I also agree that as a unified commander I have not been asked by the Chairman, nor has he put a unified command proposal on the table for review by the unified commanders.

I am aware of his thought process, and I did of course read his statement before the Congress. I would simply say I do not know where he is going, so I cannot give you a process. I have given a lot

of thought to it. But just to kind of put it in context, when I outlined what the responsibilities of my command are today, they are as a supporting CINC to three major land commanders.

I have 50 million square miles of ocean that I provide ships and marine forces to support these land commanders. Now, as I understand the UCP that was defined, General Powell added to those 50 million square miles of ocean the continent of Europe, the continent of Africa, the continent of South America, and southwest Asia.

Those areas handled by three 4-star Army generals at this time, so you can see that there is a tremendous amount of analysis and review that is necessary and perhaps Desert Storm has even changed some of the realities of that environment. I think it is premature for me to make judgments until the Chairman puts his ideas before us.

Senator COHEN. I apologize for trespassing on the Chairman's time. But this committee played, I think, a pretty significant role in the creation of CENTCOM itself. There was quite a bit of debate back in the early 1980s in terms of whether there was going to be a new command or whether or not PACOM was going to have the responsibility for the Persian Gulf, or whether EUCOM would have it. And you had quite a conflict between the Navy and the Marine Corps and the Air Force and the Army on that, and eventually what you had was Secretary Weinberger saying we will have a Central Command, with a 4-star heading that up.

So I was just trying to explore where we seem to be going in the future.

Admiral EDNEY. I would make one comment. I agree with General Galvin. It is awfully hard to argue with success, and I could not imagine anyone doing a better job than General Schwarzkopf has just accomplished for this nation.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen, thank you.

General Galvin, welcome. I did not make it for the beginning, and I regret I missed your statement. Admiral Edney, we welcome you here today, too. I had a meeting that I could not leave.

General, in unclassified testimony last week, CIA Director Webster said: "The Soviet forces are inexorably on the way out of central Europe. The U.S.S.R.'s economic troubles will constrain its military power and modernization efforts. Thus, the kind of Soviet military buildups we witnessed in the past are unlikely to be repeated in the coming years. The ability of Soviet theater forces to launch a strong premeditated attack against the west will remain low over the next 5 years."

Do you generally agree with that assessment?

General GALVIN. I do not disagree with that assessment, Mr. Chairman. I think "inexorably" is a word that does not have time attached to it, and what we are seeing is a slowdown in the overall plan for the Soviets to move out of the Federal Republic of Germany and out of other places.

I hope that the Soviets will stay on schedule. There are 350,000 Soviets still in Germany, and this week senior Soviet leaders have said: "We cannot keep to the schedule; we have too many troubles with it." The Soviet Union is going to move back away from the Warsaw Pact nations, out of the Warsaw Pact nations. That means

there will be some distance in there between NATO and the Soviet Union, and distance means time, and therefore we can make some changes.

We can allow for more time; therefore, we can put things in reserve. We can leave smaller standing forces. But we are still facing a Soviet Union that could destroy us in a hurry, if it wanted to and if we were not prepared, and a Soviet Union that is going to be stronger than the European NATO all put together.

I see a Soviet Union that is, as I said, changing. There was a window that opened when Gorbachev came in, and that window seems to be closing now. Thank God we got a lot done while it was open. But how long will it actually stay open or open the way it was?

I feel that the Soviet Union should not be considered an adversary, but certainly there is a question of balancing the force that the Soviet Union has available to it. If we do not have that kind of balance we will not have stability in Europe.

Chairman NUNN. General, despite the recent reversals in Soviet reform, do you still believe that the trend in Soviet conventional power is downward?

General GALVIN. I believe the trend will generally be downward. I think it will level off probably higher than it would have, certainly than it appeared say a year or a year and a half ago. Things are changing in the Soviet Union now in a different way. They are reverting back toward conservatism. There is more dependence on the Red Army for order, and therefore there is more influence of the Red Army on events.

So I do not know where the leveling-out point would be, but I would guess that it is not going to be as low as we might have thought. We are beginning to see that in the arms control treaty negotiations. Even though it is signed, there are still things that need to be negotiated right now, because the Soviets want to hang on to more.

We saw this in the fight that the Soviets had to keep high levels in arms control—over 13,000 tanks, for example. We did not want to keep that much in the West, but the Soviets drove it up and drove the other numbers up also. So there will be a leveling off. There will be a drop, but I wonder what the levels will be. I think they will be still pretty significant, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. According to press reports, policy disagreements between the United States and France are impeding progress in formulating the alliance's new military strategy. Could you tell us anything about that and how we are coming with the strategy effort under way within the alliance?

General GALVIN. I do not think that France will impede the strategy. France is in on the negotiations on the strategy and the construction of it. We are in the third iteration of the draft strategy. There has been more and more consensus, and I think that when we go to the meetings of the Defense Planning Committee here in May that we may very well get an approval of the draft strategy there.

I am not sure of that, but things are moving along.

Chairman NUNN. On page 2 of your statement you mention Secretary Cheney's recent articulation of a "new defense strategy

which sizes our forces principally against major regional contingencies that threaten American interests while keeping a watchful eye on Soviet military power."

Is this the strategy on which you are now basing your planning as CINCEUR?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir, it is.

Chairman NUNN. How does this relate to the NATO strategy that is now emerging or under study?

General GALVIN. The NATO strategy calls for—and I am quoting now what was said in the London Declaration, since the final strategy is not out, but the strategic principles are all there—smaller forces, more dependence on force generation, high mobility, and multinationality. Those are the major differences.

Smaller forces obviously is part of that. I see us coming down in the European Command from two corps to one, from eight wings or so down to three or four, and cuts in the naval forces. So I think that goes along with what the NATO strategy is, but it also goes along with what the U.S. strategy is.

Chairman NUNN. You may have answered this in previous questioning, if you have we will have it for the record, just let me know. On pages 9 and 10 of your statement you state that one-third of EUCOM's combat forces and 90,000 of its personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf. I recognize very well that a lot of those troops need to go back to their families with their personal gear and all of that; I completely agree with that.

However, all the unit's major equipment does not need to go back to Europe. Do you have any kind of analysis now about the amount of equipment that has been sent to the Persian Gulf that is scheduled to go back to Europe, and do you have an analysis as to how much of that is needed in Europe and why?

General GALVIN. Well, we are still working on that because we have the complex question of how much is going to be put into POMCUS, what kind of prepositioned equipment levels we are going to have in the future, whether or not there will be prepositioned levels in the same places geographically as they were before, what the theater reserve stocks will look like, and then what the detailed force structure of that corps and those wings will be.

But that does not mean that there is not a lot of effort going on. I would think that basically what is going to happen is that some of that equipment is going to go straight back to the United States, some will go into storage in locations where it was before and maybe some in other places, and then some will go back to units from which it deployed in the first place.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral, on page 11 of your statement you say that you can "envision some periods where there may not be a CVBG carrier battle group in the Mediterranean." Does that assume that Crotone will be built?

Admiral EDNEY. No, it does not.

Chairman NUNN. So you are not basing it on that assumption?

Admiral EDNEY. No, I am not.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Just one more question on the same subject that the Chairman was talking to you about, General Galvin, and that I raised with you before. You say that you are

currently planning for these troop reductions —the reduction from two corps to one and so forth.

Is that a plan which has a timetable to it? In other words, have you given somebody or yourself some kind of a deadline, saying that by X month of X year we are going to have a plan in terms of this effort?

General GALVIN. No, Senator Levin, but the general idea is we are looking out at the 1995 time frame—out that way.

Senator LEVIN. You do not have, for instance, a study or a plan that is due in a certain month of this year?

General GALVIN. No, I do not.

Senator LEVIN. Okay.

General, the Warsaw Pact is going to be dissolved on March 31, and some of the nations of eastern Europe I believe have indicated some interest in possibly joining NATO. Is that true and what is your reaction?

General GALVIN. Some of the nations in eastern Europe have indicated that they would like to join NATO. Most of those indications have been informal statements made publicly about that. NATO itself has given indications that it recognizes there has to be some kind of a relationship with the eastern European countries, to include the Soviet Union, in the question of overall European security.

How that relationship evolves is something that nobody seems to want to try to predict in any detail right now, but steps are being taken. The first one was to say, in the London Declaration, that the eastern European countries or former Warsaw Pact nations are no longer adversaries, and the second step was to talk about diplomatic liaison at NATO. In other words, come and sit at the table with us.

I would assume that there will be more steps in that direction. Also, CSCE, the overall structure there I think will be related somehow to NATO, with NATO being the backbone alliance and CSCE covering some security issues. I think this will tend to be something that will be not laid out in a detailed plan. I think that would be very close to impossible, but it will be something that will grow in an organic way—in other words, one step after another—through assimilation, through aggregation, through various arrangements and will eventually lead to a pan-European security.

Senator LEVIN. Have you had discussions with top level military officials of eastern European countries about that issue?

General GALVIN. I have had some discussions with Soviet senior military about this.

Senator LEVIN. Have they visited you in NATO?

General GALVIN. Yes, they have. Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Lobov was there a couple of weeks ago. I have visited with Lushev, who is the commander up until the end of March of the Warsaw Pact.

Senator LEVIN. How about eastern European military leaders? Have you met with any of them?

General GALVIN. No, I have not. I am going to be visiting Prague in the near future.

Senator LEVIN. Any other plans for visits from them to you or you to them other than Czechoslovakia?

General GALVIN. Yes. We are developing plans in the military committee and major NATO commanders, like Admiral Edney and myself, are preparing plans for a spectrum of visits—visits at the lower level where we can have seminars and so forth, because we want to make communication with younger upcoming, developing officers, and then visits at the senior level on policy matters and so forth.

Senator LEVIN. Have you noticed in your meeting with Soviet military leaders any shift in attitude or planning? We know what is happening at the top level. We read about events in the Baltics. How about your personal relationships, if any, with them? Have you noticed a shift there?

General GALVIN. I have had a chance to go to Moscow and Kiev and Sevastapol. I have talked to Moiseyev and Yazov and Gromov and others, and Admiral Kronopolis of the Black Sea fleet. I find them to be open, objective, ready to talk, not necessarily in agreement on a lot of issues but wanting more communication.

I really think that communication is the answer because what I have done so far—and I think what all of us have done, western military leaders—is a drop in the bucket compared to what ought to be going on. I think that we can solve some military logjams at lower levels, which would allow for better political relationships at higher levels. But there has been some reluctance to support all of that.

I hope that is breaking up now and we will get this communication.

Senator LEVIN. Is that reluctance on our part, their part, or both of us?

General GALVIN. It is on our part, the western side. In the U.S., for example, very often when the Soviets do something we do not like, we shut off communication. My opinion is that we ought to look at that one again. Even if they do something we do not like, we ought to keep up the communication. What we are interested in is change, and we are not going to get it without communication.

Senator LEVIN. Do you have enough contacts with the Soviets so that you would notice if there is any shift over time in attitude?

General GALVIN. I am not sure I would notice a shift that way, but I do think I see a shift right now. I see a shift in Soviet attitudes. Before this, there was a great deal more talk about military reform than there is right now. Now there is more talk about order.

Senator LEVIN. Is it in your context you notice that, or is that through what you read?

General GALVIN. Well, partially it is in my context. But unfortunately most of my context still remains intelligence and so forth rather than direct communication.

Senator LEVIN. What is your assessment of the next generation of conventional weapons the Soviets are planning? Given the lousy state of their economy, do you see any reduction in the plans for the next generation of conventional weapons on their part?

General GALVIN. Soviet military leaders have been talking publicly in the last couple of weeks or last month or so about the absolute need for high quality military equipment. They are looking at the example of the Gulf and they are saying that we have got to

get with it here and really make sure we have high quality technology, especially if we are going to be a smaller force.

Senator LEVIN. And that is despite their economic problems?

General GALVIN. That is despite them.

Senator LEVIN. Do you know whether or not that approach on the part of the military leadership has been adopted by the political leadership? Will they be able to carry off the acquisition of a next generation of conventional capability with those economic problems of theirs, or will they have to reduce their plans?

General GALVIN. I think economic realities will definitely have an effect on their plans, but I think they will push very hard and they are getting more influential right now. That is the major trend. It is the influence of the military growing stronger, so they will probably get a good amount of that.

They are still building four different kinds of ICBMs, for example. That willingness to sacrifice in order to hold to a strong production of military equipment is probably going to continue, but maybe not quite at the same levels. They cut their tank production back by half, but they are still producing more tanks than the NATO nations put together.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral, Norway recently accused the Soviet Union of building up its Backfire bomber forces on the Kola Peninsula despite previous Soviet assurances that there would be reductions in that region. How do you assess the Soviet threat in the northern region? Is it increasing or declining?

SOVIET THREAT

Admiral EDNEY. If you make the assumption that the Soviets are a threat, then the threat has increased in the Kola Peninsula, both in the transfer of air and infantry units and also the increasing productivity of their submarine force.

The challenge is, is it really an increase in the threat or is it just that they have to find someplace to put the equipment they redeploy from central Europe.

Chairman NUNN. Is that just because they continue to turn out the Backfire bombers, or are they redeploying from elsewhere?

Admiral EDNEY. They are redeploying some MiG–29s and they are redeploying what they call naval infantry. One could assume that this is a way to get around some of the CFE top-level equipment definitions of what is a verifiable asset but one could also say that as all of this equipment comes out of central Europe they have simply chosen the kola to store it.

I personally visited the Kola Peninsula with Admiral Crowe, and it is a vast wasteland, and it is a place that would be logical to put additional equipment if you were bringing it out of Europe.

MERCHANT MARINE FORCE REVITALIZATION

Chairman NUNN. Admiral, your testimony on page 20 states: "We simply need to execute a balanced sealift policy that should be tied to a national plan to revitalize our merchant marine." What

do you think should be done to revitalize our merchant marine? What do you prescribe on that?

Admiral EDNEY. Well, I thought the study that was done two years ago was a good, balanced plan. My discussions with shipbuilders in Europe lead me to believe that as Europe becomes whole and free that there is going to be more and more business on the high seas, and that as a maritime superpower we should be participating in that business. It should not be just Japan and other countries, including many of our NATO allies, that are building ships.

I would like to see us get back into the shipbuilding business. As we decline down to a 450-ship Navy, we are going to have to shut down a shipyard, while we should be sustaining the maritime industry in this country. I think General Johnson's initial approach as you look at sealift says that the lessons that we learned out of Desert Storm are that we can use some more fast sealift ships, that they worked extremely well, and that we ought to get some more roll-on and roll-off ships.

But I do not think we can afford to acquire large numbers of those ships, either brand new or bought off the open market relatively new, and tie them up on the James River. We need to get involved, but I do not think it has to be done with large amounts of subsidies. I think we can be competitive in the market out there, and we need to work that issue.

I do not think it needs more study. We have studied it quite a bit.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My apologies, gentlemen, for being tardy. It is nice to see both of you again.

General Galvin, this committee received testimony just a week or so ago, I believe, from a series of experts on eastern Europe, at which time I inquired of them their views with respect to these emerging democracies taking their very, very scarce economic assets and beginning to build up their own individual military forces.

I wonder first if you would comment about the extent of your knowledge as to the extent they are doing this and, second, the wisdom of doing it, given the stress to the breaking point on these fledgling economies and whether or not they really need these forces.

General GALVIN. Senator Warner, I really do not have a lot of detail about the military buildup in the eastern European, former Warsaw Pact countries. In general terms, I see them turning to a modernization of their military forces and an independent or nationalizing action. I do think that that does present some problems for the future.

Now to me the only way that something like that could be adjusted to make a more favorable arrangement would be if there were some kind of collective security organization that would mean that it was not necessary for the nations to have a completely national force. We are moving toward that with CSCE, but I think it is going to be some time before those nations are confident that they can get along in a collective way.

Right now they are moving individually. To what extent, it is really hard to determine, at least right now.

Senator WARNER. Is there a strong likelihood that any significant disagreement between one or more of these nations could develop such that they would utilize these military forces against one another?

General GALVIN. The history of the region——

Senator WARNER. Is very unstable.

General GALVIN [continuing]. Is one of instability.

Senator WARNER. And there are some long, deeply-rooted animosities—border disputes, ethnic disputes and the like —any one of which could erupt at any time into some problems.

General GALVIN. That is correct—ethnicism, cultural nationalism, including ideological questions. These things can generate problems again as they did in the past.

Senator WARNER. Would you think the Soviet Union would try and step in in some manner to resolve this or just stand by and let it go?

General GALVIN. It is really difficult to speculate along those lines. I think that is possible. I think what it calls for is a relationship to be established between NATO and the Soviet Union, first of all, a relationship of confidence, which would then allow NATO to work more closely with the eastern European nations.

So far, we have established a diplomatic liaison relationship between NATO and those nations. What the next steps would be I think are still left open. I have not seen much along those lines yet, but I assume that once we make some steps we will make some more, and we will proceed toward some kind of pan-European arrangement for security in the long run.

Whether, given all the problems that entails, it can be done in time that would avoid problems, is, I think, very hard to say.

Senator WARNER. Admiral, turning to the Soviet submarine threat, my information is there has been no diminution in their drive to continue to modernize that sub-surface capability. What is your view?

Admiral EDNEY. Well, that is absolutely correct, Senator Warner. As we look at the productivity level of Soviet submarine production, last year it was higher than it has ever been since 1980—10 to 11 submarines, and those are Akula submarines, Oscars, and Deltas, and Sierras. I believe they are going to produce 7 to 9 this year.

Senator WARNER. Are all power plants nuclear or diesel?

Admiral EDNEY. No. The Tango submarine is a diesel. I believe it breaks out to 6 nuclear and 5 diesel. But the diesel submarine is a very capable submarine and especially since going to an air-independent propulsion system. So we should not look at the diesel submarine as a sick brother; it is a very effective submarine.

Senator WARNER. In other words, it poses a threat to NATO forces?

Admiral EDNEY. Absolutely. What I cannot tell is the question that I believe Senator Nunn was alluding to. With their economic problems, as you know, to build a submarine takes about four to five years, so whether this production rate continues. But clearly, as we look at it now, the numbers of the modernized Soviet subma-

rine force is going to be somewhere around 130 to 140 nuclear submarines, and somewhere around 70 to 80 diesel.

That is an awful lot more submarines than would appear to be necessary for a defensive force.

Senator WARNER. How many new construction yards are involved in this program? First, how many nuclear-capable yards, and how many diesel propulsion-capable yards?

Admiral EDNEY. I would have to provide that answer for the record, sir. I do not have that at the tip of my fingers.

Senator WARNER. It is my understanding, though, there are several yards involved.

Admiral EDNEY. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Widely distributed in the Soviet Union geographically—that is, on the coast.

Admiral EDNEY. That is my understanding also. I will provide that for the record, sir.

[The information follows:]

SOVIET NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SHIPYARDS

Senator WARNER. How many nuclear-capable shipyards, especially submarine construction, are in the Soviet inventory?

Admiral EDNEY. [Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. I appreciate that. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. You can go ahead.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will ask an additional question or two.

General Galvin, as you know, prior to signing the CFE Treaty in November of 1990 the Soviet Union moved massive amounts of military equipment which would have been covered by the treaty to locations east of the Urals. By moving this equipment outside the ATTU zone of the treaty, the Soviets avoided the necessity of destroying this equipment, which would have been excess to CFE limits.

Would you comment on the military significance of this equipment, formerly located in eastern Europe? In the event of possible conflict in the future, would it be possible for the Soviets to return this equipment to reconstituted units in the ATTU if they chose to do so?

General GALVIN. First, it is possible to return the equipment from east of the Urals.

Senator WARNER. You might give a time frame in which that could be achieved.

General GALVIN. I will, although most of that equipment is sitting out there right now not maintained, bumper to bumper, in the snow, not adequately housed, although some of it is receiving maintenance. This applies not only to ground equipment but to aircraft.

When I talked to Soviet military leaders about this, they said to me ". . . it is a matter of organization. We cut our forces by 500,000 troops. That was a lot of units. We pulled out of Mongolia and we pulled out of eastern Europe, or we are in the process of doing so, and this has caused us enormous management problems. So we have moved that equipment out of the treaty area in order

to decide what we are going to do with it. Some of it we are going to destroy, and some of it we are going to redistribute."

Technically, under the treaty they had a right to do that because we had not signed the treaty. They also bring up to me the fact that, since the area of the treaty mandate is from the Atlantic to the Urals, none of the American equipment that is in the United States is counted. They make that point.

Senator WARNER. So that there are cross references.

Let me just ask one additional question. In this Persian Gulf conflict the world witnessed a most extraordinary chapter, both diplomatic, military and also terrorist in the use of this SCUD missile. It is not a military weapon, in my judgment; it is a weapon of terrorism. Had it successfully been employed against the State of Israel, the likelihood that they might have intervened, and we know the history of the Patriot system and successful interdiction.

We also know the tragedy that it inflicted on our troops not only in death and injury but also in an enormous amount of inconvenience from time to time occasioned by the air raids and the necessity to be on watchful defense at all times. I am sure that detracted in some ways from the efficiency of our forces there.

What priority do you give to the ATBM defense for our country, particularly the sector in which you are now involved? I presume that the Soviets would have a better class of such missilery and far more in number.

General GALVIN. I give it a high priority, Senator Warner. I supported it before, and now, with the example that we have seen in the Gulf of what a few ballistic missiles can mean, I give it even higher priority than I did before.

Senator WARNER. What type of defenses do you presently have against those systems?

General GALVIN. Well, we have the Patriot, of course, in Europe, but that is really the only defense.

Senator WARNER. We of course would recognize the very valuable defense—and I categorize it defense—performed by air units in searching out the source of the firing—that is, the launcher itself and perhaps the associate infrastructure. But it seems to me a sharp contrast between the relatively open spaces of the desert of Iraq and the relatively few dwellings and the insignificant amount of ground cover through foliage and otherwise.

It seems to me that your problem of searching for the source in that theater of operations in central Europe would be far different and far more complicated. Am I not correct?

General GALVIN. You are correct, and there would be hundreds and hundreds of launchers and thousands and thousands of missiles. It would not be a matter of a few hundred.

Senator WARNER. And their indiscriminate use against civilian sectors, in my judgment, would cause a considerable amount of unrest and problems in the rear echelon area, would it not?

General GALVIN. Yes, it would, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Do you think this country should embark on a more aggressive research and development program to try and determine the feasibility of developing and testing a more adequate system than the Patriot?

General GALVIN. I definitely support a requirement from the European theater for this kind of defense. Obviously, given all the other things that has to compete with, I would have to see how that works out back here. But that is definitely a requirement for any kind of conflict that we could see in the future.

Unfortunately for us also, it does not necessarily mean conflict just against a major country like the Soviet Union. Many, many more smaller countries now are picking up this kind of capability.

Senator WARNER. So the proliferation is another added factor.

General GALVIN. And that is something that we have to work also.

Senator WARNER. My understanding is that by the year 2000 there will be upwards of 20 nations either having the capability to manufacture some type of system on their own or acquiring them in the open market.

General GALVIN. That is the same figures that I have—having the warheads and having the delivery capability.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Senator WARNER. Admiral, in terms of fleet units, the current accuracy of the system certainly employed in Iraq was minimal. But nevertheless I can see a future system being adapted so that there is a vulnerability to deployed fleet units from this type of attack. Do you think that we should begin to research ideas for the defense of naval vessels against such types of ballistic missiles?

Admiral EDNEY. Yes, I do.

Senator WARNER. What sort of priority do you attach to that?

Admiral EDNEY. Well, once again, because no one other than the Soviet Union has that capability, and because we are in an austere spending environment, my assumption would be that it would probably have a difficult time competing.

But, as I said in my statement, we have to have a stable commitment to research and development and the anti-ballistic missile defense against ships has got to be a priority.

Senator WARNER. The accuracy, as I say, at the present time is questionable. If a ballistic missile was bearing down on a ship is there any defense aboard our modern naval vessels to intercept that missile?

Admiral EDNEY. A ballistic missile of the type you describe could be intercepted using the Aegis system. The Aegis system with phased array radar, is the finest system of its kind in the world today. However, it is not totally invulnerable. There is a small window of vulnerability in the Aegis system, but it is not considered a significant concern. It is impossible to design and optimize a single radar system for every potential requirement.

Senator WARNER. What would interdict the missile if it were coming down on an Aegis ship or in a battle group over which the Aegis was providing the electronic cover?

Admiral EDNEY. Right now the only thing that could interdict it is the standard missile system that we have.

Senator WARNER. So we are just near being defenseless at sea should that accuracy improve.

Admiral EDNEY. If you had that threat today, and if it had a high degree of accuracy, the problem of anti-ship missile defense would certainly increase. However, our battle group's multi-layered defense, which includes Aegis, would still be effective.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much. I thank the indulgence of the Chair.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. General Galvin, in your statement, on page 10, you state that "the Air Force has achieved overall savings of one-third in the cost of the proposed air base at Crotone, Italy." We have not received that information. Could you submit that for the record?

General GALVIN. Yes. That is coming to you now. I was hoping that we would have that information today in detail. We do not quite have it because we are coordinating with some nations. But very shortly the Defense Department will provide that.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. General, also, in the London Declaration last summer NATO pledged to start new negotiations on the short-range nuclear force, the so-called SNF, as soon as CFE was signed. Is that linkage off now that CFE has been put on hold? Where do we stand on the SNF negotiations?

General GALVIN. Well, from what I can see there is not as much enthusiasm about moving toward the nuclear negotiations, given the problem that we have right now with the conventional force treaty and the Soviet inability to see that they cannot move 3,600 pieces of equipment, keep them in the treaty area, and not count them.

Chairman NUNN. How realistic is it to assume that Germany will eventually accept peacetime deployment of TASM on its soil?

General GALVIN. What I really think we should try to do is look at the production of TASM and the deployment of TASM as two different things. We need TASM in terms of United States defense strategy, and so I think we ought to go on with it.

I do not know at what point we would be ready to deploy the tactical air-to-surface missile, but I would hope that we would not get into the same kind of problems we have had in the past but would instead defer the question of deployment until the time comes when it is necessary to deploy.

Chairman NUNN. That is going to be a hard sell, very difficult.

Is Italy or any other nation thinking about deploying TASM?

General GALVIN. We have not really started to coordinate with nations about that.

Chairman NUNN. On page 13 of your statement, General, you state the United States needs to maintain in Europe "a competent, credible, operationally significant force ready for a multi-faceted mission."

Do you have in mind now a view as to what size that translates into? Are you talking about an entire corps, or are you talking about something less?

General GALVIN. I am talking about, sir, one corps with two divisions, three to four Air Force wings, and the Sixth Fleet.

Chairman NUNN. What does that translate to in terms of manpower? Do you have in mind a manpower level?

General GALVIN. I do not have a manpower level. That is where the flexibility lies right now, in the sense of what exactly those

units will be composed of. I do not have that because that just has not been worked out yet.

Chairman NUNN. What is the justification, since we have so much more warning time—and I certainly agree we need some combat power there—but that large a combat power, given the warning time we have, if we had prepositioned equipment and if we had prepositioned support?

General GALVIN. Well, let us say that the Soviets move back 600 kilometers—in other words, the Warsaw Pact is not the Warsaw Pact any more—and the Soviets get out of all those countries. So they move back 600 kilometers and we cut our force in half. I think that is a pretty strong response to what they have done—that is, we cut our forward-deployed force about in half.

I certainly think that we have to look at an element of, as Admiral Edney said earlier, acceptable risk. But we are pretty borderline about acceptability of a risk when we get to that level in terms of what the Soviets have done. They have cut their forces and they have moved them back, but they still are a very powerful and, at the current moment, unpredictable force.

ROTHR

Chairman NUNN. Admiral, you mentioned that drug surveillance and interdiction within your area of responsibility is one of your four essential missions. The Committee has been informed that the Navy will place the relocatable over-the-horizon radar in Virginia into storage and not use it for surveillance of the Caribbean drug traffic.

Did they get your view on this, or do you have a view on it in terms of how it affects your narcotics mission?

Admiral EDNEY. I have a view on it, and I have submitted that view. My view is that the ROTHR in Virginia would be highly productive and desirable for counternarcotics coverage of the Caribbean, and I have come forth stating a valid requirement. I consider it a high priority.

Chairman NUNN. So you do not agree with putting it in storage?

Admiral EDNEY. No, I do not.

Chairman NUNN. One other question, Admiral. For budgetary reasons, the Air Force is shutting down or mothballing a number of radars that used to contribute to air defense in the northern region, including the former DEW radar in Greenland and the east coast Over-The-Horizon Backscatter radar. Has your command concurred in these decisions and how do you assess the importance of those?

Admiral EDNEY. We have reviewed that and we consider that within the risk and the funding environment those are acceptable decisions.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Admiral EDNEY. Sir, I would like to add that the previous question you had on sealift is such an important one. I was struggling for the name, but my recollection on that is that Senator Denton's report is a good starting point. It laid out what needs to be done as a national program, sir.

Chairman NUNN. That was about three years ago, something like that?

Admiral EDNEY. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. We will take a fresh look at that.

Senator Exon, I am going to ask you, if you would, to close out the hearing.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. General Galvin, good to see you, and Admiral, good to see you. We are delighted to have you here and we appreciate very much your commands' contribution to the very successful Persian Gulf operation. I hope you will convey that appreciation and pride on behalf of our Committee to each one of your people that have participated in your command.

General Galvin, I know you took some personal pride in the performance of the 24th, since that was your command at one time, and I understand some of them are on their way back home to Savannah, Georgia, as we speak. So I know that you took pride in that as well as those in your command.

General GALVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral EDNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON [presiding]. As operational commanders and I know you do not have the primary authority in this area—what kind of a priority would you put on the B–2 bomber and the deterrent that it is designed to provide?

Let me put the question another way. Do you believe it is worth the investment that is projected on the B–2 to strengthen your hand as operational commanders?

General GALVIN. Well, Senator, as an operational commander I do have a requirement for deep interdiction, and it is an important requirement. But as I lay that out I do not know whether in the end that transmits into the B–2 or how many B–2s. That is something that just remains to be seen.

I have stated the deep interdiction requirement each time I have had the opportunity to present my views in the Department.

Admiral EDNEY. My experience from 33 years in this business as well as my perception of where the world is going, convinces me that the B–2, with its capability for deep interdiction, both strategic and conventional, is a weapons system that this Nation must have.

Senator EXON. Let us turn to eastern Europe, if I might, for just a minute. I would like to get your views on this.

This month Defense News had an article with regard to certain eastern European countries—I believe the article mentioned Poland and Czechoslovakia and Hungary—had indicated a very keen interest in cooperating with NATO with regard to the CFE enforcement and how the Soviets were complying with the proposed agreement.

As I understand it, they have gone so far as to suggest nearly complete free exchange of information on this with the NATO alliance and their countries back and forth. What is your view on this? How far do you think we should go in that particular area in the future?

General GALVIN. In that area of verification I think that we are coming up with a pretty good plan of what are called the Objects of

Verification—that is, where we can go and what we can inspect and how many times. This is going to be a very complex question of all the nations inspecting the other nations in terms of what kind of teams, from what nations they are put together, what kind of experts are on them, and are they going to be multinational teams in terms of expertise?

What if a smaller nation does not have the experts that know something about missiles or submarines or something else? How will those nations be scheduled so that there is an adequate spread across the year and an adequate spread geographically and also among the different nations?

This has been worked out now in terms of an organization at NATO to interface with the eastern European countries. Information is being put on the computer, because, as you saw after the CFE Treaty was signed, the number of pieces of equipment, when you print that out, stands about three or four feet high. There is just a lot to all of this in terms of the organization.

I think that we will, if we follow what we are doing now and keep good command and control over this, be able to satisfactorily interface with the eastern European countries and make adequate inspections. You cannot inspect everything, but statistically we can inspect enough so that we are statistically satisfied that the treaty is not being violated.

I know the eastern European countries are concerned about that. But I think this thing is working along very well. We have established, at the level of the Secretary General of NATO, an official who is in charge of all of this and reports directly to the Secretary General. I think this is going to be helpful too, although it is only temporary until everything gets under way.

Senator EXON. Admiral?

Admiral EDNEY. Sir, I do not have anything to add to that.

Senator EXON. Let me ask your opinions on Soviet intelligence gathering. They must have been gathering a great deal of it with regard to how their equipment performed or did not perform that were in the hands of the Iraqi soldiers. The Soviet news agency Tass reported on March 1 that the Soviet officers, "from lieutenants to marshals," are studying the results of the Persian Gulf war and quoted a Soviet air force colonel as saying that the crushing defeat of the Iraqi army made clear that the Soviet military doctrine is obsolete.

Now I wonder whether as military strategists you think that is true. I would suggest that the Soviet military planners may have felt that the lack of command and control and training, not necessarily doctrine, was one of the reasons that the ground forces performed so poorly in the Iraqi forces.

Are you concerned about what the Soviet Union has learned from the Iraqi war with regard to our weapons systems? How will this all play out in the future, in your view?

General GALVIN. Well, I have been reading those comments, too, and looking into that. I think what we are seeing here, when the Soviet military is saying the defeat in the Gulf showed that we have to make some changes, is possibly a move away from military reform.

You remember that it was not the Red Army that said it needed military reform; it was the Soviet political leadership. And the armed forces of the Soviet Union accepted that and began the military reform. Remember, a while back there was a lot of talk about defensive defense, but I have not heard any of that lately.

There were indications that military reform meant becoming more defensive, to not look at what the Soviets before had seen as a preemptive—that was their word—preemptive attack, which was the essence of the defense. But now I do not know whether military reform is going to mean something that is defensive or not.

I think myself what you are seeing in these reports in the press and so forth is a message that says maybe we need a new and different look at what military reform in the Soviet Union will mean, and that kind of worries me.

Senator EXON. Admiral, with your background in the Pentagon I suspect you have some views on this question. I am wondering what you think of it.

Admiral EDNEY. Well, if I was a Soviet I would be burning some midnight oil right now. If, in fact, the Iraqi strategy was the defensive strategy taught in Soviet schools then it has a lot of holes in it. It was not a flexible defense strategy.

I do not know that the Soviets would employ their force that way. I do know that the Soviets would not be as inept as the Iraqis were. It is hard to make that judgment. But clearly the Iraqi force was not the dynamic, flexible, mobile force that General Galvin, for example, is in command of in Europe. If you are going to go defensive, you still have to have mobility and assume that the other guy is not going to come right down your throat.

So I think that the Soviets are looking at a lot of areas that give them great concern. Clearly I think you have to add that the Soviet government was cooperative and played a positive role for the most part throughout the conflict, and we should not forget that.

Senator EXON. That is kind of my thinking. I do not want to take a thing away. Everything has worked so very well, but given the position from the beginning that Iraq found itself in, unlike the enemy in the Korean War, unlike the enemy in the Vietnam War that had lines of supplies from noncombatants and were not surrounded, it seems to me that Iraq was obviously doomed sooner or later when this war broke out, given their isolated position.

Therefore, I am not sure that we should necessarily rely on the fact that Soviet tactics are all bad and would not be used or that the equipment that they had over there. This was a rather different kind of war, and probably we are not going to be in the future facing a situation where everything was going our way from the beginning of the conflict. That does not take away from the brilliance of the campaign at all.

I do not believe we should draw too many conclusions that the Soviet military are not good planners or that they do not have good equipment.

Specifically, I would like to ask you, General Galvin, have you had any detailed reports on what our troops think of the Soviet-built tanks and how they performed the recent war?

General GALVIN. I have not had those reports, and I would think that Norm Schwarzkopf would work up his lessons learned dealing directly with the forces that he has.

But it is obvious that there are some lessons beyond what I said earlier at the start about orchestration versus deorchestration—that you have to package things, put it all together—and the person that can do that in three dimensions is going to win. There are other things to learn too.

One of them is that this for us was a high mobility/strategic mobility operation, but it also was unopposed in that strategic mobility. There were not any submarines out there to stop anything. We had some time to get there.

I agree with Bud Edney that the studies that have been done on mobility and that showed the need for maritime structure in the United States are very good. But, I think we really need to take some moves to get a faster sea mobility, such as the roll-on/roll-off fast ships, because I think if we depend on talking about how much the American maritime side should improve we are just going to keep doing what we have been doing for 20 years. I think we have to make some moves now.

We shipped about 90 percent of what we had by sea. I think that is a big lesson there that we learned.

Also, as I told one of the Soviet generals, we did have high technology in the Gulf, but we also had a mix. We were flying the F-4E, for example; that airplane has been flying since I was a youngster in the service. We had a mix of old and new, as we have all the time. We did have some spectacular indications of new technology, such as the Tomahawk and the Patriot, but we also had a mix right across the board.

I think that we need to see that the lesson is not just that you need the new technology. Of course you do. And in some cases, such as the ability to penetrate those reinforced defensive hangar structures with smart munitions was absolutely essential. But it is really the whole mix of what we had there, and, beyond that, it is the training and readiness and preparation of the force.

MINE WARFARE

Senator EXON. Admiral, when you respond could you expand a little bit into something that I have been wondering about. Obviously there was no significant naval threat from Iraq in this war. I think they only launched one Silkworm at us, as far as I know. But we must have learned something about dos and don'ts of mine warfare. I think with the number of mines that I understand were in that Gulf area, I think it is a rather dramatic success also that we did not have much more damage or loss of ships or disabling of ships than we actually had.

Have you seen any reports from the Navy as to what we need? Do we need more minesweepers? Do we need to do more research in that particular area? Could you give us any information on that?

Admiral EDNEY. Clearly I think we have learned in the last few engagements, and certainly in this one, that mine warfare is a very low-cost equalizer for high technology naval equipment. That an in-

expensive mine can significantly damage a $1 billion ship and weapons system.

I agree that we need to do more research and increase our efforts to develop systems with which we can accurately locate mines and then remove that mine threat. The mine is an insidious weapon system that is easily deployed. For example, you can throw it off the shoreline and let it drift with the current. The Iraqis deployed somewhere between 300 and 800 mines out there, of which we have destroyed about 150 to 160. So there remains a significant threat to merchant shipping and general commerce in the northern Gulf. So, yes, I agree with that assessment.

I would like to make one additional comment. I certainly would not want to give any impression that I associate the Soviet equipment or the Soviet armed force with the performance that we saw in Iraq. I had the privilege of visiting the Soviet Union for 12 days two years ago. I have seen a Soviet 3-hour tank battle. I have watched them and sailed with their Kirov nuclear cruisers off Murmansk, and I have been on board their airfields.

They are a highly disciplined, professional force that would employ that same equipment with much devastating results. I have never seen a 1,500 aircraft force that would not fly. You cannot make those judgments.

I agree with you that you have to take in totality what the leadership of Iraq was all about. It was a leadership on fear that had driven and abused that armed forces for 8 years. The first principle of leadership is that you take care of your people. That is not a principle of leadership within Saddam Hussein's armed force, and it showed in the end results.

I think you have to be very careful on any lessons learned. I have a great deal of respect for the Soviets and I consider them to be a highly-disciplined, very professional force that will defend its country. They have a very strong feeling of pride in their units, just like we do.

Senator EXON. I am glad to hear you say that. I think that with all the euphoria that we are encompassing now we may be planting the seeds that we have all this smart weaponry that we have demonstrated works, and we have all this flexibility. We have the ability to project forces like no one else in the world, and no one disagrees with that.

There may be some that would say well, this just shows we can make wholesale cuts in all the areas at the present time because look how superior we are. Well, I think we ought to give some caution in that particular area, or that could catch fire and cause us some great difficulty as we try to improve and advance our technology in all of the areas that we have touched on this morning.

I have no further questions. There may be some additional questions for the record that I would hope that you could respond to, and I think they will be of a very minimum nature because we know you have other things to do than sit around answering questions by mail.

I have been asked at this time to include in the record on behalf of Senator Nunn a booklet, "The United States and NATO in an Undivided Europe," that I would like to be made a part of the record at this juncture.

[The information follows:]

The United States & NATO

in an Undivided Europe

A Report by the Working Group on Changing Roles and Shifting Burdens in the Atlantic Alliance

- David Abshire
- Norm Augustine
- Barry Blechman
- Bill Bradley
- Harold Brown
- Zbigniew Brzezinski
- David Calleo
- William Cohen
- Lynn Davis
- Russell Dougherty
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- Alice Rivlin
- Peter Rodman
- Patricia Schroeder
- Simon Serfaty
- William Simon
- William Y. Smith
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt

The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute

The United States & NATO in an Undivided Europe

A Report by the Working Group on Changing Roles and Shifting Burdens in the Atlantic Alliance

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The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute 23

Executive Summary

The dramatic events in Europe of the past year and the resulting attainment of the Atlantic Alliance's most basic objectives mandate a far-reaching review of the basic purposes, strategies, and organization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This report examines these questions from a U.S. perspective, providing an informed assessment by an experienced group of U.S. policymakers, legislators, and scholars.

The United States continues to have a fundamental interest in preserving European peace and security. NATO remains an essential instrument for preserving this interest in the face of the major uncertainties that remain in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. NATO also continues to play a crucial role in ensuring the smooth transition to a Europe that is truly "whole and free." This does not mean, however, that the Alliance can stand still. Indeed, NATO must undergo significant change if it is to continue to function successfully in the dramatically changed international environment. Specifically, we propose that

- U.S. forces in Europe should be reduced from the 1990 level of 300,000 to less than 100,000. The composition of the residual force should be oriented so as to provide a small, but militarily meaningful number of combat forces, along with the logistical and administrative infrastructure necessary to facilitate large-scale redeployment of U.S. combat troops in the event of a crisis.
- U.S. combat forces remaining in Europe should operate as part of multinational military formations, organized initially at the corps and numbered air force level, and perhaps evolving gradually with experience to the division and wing level.
- To reflect this change in relative contributions, NATO's European members should assume a more proportionate role in the Alliance's decision-making processes; for example, a European could be named as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in the future. In such an eventuality, control of U.S. nuclear forces assigned to NATO should be vested in a U.S. deputy to the European SACEUR.
- Substantial reductions can be made in the number and types of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, particularly in Germany. Still, the threatened use of nuclear weapons as a last resort remains a necessary part of NATO strategy. A small number of U.S. nuclear weapons should be maintained in Europe to help make that strategy credible.
- NATO's basic focus on preserving the peace and security of Western Europe should be maintained. The Alliance should reject proposals to expand its membership by including East European nations or to become a peacekeeping organization to quell ethnic and national disturbances. Moreover, although the United States should encourage its European allies to assume greater responsibilities outside of

Europe, the real differences in U.S. and European perspectives dictate that such efforts take place primarily outside the Alliance framework, preferably through bilateral agreements. This is the approach used primarily during the war against Iraq and it seemed to work satisfactorily.

- Even as NATO is preserved and restructured, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), encompassing all the nations of Europe plus the United States and Canada, needs to be nurtured and its functions expanded. The CSCE should begin modestly as a forum for discussing European security issues and for coordinating confidence-building measures and verifying arms control accords, evolving gradually into a mediating and peacekeeping body. The agreement in Paris in November 1990 to establish a small secretariat for the CSCE in Prague, a conflict prevention center in Vienna, and an office for free elections in Warsaw is a good beginning. Eventually, the CSCE might become the basis for a true European-wide collective security system, but this will depend on the outcome of current events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Thus, although substantial changes in the composition and level of America's material support to, and role in, the Alliance are in order, the United States, in our view, must preserve its commitment to the peace and security of Europe for years to come. Through its participation in the NATO alliance and its active engagement in the CSCE process, the United States serves vital functions for European security, reassuring allies and former adversaries alike. U.S. military involvement on the Continent has provided, and will continue to provide, the stabilizing influence necessary for steady progress toward European integration and East-West reconciliation.

The general thrust (though not necessarily every word) of this report was endorsed by David Abshire, Norm Augustine, Barry Blechman, Bill Bradley, Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Calleo, William Cohen, Lynn Davis, Russell Dougherty, Joseph Fromm, Andrew Goodpaster, Lee Hamilton, Arthur Hartman, Dave McCurdy, Edward Meyer, Sam Nunn, Rudolph Penner, Rozanne Ridgway, Alice Rivlin, Peter Rodman, Patricia Schroeder, Simon Serfaty, William Simon, William Y. Smith, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt.

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The United States and NATO in an Undivided Europe

The past year has been truly extraordinary, witnessing the achievement of all the United States' fundamental objectives in Europe. The postwar divisions of Germany and Europe have been healed on terms that are fully compatible with American values and goals. The former "captive nations" of Eastern Europe have been set free, for the most part embracing both democratic political principles and market economies. The Red Army is finally withdrawing from most of the territory it occupied during the World War II, and Soviet conventional military power is beginning to decline. According to the terms of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), concluded late in 1990, and the bilateral agreements between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and various European nations, by 1994 there will be a much smaller Soviet Army and Air Force, confined to the territory of the USSR—and that territory itself might become considerably smaller if various, now-constituent republics succeed in gaining their independence.

All this has become possible as a consequence of the changes in the internal politics and external policies of the Soviet Union that have taken place during the past four years. Although still far from satisfactory, particularly with respect to nationalities issues, human rights and free political choice have made progress in the USSR, as have the principles (if not the practice) of a market economy. In foreign policy, the new cooperative attitude of the Soviet Union was demonstrated pointedly in its support of the United States and the United Nations in the recent conflict with Iraq.

The dramatic achievements in Europe are also the result of 40 years of consistent U.S. policy and military deployments in support of its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, however, the threat of a sudden and massive Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe, already greatly eroded as a basis for mobilizing popular support for NATO or for steady spending on military forces, lost whatever credibility it had managed to retain. The accelerating retrenchment of Soviet power in the ensuing 15 months, along with the increasingly obvious disarray of the Soviet economy and political system, make clear that a period of years would be required before the USSR could again mount a serious military challenge to Western Europe through invasion. Understandably, many in the United States and in Western Europe view this situation as a windfall, as an unparalleled opportunity to curtail drastically military spending and reduce the size of Western armed forces. In view of the economic problems facing most Western countries, and especially in view of the United States' difficult fiscal situation, relief in the burden of defense preparedness

would be greatly appreciated by governments and citizens alike.

Political and budgetary pressures for the rapid withdrawal of significant numbers of American troops from Europe, close to the surface on both sides of the Atlantic for many years, have become far more powerful during the past year. The general judgment that U.S. forces redeployed from Germany to the Persian Gulf will not return to Europe is but one indication that major, long-term reductions in U.S. force levels are now viewed as inevitable. Pressures for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons have also gained in magnitude, with even conservative Germans now assuming that most, even all, U.S. nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from their country within a few years. And all members of NATO are now contemplating substantial cuts in the size of their armed forces and their level of defense spending.

We share in the belief that the upheavals in Europe during 1990 make possible, indeed essential, a far-reaching revision of NATO's basic strategies and military forces. At the London NATO Summit in July 1990, the Alliance recognized the need for fundamental changes, mandating a review of NATO's force posture and strategy be completed by spring of 1991. We anticipate, as a result of this review, that there will be substantial reductions in the burden of preparations for the defense of Western Europe and specifically that large numbers of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons will be permanently withdrawn from Europe. The American commitment to defend Western Europe from Soviet aggression and the military preparations and deployments made in support of that commitment have served their purpose and achieved their aims: Europe is free, relatively peaceful, and—in the West at least—prosperous. Western values have been defended successfully; Western ideals have triumphed.

Yet, we also believe that it would be a mistake of historic proportions for the United States now to withdraw completely from Europe. *It is in the American interest*, in our view, to preserve the Atlantic Alliance, to continue to support U.S. commitments to European security, and to maintain some U.S. military forces, including nuclear weapons, in Europe for at least a number of years to come. At the same time, the greatly changed political situation and military balance in Europe, we believe, make inevitable substantial changes in the nature of the Alliance and in its distribution of burdens, responsibilities, and decision-making authority. We explain the reasons for these views in the report that follows and then detail their implications for NATO strategy, U.S. military forces, and the future of arms control and international security cooperation.

THE CONTINUING U.S. INTEREST IN EUROPE

It takes nothing from the generosity and stalwartness of the U.S. electorate that has supported a leading American role in Europe, including a massive security commitment for more than 40 years, to note that the United States has never acted in Europe for altruistic reasons alone. The United States has a clear national interest in helping to preserve democratic values, stable governments and economies, and peaceful relations among the nations of Europe. Twice before in this century, the outbreak of war in Europe led to U.S. involvement in major military conflicts, with great losses of American lives and fortune. Given the destructiveness of modern weapons, the potential size of military forces in Europe, and the risk of escalation to a global nuclear exchange that would inevitably accompany any new war in Europe, the cost of a third war in Europe, in human terms, would be unprecedented.

Even if the United States remained uninvolved militarily, moreover, the interdependence of United States and European economies, monetary systems, and financial markets, means that the economic cost to the United States of any conflict in Europe could be horrendous. In any event, the interdependence of Western cultures virtually ensures a U.S. military role in the event of a European conflict; U.S. and West European societies are so intermingled and interdependent that the thought that the United States might stand aloof while Western Europe fell under some tyrant's control, is

hard to take seriously.

Granted, it is equally hard to believe that there is any serious likelihood during the next 5 to 10 years of a new war in Europe or, for that matter, the emergence of a tyrannical leader bent on aggression and territorial expansion. But military and political leaders must take account of even remote contingencies if they are to fulfill their responsibilities and must also look beyond even 10-year planning horizons to more distant possibilities. We sense, even though we cannot quantify, the dangers that could attend a military vacuum or even a prolonged state of military weakness in a democratic Europe. Particularly in view of the lengthy periods of time required to cause democratic societies to become aware of distant threats, as President Franklin Roosevelt discovered in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and the also lengthy periods required to build modern defense industries and military capabilities, a prudent security policy not only can deal effectively with possible contingencies, should they occur, but preferably can prevent them from emerging altogether.

It is in the American interest, therefore, to help preserve democratic values and peaceful interstate relations among the nations of Europe, thereby avoiding not only any risk of a new war on the Continent, and thus any new U.S. combat involvement, but also preventing the emergence of political conditions in which the risk of war might grow. Despite the very favorable developments of the past few years, this key American security interest remains at some risk. Taking a long view, defense planners must take account of two ways in which political stability in Europe might still be threatened.

First, despite the current disarray in the USSR, one cannot rule out the possibility of a reemerging Soviet, or even Russian, military challenge. There are several scenarios in which such a threat might develop. In an optimistic scenario for the USSR, the current period of political turmoil and economic failure could be followed eventually by modernization of the Soviet economy and the restoration of economic growth. The cutbacks in the Soviet armed forces and defense budget now taking place could both contribute to this economic revival and open the way to restoration of a smaller, but technologically advanced and even more powerful Soviet military force. Such a resurgent Soviet state could be tempted to seek to reassert its dominance in Eastern Europe and eventually move to challenge the nations of Western Europe for dominance on the Continent for reasons of ideology or national aspiration.

Even in a pessimistic scenario for the USSR, Soviet military power—particularly its nuclear dimension—could remain formidable. Defense planners cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviet armed forces, restive with the cuts now being clearly imposed on them and the diminution of their role in Soviet society, together with disaffected civilian officials, might eventually seek to reassert a more aggressive Soviet policy toward Europe. A continuation of recent events in the Baltic Republics and other outlying regions of the USSR, involving the emergence of violent conflicts between Soviet and national forces, could provide a rationale for such a change in Moscow's leadership. Political turmoil and economic failure in Eastern Europe might also provide the opportunities for such a reassertion, even if all Soviet forces had already returned to Soviet borders.

Such a contingency could even occur if the USSR had disintegrated into its constituent republics. In such an eventuality, the Russian Republic—perhaps linked with Byelorussia, the Ukraine (or parts thereof), and portions of Soviet Central Asia—would remain the largest nation in Europe, rich in natural resources, powerful militarily, and perhaps imbued with a radical nationalism intent on settling injustices perceived to have been inflicted during the period in which the USSR was disintegrating. Such a Russian Republic initially would have to reimpose its will on states that are now part of the USSR, but eventually could again threaten nations in Eastern and Central Europe.

Second, there are the risks associated with worsening nationalistic conflicts, political uncertainties, and economic failures in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union

itself. These risks can be manifested in several ways.

As already noted, such upheavals could encourage the reemergence of an expansive Soviet or Russian government. Any government in Moscow would be concerned about such turmoil, particularly if it embroiled territories now part of the USSR, as it seems likely would be the case. Such conflicts might make it more difficult to restore the Soviet or Russian economy, could encourage centrifugal pressures and national conflicts within the USSR, and might even affect stability in the Russian Republic itself.

Similarly, one cannot be certain of the impact on Germany of sustained turmoil in Central and Eastern Europe. Such prolonged problems could induce the German government to pursue interventionist policies, no doubt resting initially on political, economic, and diplomatic instruments, but leading eventually to the perception of greater need for military capabilities. The combination of turmoil in Eastern Europe with a reemergent, aggressive Soviet or Russian government would hasten such developments. A shift in Germany toward more assertive policies, in turn, could both encourage greater aggressiveness on the part of the Soviet government, as well as encourage small nations in Eastern Europe to seek to protect against possible German domination by developing closer relations with the USSR.

Likewise, the complete disintegration of the Soviet Union into a state of anarchy could raise significant challenges for the United States and its European allies. Aside from the impetus such a breakdown could give to the emergence of a far more militant and threatening central regime determined to restore order, widespread civil war in the Soviet Union among various national groups, possibly armed with nuclear weapons, could pose serious problems for the fledgling governments of Eastern Europe and, indirectly, for the West. The spread of such turmoil to the frontline states of Eastern Europe through either the influx of refugees or actual armed conflict might trigger the same German response as would indigenous conflicts in the region. Moreover, so long as Soviet troops remain in Germany, widespread civil strife in the Soviet Union could spark potentially explosive confrontations within Germany itself.

A significant change from Germany's current policies also could raise concerns in the West, possibly disrupting the long-term trend toward economic and political integration in Western Europe. Particularly if U.S. military power is withdrawn from Europe, a disruption in the process of West European integration, in turn, could push Germany further toward the East, but cause it at the same time to feel increasingly vulnerable to Soviet military, and especially nuclear, capabilities. Equally disturbing from the German perspective would be the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe or in the formerly constituent republics of the Soviet Union. In either case, in the absence of a U.S. nuclear guarantee (and the military capabilities necessary to underpin this), Germany eventually could see a need to develop its own nuclear forces, reinforcing both Soviet and West European concerns.

In the flush of the huge accomplishments of the past year, all these contingencies seem, and are, far-fetched, but that is the case precisely because of the policies pursued by the United States throughout the postwar period. The greatest contribution of American military power may not have been in its direct defense of Europe or even in its contribution to the deterrence of an overt Soviet threat, but in its more subtle, political role. By committing itself to the defense of Western Europe and by sustaining substantial conventional and nuclear forces in Europe in support of those commitments, the United States has helped to reassure all European states that they could pursue cooperative policies without fear of the emergence of new aggression from any quarter. The U.S. presence reassured the French and British, and even the Soviets, that German militarism would be unlikely to reemerge, just as it reassured Germany that it could remain a nonnuclear and peaceful power, despite the nuclear weapons and huge conventional armies arrayed against it.

In doing so, the United States helped to

make possible the degree of political and economic integration that has occurred in Western Europe, just as it encouraged the détente that now characterizes East-West relations. The process took a long time, but eventually Soviet political leaders, as well as leaders in West European nations, came to understand that all countries' interests would be served by ending the East-West conflict and military confrontation and by building more peaceful and stable relations.

A continuing U.S. military role in Europe, similarly, can help to ensure that such perceptions continue to dominate decision-making on the Continent. The U.S. role as outside balancer and guarantor will be no less important during the next 10 years or more as Europe moves to solidify and institutionalize the gains of the recent past, than it has been for the past 40 years.

This is not to say that the United States must play such a role forever. Eventually, the Soviet Union (or its constituent republics) and the nations of Eastern Europe may develop the same sort of peaceful, democratic, prosperous, relatively lightly armed, and stable political systems that have brought peace and cooperation to Western Europe. The process of European political and economic integration may continue to broaden, incorporating more nations and more functions, and to deepen as well, becoming more entrenched in the underlying beliefs and values of political leaders and electorates. Europe, or much of it, may eventually become a single nation or at least some sort of confederacy in which there was no threat of internal conflict. In such eventualities, which are perhaps the most likely kind of future for Europe, the need for U.S. security guarantees and military power will continue to decline.

Although promising, we do not believe that the events of the past few years yet adequately guarantee such a benign future, however. For now, and for the greater part of the next decade, at least, in our view, a continuing U.S. military presence in Europe is important in ensuring the continued momentum of favorable political developments. Moreover, in view of the tremendous progress that has already been made, the United States can continue to play its key security roles at a far smaller price, and with substantially lower risks.

NATO'S ROLE IN AN UNDIVIDED EUROPE

The primary vehicle for U.S. military involvement in Europe should continue to be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The 1949 Treaty of Washington, which established the organization, expresses and delimits the U.S. military commitment clearly and definitively. It did so at a time (1949-1953) when the number of U.S. forces in Europe was much lower than it is now, and it can do so in the future when U.S. forces again decline. NATO's Secretariat and command structure, moreover, which constitute the organizations of the Alliance's civilian and military sides, respectively, have proven to be workable, if cumbersome, institutional means for policy-making and military planning and coordination in peacetime and in crises, and would serve as effective means for organizing the Alliance's military response to any aggression, should that ever become necessary.

NATO's integrated military command is especially important in ensuring the Alliance's effectiveness in the event of conflict, as well as a means of reassuring European states as to the common purpose of their military power. For the foreseeable future, whatever changes are made in the roles and internal organization of the Alliance, the integrated military command structure should be preserved. Absent this command structure, the size, character, or activities of national armed forces could at times frighten others, even if such concerns were wholly unreasonable. Their reactions could in turn not only undermine the ability of the Alliance to formulate a coherent security policy, but also lead to an unraveling of the process of West European integration.

This is not to say that some changes should not be made in NATO's command arrangements. If nothing else, the United States and its allies will have to come to grips with the problem of organizing and commanding military forces in the former territory of East Germany, which—for some

time at least—cannot be part of the normal NATO military command structure. Given that this territory abuts the forward boundary of the Alliance's territorial commitment, which now presumably extends to the eastern border of the united Germany, the problem is not inconsequential. The Polish border, after all, is only 80 miles from Berlin.

Thought also must be given to the implications for the command structure of the greatly reduced number of foreign forces that will remain in Germany. Many observers have suggested that lower force levels argue for the creation of integrated multinational commands at much lower levels of military organization than has been the case in the past.

Other major changes might be made in NATO's organizational structures and procedures and in its strategy, deployments, and approach to arms control. We are skeptical, however, about altering the Alliance's basic purpose and role. Each of the three major suggestions that have been made for such significant change, we feel, are either unrealistic or suggest more problems than they promise to solve.

Expansion toward the East. Some Hungarian officials, for example, have suggested that Hungary might want to join NATO at some future date; other observers have speculated that Czechoslovakia and Poland might also seek NATO membership. Quite apart from the question of whether Americans (and British, French, and other West Europeans, for that matter) would be prepared to extend their solemn defense commitment to Eastern Europe, there is the question of the impact on the Soviets of such an expansion of NATO's role. Obviously, such an extension of the Alliance's area of responsibility would be perceived by the Soviets as threatening and as a repudiation of Mikhail Gorbachev's aim to build a "common European home," the justification for his voluntary relinquishment of the USSR's previous hold on Eastern Europe. This challenge to Soviet policy could aggravate existing tensions within the USSR and facilitate the Soviet armed forces' resistance to Gorbachev's efforts to reduce their size and position in Soviet society. It might even lead to calls from Soviet constituent republics for the extension of NATO's guarantees to their sovereignty, placing the Western powers in a very difficult situation.

None of this is to imply that the Alliance can be indifferent to the fate of the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe or to the way in which the USSR deals with national aspirations in the Baltic Republics. Any Soviet attempt to reassert control over its East European neighbors would constitute a dangerous reversal of the positive trends now under way. The reimposition of Soviet military dominance over the region would represent not only a clear violation of the CFE Treaty and the CSCE process, but also would alter dramatically the military situation facing the Alliance. Most important, any Soviet intervention would destroy the military and political conditions that make significant changes in NATO's force posture and strategy possible. In short, just as the creation of a Soviet empire in Eastern Europe triggered the Cold War, any attempt to recreate that empire would precipitate a new military confrontation.

There is a tricky tension in the Alliance's choice of future policies: It must, in our view, maintain a strong and united front to deter the reemergence of an aggressive Soviet or Russian state. But, at the same time, it must avoid policies that cause the Soviet Union to feel threatened and isolated, contributing in that way to the emergence of precisely the renewed threat that NATO seeks to avoid. The extension of NATO membership to former allies of the Soviet Union would clearly run such a risk. The United States and its Western allies retain a vital interest in the security and independence of Eastern Europe. A more fully developed CSCE may be able to help ease security concerns stemming from disputes within the region and [illegible] certain political inhibition to renewal of Soviet interventionism. In addition, carefully circumscribed bilateral assistance programs and military liaisons between NATO countries and former members of the Warsaw Pact, as suggested in the 1990 London Declaration, could help to make clear the interests of Western countries

in East European developments. A direct NATO commitment to guarantee the security of Eastern Europe, however, would undermine, rather than enhance, the long-term prospects for peace.

Peacekeeping Missions. Even without expanding its membership and area of responsibility, some have suggested that NATO could somehow play a role as peacekeeper in Eastern Europe, helping to contain and to resolve conflicts among nationalities in this region. This expansion in NATO's role, too, in our opinion, would be a mistake, raising the same risks of causing the USSR to feel isolated and beleaguered, as would an overt expansion in its membership. Peacekeeping in Eastern Europe would also be best left to the United Nations or a vitalized CSCE.

Out-of-Area Operations. Others have suggested that NATO should play a greater role in regions beyond Europe, such as in the conflict in the Persian Gulf over Kuwait. Such pressures for a greater out-of-area role have surfaced repeatedly throughout the past several decades, but have never been transformed into significant actions. Members of the Alliance have sometimes participated in common military efforts out-of-area, but these actions have always been arranged directly among the countries involved or have been coordinated through some other organization. European participation in the war against Iraq, for example, has been discussed and, to a degree, coordinated in the Western European Union (WEU). For the most part, however, arrangements between U.S. and European forces in the Gulf have been made on a bilateral basis.

This reluctance to add an out-of-area role to NATO's mission also strikes us as sound policy. When it comes to Third World regions, there are substantial differences of perspective, and of interests, between the United States and most West European countries, as well as among West European states themselves. Any attempt to coordinate military actions out-of-area can only emphasize these differences and possibly mar military cooperation within Europe, as well. A special problem in this regard is the United States' predominant position within NATO. Other nations, especially France, fear that if NATO were to adopt out-of-area roles, the United States' special position in the organization would lead to the slighting of their own national interest. As a result, with respect to Third World regions, European states have generally preferred to coordinate their actions in separate forums and then to approach the United States directly—outside of the NATO context. Both the WEU and the European Community (EC) have been suggested as the proper forum for West European military coordination in the future.

Sparing the Alliance the strains that might otherwise arise from efforts to coordinate Third World activities is the prudent course, in our view. The exception, however, would be a crisis outside European boundaries that threatens the security of an ally, for example, spillovers from situations in Southwest Asia that might affect Turkish security. As a full-fledged member of the Alliance, Turkey should be defended from all threats, regardless of whether they originate in Europe, with the Soviet Union, or from aggressive third powers in the Middle East.

Obviously, in those instances in which the interests of the United States and some or all of its NATO allies coincide, the United States should encourage the active cooperation of its allies. The particular legal or institutional framework within which coordination occurs is of little importance. Oftentimes, bilateral arrangements between national governments are likely to be the most effective and least cumbersome method of coordinating U.S. and allied policy. However, the United States should remain flexible enough to welcome other arrangements, such as European coordination through the WEU or the EC. Even in those cases in which U.S. and allied interests differ, the United States should seek the requisite political understandings to enable U.S. forces to use NATO facilities in support of out-of-area operations.

In short, we advocate a conservative approach to NATO's basic purpose and role. In our view, the Alliance should remain the

primary vehicle for U.S. participation in European security matters, serving as the means of deterring the reemergence of a Soviet or Russian threat to Western Europe and reassuring Germany and other West European nations that they can continue to eschew aggressive policies in favor of continued progress toward ending the East-West conflict and the building of a peaceful and cooperative Europe marked by a high degree of political and economic integration. The adoption of an expanded role for the Alliance could, in our view, detract from the accomplishment of these fundamental purposes.

REORGANIZING THE ALLIANCE

In organizational and procedural terms, we believe that reforms should aim both to increase the degree of integration within the Alliance and also to streamline its bureaucracy and procedures.

The former is particularly important in view of the tightening constraints on defense budgets contemplated by most members. Experiments with the creation and operation of integrated multinational military formations should be expanded, beginning at the corps level. If the initial experience so indicates, these experiments should be extended to the division and wing level. Among other things, such integrated multinational military formations might facilitate the maintenance of a small number of U.S. ground combat forces in Europe, thus strengthening the credibility of U.S. pledges to reinforce NATO should events turn hostile in the future. Truly integrated multinational military operations require even greater attention to the interoperability of NATO forces. Much has been written and said about this subject in the past, but much more actually could be accomplished.

In addition, in view of the reduced demand for military equipment purchases that will characterize all NATO members in the future, greater attention needs to be given to the rationalization of the Alliance's defense industrial and scientific base. In the most likely scenario, NATO members simply will not be purchasing sufficient numbers of aircraft, tanks, and other military equipment to maintain multiple production facilities in many countries, as is now the case—at least not unless they are willing to pay very high premiums (in the form of greater prices) for each unit of this equipment. Defense industries in Western countries inevitably will be restructured during the next 5 or 10 years; it would be sensible for the NATO governments to take into account their common industrial base as these changes are made.

One factor that has hampered closer military integration in NATO in the past has been the predominant role played by the United States. This asymmetry was unavoidable in the early years of NATO, but as the European states rebuilt their economies and armed forces it made less and less sense. This asymmetry resulted in resentment in the United States about its perceived excessive "burden" in European defense, and in resentment in Western Europe, which stemmed from perceptions of excessive U.S. influence. In view of the political developments during the past year, the specific contributions of the United States to NATO's peacetime military posture can be reduced substantially. This reduction in resources should be matched by a realignment of the American position in the Alliance's military and civilian planning, policy-making, and implementing bodies. The readjustment in the U.S. role could usefully take place as part of a broader effort to streamline these organizations, reducing the cost and the cumbersomeness of the Alliance's decision-making procedures.

Quite apart from these kinds of change, the specifics of which can result only from detailed internal examinations of existing organizational functions and procedures, the Alliance might also consider, in our view, eventually departing from the practice of always having an American serve as the Alliance's military commander and a European serve as the civilian secretary-general. The appointment of a European to command the Alliance's military forces, perhaps more than any other single step, would symbolize the more equitable distribution of responsibilities within the Alliance.

Objections to this change may be raised on both sides of the Atlantic. Some Americans will oppose the possibility of American troops fighting under a foreign commander, although this did occur, at times, in previous wars. Some Europeans believe that only an American Supreme Commander can ensure the participation of U.S. forces in the defense of Europe. A special problem concerns the question of who in the command structure would have the authority to request and, more important, to release U.S. nuclear weapons for use in the theater. This problem might be solved by vesting such authority with an American deputy with separate channels to U.S. officials for release authorization.

In our view, the hesitancy to appoint a European as SACEUR was more appropriate in previous years. If the Alliance is to persist into the next century, it must move toward a greater balance between U.S. and European contributions and the closer integration of its component forces at all levels—including the very top. The Alliance's role during the next 10 years will consist largely of political and planning functions, hedging against the reemergence of military threats in the future. There is no reason why a European could not command the Alliance's forces in this context.

Moreover, as the security policies of our European allies are increasingly formulated within the cooperative context of organizations such as the WEU and the EC, the Alliance must adapt its organizational structures. At the December 1990 NATO foreign ministers meeting, the United States specifically endorsed the development of the WEU into a true European "pillar" of the Alliance. Although progress in this regard may be difficult, such a development would, in fact, ease the transition to a more prominent European role within the Alliance, including the eventual appointment of a European NATO commander. In any case, NATO must be remain flexible enough so as to evolve in concert with the growing integration of Western Europe.

STRATEGY AND FORCES

As was recognized at the London NATO Summit in July 1990, NATO obviously must reconsider its strategy and force posture as Soviet forces withdraw from Germany and from the nations of Eastern Europe. Two requirements that have largely determined the Alliance's military planning for many years will soon no longer have to be fulfilled.

First, the emergence of truly sovereign states in Eastern Europe, and a substantial scaling down of the size and readiness of Soviet forces within the USSR, together with the disarray in the USSR's political and economic system, obviate NATO's previous need to maintain large conventional forces near the front lines in peacetime. The Soviet Union will no longer be able to mobilize and launch a massive attack in a relatively brief period of time. The U.S. government already estimates that it would take months for the USSR to prepare for war, and many observers believe that this required period of preparation would extend to years if current trends continue. Although the Alliance may wish to maintain its previous policy of defending as far forward as possible in the event of war, the active duty forces necessary to implement such a policy will be far smaller.

Second, unilateral reductions in Soviet military forces and spending and the 1990 CFE Treaty, whose terms would establish parity between Western and Eastern ground forces and land-based air forces throughout Europe and put additional limits on the number of Soviet forces deployed outside its territory, should make it possible for NATO to reduce its previous reliance on the first use of nuclear weapons to defend against a Soviet conventional attack. Under the treaty's terms, the USSR will be able to maintain larger conventional forces east of the Ural Mountains, if it so chooses, but the United States can offset to some extent any such decisions with American forces maintained in the continental United States. Nuclear weapons will continue to have an essential role in NATO strategy, but the reductions in Soviet conventional forces should make it possible for NATO to maintain an effective conventional defense against a conventional

attack and to greatly reduce its deployments of nuclear capabilities.

Once Soviet forces are withdrawn from eastern Germany and reductions are made in Soviet active forces and military procurements, any significant aggression against NATO would be preceded by a period of *strategic warning* lasting years, as the USSR (or a Russian Republic) reversed its current policies of cutting back active duty military forces and renewed the production of military equipment. Just how long would be required for the Soviet Union to be in a position to mount an attack would be determined primarily by how far the current cutbacks proceed. A decision to shift to a much smaller, volunteer armed force, as has been suggested by civilian "reformers" within the USSR, would increase the strategic warning available to the West quite considerably. Continued cuts in the production of military equipment (tank production has already been cut in half) and the conversion of affected industrial facilities to civilian outputs would also be helpful.

There is no guarantee that the United States and other Western nations would react to strategic warning of a new Soviet or Russian buildup. The retention of U.S. security guarantees to Europe through the NATO Treaty, backed by a small military presence on the Continent, would make it more likely that American society would respond to strategic warning of a renewed Soviet or Russian threat in a timely manner. The fact that such a period of warning would exist, moreover, offers the opportunity for NATO to shift to a less costly strategy depending largely upon relatively small active duty cadres, backed by large reserve forces and plans to mobilize industry and populations. Aside from mobilizing their own resources, the Western nations would be advised to seek to strengthen the political will and material capabilities of nations in Eastern Europe during the warning period or at least to help them avoid making political or military concessions to the USSR that would bolster the latter's military options.

Any aggression against NATO also would likely be preceded by a period of *tactical warning* lasting weeks, as Soviet (or Russian) forces would have to first cross through the territories of independent nations in Eastern Europe before threatening the NATO guidelines' area. Just how long it would take for Soviet forces to make such maneuvers is difficult to calculate because it depends on the degree of resistance, if any, put up by Polish and other East European armed forces. Given the remoteness of these contingencies from current political trends, it is impossible to predict with any assurance the likely course of events.

The members of NATO can thus prepare to greatly reduce the size of their active duty military forces. As a result of its agreement with the USSR, Germany will be reducing its armed forces to no more than 375,000, down more than 200,000 from the combined forces of the former West and East German states. Moreover, fiscal pressures may quickly cause deeper cuts in German forces and modernization plans than are now contemplated. Several German officials and political leaders have suggested that a steady-state, active duty force of 200,000 may be sufficient for German defense for the long term. France, Great Britain, and other nations are also already planning cuts in their armed forces, overall, and specifically in their forces deployed in Germany.

We believe that given its disproportionate share of the current NATO conventional force structure, a disproportionate share of any reductions in the Alliance's overall force posture should also fall to the United States. Specifically, we believe that U.S. forces deployed ashore in Europe should be reduced during the next five years to less than 100,000 troops (from the 1990 level of about 300,000), with the reductions to be completed *after* the Soviets have withdrawn completely from Eastern Europe. The residual force would permit the United States to deploy a militarily significant number of combat units, including armored calvary regiments, tactical air wings, and some nuclear forces, as well as reception forces for reinforcements composed of logistical, administrative, intelligence, and headquarters command cadres. The logistical personnel would maintain prepositioned heavy equipment and a considerable portion

of the supplies and munitions necessary for the much larger force that could be mobilized and deployed to Europe in the event of strategic warning of Soviet preparations for war. In determining the size and location of its residual forces in Europe, the United States should be sensitive to political pressures in Germany to reduce the day-to-day annoyances of that nation's participation in the Alliance, especially those associated with the large number of allied forces previously deployed in West Germany and the even larger number of Soviet forces deployed in the former East Germany.

As mentioned earlier, residual U.S. combatant forces in Europe should consist of tactical air wings or squadrons, nuclear forces, and a few armored cavalry regiments. Air defenses and eventually, perhaps, anti-tactical ballistic missile defenses might also be deployed there. Experiments should be conducted in which combatant units based primarily in the United States are rotated to European facilities without dependents for deployments lasting six months to one year—depending on unit type and mission requirements—for familiarization and joint training with other NATO forces. Such an arrangement could substantially reduce the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe by cutting back the size of the peacetime infrastructure necessary to support the forces and their dependents, all of which would be located instead in the continental United States.

Despite the initial command difficulties likely to be encountered, U.S. combat forces in Europe should operate as part of multinational military formations, organized initially at the corps and numbered air force level, and shifting over time to the division and wing level. Routine support for these forces, including combat support, should be provided by host nations—a further step toward integrating the Alliance's military arm, which would require the much closer attention to interoperability than suggested previously. U.S. forces, particularly air forces, should not be concentrated in Germany; for political reasons, it would be better for these forces to be dispersed more widely. It would be especially beneficial to the Alliance if France would reconsider its 25-year policy of excluding foreign forces from bases on its soil.

The United States should maintain larger forces in the United States that could be moved to Europe to reinforce NATO's active duty command cadres. Some tactical air forces and armored units—and the airlift and sealift resources necessary to move them—should be maintained at a readiness level that would permit relatively quick redeployment. It is particularly important that forces necessary for the defense of NATO's flanks—Norway in the north and Turkey in the south—be kept in sufficient readiness for a quick response because the strategic and tactical warning necessary for the much smaller Soviet forces that would be required to mount an attack on the flanks could be relatively brief. Evaluations of force needs for the defense of Turkey should consider possible threats from Southwest Asia, as well as from the USSR.

The bulk of U.S. forces planned for use in Europe could be maintained through reserves. The necessary size of these forces, and their required readiness, can not be calculated until the Soviet force structure stabilizes and the status of Soviet reserves and the Soviet conscription system becomes more clear. Reserve forces and active duty units intended for NATO contingencies, but based in the United States, should conduct command post exercises to practice major deployments to Europe periodically, although exercises of the scope and frequency of the past annual "Reforger" drills would be politically inappropriate and militarily unnecessary under prospective circumstances.

Eventually, as conditions in Europe and the Soviet Union become more stable and predictable, the United States could reduce the size of its reserve forces, relying instead on the substantial period of strategic warning that would precede any new threat in Europe to reconstitute active forces. This strategy would reduce the U.S. defense burden even further, but would require that the United States greatly improve the administrative mechanisms necessary (e.g., a standby draft) to rapidly raise and train the required forces. The defense research, development, and

procurement process would also need to be altered substantially.

The United States must also maintain sufficient naval force to be able to secure positive control of the Atlantic and northern waters in the event of war to maintain the flow of troops and equipment to Europe and to be able to project naval power in any conflict on the Alliance's flanks, should that be necessary. The USSR is making very sizable reductions in its navy, thus easing the dimensions of this task. Given current construction and retirement rates, for example, the number of Soviet attack and cruise missile submarines is declining rapidly and could reach about 130—about one-half its current level—by the end of the century. Given the lengthy periods of time necessary to build naval combatants, U.S. naval forces can be reduced commensurately, with the period of strategic warning being relied upon as sufficient to rebuild U.S. naval force levels.

Despite its prospective ability to match Soviet conventional capabilities with conventional forces of its own, NATO cannot dispense completely, in our view, with the nuclear component of its current strategy. If nothing else, the Soviet Union will continue to maintain a capability to attack NATO with nuclear weapons, a threat highlighted by the fact that the USSR has not yet reduced significantly either its nuclear modernization program or its nuclear force levels, despite its cuts in overall defense spending. Soviet central strategic forces will be reduced somewhat when the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty is signed, ratified, and implemented and when Soviet tactical nuclear weapons are removed from Germany and Eastern Europe along with Soviet forces. Even so, the USSR will retain very substantial nuclear forces—both for use on the battlefield and for medium- or long-range bombardment of military or industrial facilities.

U.S. central and theater nuclear forces assigned to NATO's defense will remain critical in determining nuclear attacks in unusual political circumstances, even as negotiations continue for deeper cuts in strategic and tactical nuclear force levels. U.S. central strategic forces can bear the brunt of this mission, while British and French nuclear forces can help dissuade the USSR from contemplating a nuclear attack confined to Europe in the hope that the United States would not respond with its central forces in order to avoid attacks on the United States itself.

We believe, however, that NATO should also maintain a small number of tactical nuclear weapons, both to deter a Soviet attack that relied on such weapons itself and to terminate a Soviet conventional attack that had defeated NATO's conventional forces. The maintenance of parity in conventional forces cannot fully guarantee a successful NATO conventional defense, although it is certainly preferable to forces that are inferior in number. The outcome of any conventional conflict would depend upon a variety of intangible factors that make predictions of success uncertain, at best. There are many examples in history of successful conventional offenses by numerically inferior forces, not least of which was the German offensive against France in 1940.

The maintenance of NATO's policy of threatening the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort if conventional defenses had failed provides a final military option to the Alliance that could be essential in unusual circumstances. More important, the preservation of this option contributes measurably to detering any Soviet attack and to encouraging the USSR to continue working toward further reductions in all nations' military forces and the building of political relationships and multinational institutions that can preserve the peace in Europe indefinitely. Many observers share the French view that it is fear of the incalculable outcome of the initiation of any war—whether nuclear at the outset or conventional—that has been primarily responsible for the preservation of peace in Europe for the past 45 years. NATO's nuclear policy has been, in this view, a key element in keeping this fear in the forefront of Soviet (and Western) political calculations.

With the achievement of parity in conventional military forces, NATO need no longer have any intention of using nuclear forces except in response to nuclear

aggression. Intentions aside, however, maintaining the option to utilize nuclear capabilities in response to a looming defeat in a conventional battle can hedge against unforeseeable circumstances.

To maintain the credibility of NATO's nuclear option, we believe that a small number of U.S. nuclear weapons suitable for theater use should be kept in Europe. Nuclear-armed tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASMs) can serve this purpose and should be deployed at a limited number of airfields in Germany and other nations. This recommendation stems more from a recognition of the political dynamics likely to operate during any future crisis than from a strictly military analysis of NATO's current requirements. Obviously, from a military point of view, such a deployment is not essential. The warning time that would be provided by a Soviet mobilization would be more than adequate to move nuclear weapons to Europe from bases in the United States, assuming that crews had been adequately trained and plans had been made to incorporate their possible use.

However, the continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons within the theater greatly enhances the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent. Although the maintenance of nuclear weapons in Europe may cause some near-term political difficulties, these pale in comparison to those that allied leaders would face should the need arise to reintroduce theater nuclear forces during a crisis. Such a step would likely be seen as an escalation of the crisis and a potential provocation, in all likelihood making it difficult for European governments, and Washington, to authorize such a step. In contrast, maintaining theater nuclear forces in Europe would eliminate the need to confront such a stark political decision at the height of a crisis and, consequently, would reinforce the deterrent effect of NATO's nuclear policy.

The location of some nuclear weapons in Germany and other European nations also provides mutual reassurance to the United States and to the host nations. By making clear, on the one hand, the U.S. commitment to take even extreme measures to help defend NATO's members, the location of nuclear weapons in Europe helps persuade nonnuclear powers that they can continue to foreswear obtaining nuclear weapons of their own. On the other hand, by demonstrating the willingness of European states to run even extreme risks in the common defense, the nuclear deployments help persuade the American electorate that the Alliance is a common effort that deserves support.

This same logic extends to the deployment of some U.S. combat forces in Germany. The location of troops in the theater would make it easier for a future American administration, possessing strategic warning of Soviet preparations for war, to take the difficult political steps of mobilizing reserves and industry and of deploying large numbers of additional U.S. troops to Europe. In a sense, the prior location of forces in the theater lowers the threshold for a mobilization decision.

In our view, the continued deployment of limited numbers of U.S. combat forces and nuclear weapons are essential to the preservation of peace and stability in Europe. U.S. forces deployed in Europe have served, and can continue to serve, vital U.S. and allied interests, guaranteeing NATO's security while fostering a stable environment for European economic and political integration. In contrast, we believe that the wholesale withdrawal of U.S. forces would lead to perceptions of U.S. abandonment of Europe, thereby severely undermining European stability and the prospects for lasting peace on the Continent.

We recognize, of course, that as an alliance of free and sovereign nations, some members of NATO may disagree with the recommendations outlined above. Ideally, such differences should be resolved through NATO's consultative mechanisms. Given the substantial warning that would precede any new Soviet threat, Alliance planners have greater latitude to accommodate specific national objections. In the event of differences over the means of implementing extended deterrence, however, the United States and its allies may wish to reconsider Alliance strategy. We believe that any careful review of U.S. and European interests will conclude that the

preservation of the cohesion of the Alliance is of overwhelming importance.

INSTITUTIONALIZING SECURITY

The gains of the past year open the prospect of even greater progress toward a disarmed and peaceful Europe in the future. Much remains to be accomplished, however. We believe that the United States should play a leading role in creating the conditions necessary for the eventual integration of all of Europe into a peaceful community. This process should include continued progress toward reduced levels of nuclear and conventional armaments and, more important, the strengthening of multilateral institutions that can help resolve conflicts and build a peaceful community of common interests in Europe.

With respect to arms control, the prolonged failure of the United States and USSR to conclude the talks on strategic nuclear forces has been a troubling exception to the general improvement of East-West ties in Europe and the bilateral great power relationship generally. As we have noted, Soviet strategic nuclear programs remain virtually unchanged from their previous levels, despite cutbacks in overall defense spending in the USSR. Continued modernization of the Soviet SS-18 arsenal, as well as the ongoing U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) testing program, stand in sharp contrast to the dramatic progress already achieved in other areas. Soviet strategic power remains a potent lever of coercive influence in Europe in some unforeseen future circumstance. Especially in view of the cutbacks in U.S. strategic programs, which have resulted from fiscal constraints on U.S. defense spending, curbing Soviet strategic nuclear forces through arms control should be a high priority of any U.S. administration. The prospective START I Treaty represents an important step in the process of implementing significant reductions in strategic nuclear forces.

Following ratification of START I, it is desirable for the United States and USSR to follow up on their commitment to move quickly to new negotiations for deeper reductions in their central nuclear forces, thereby reducing what will remain as the primary coercive lever available to the USSR for use against the United States and Europe. These new talks might consider further reductions in each side's strategic nuclear forces beyond the 6,000 "accountable" warhead limit currently envisioned. Unlike the START I limits, which because of a complex and permissive set of counting rules actually permit both sides to deploy many more than the 6,000 accountable warhead limit, a follow-on agreement might establish a firm limit of perhaps 3,000 to 5,000 warheads. The nuclear forces of third nations must also be brought into the negotiating process at some point as the forces of China and France will each exceed 1,000 warheads by the end of the century.

Separate U.S.-Soviet negotiations on short-range nuclear forces also might begin in the future. These talks, in our view, should consider all types of short- to intermediate-range weapons, including both missiles and aircraft-delivered munitions deployed either on land or at sea. It would be in the U.S. and NATO's interest to seek an agreement that reduced the number of such land-based weapons to a few hundred on each side and that denuclearized most kinds of maritime platforms. Obviously, effective means of verifying such constraints would have to be included in any formal agreement. For some systems, such as nuclear artillery shells, effective verification may prove impossible. In such cases, the United States should pursue mutual, politically binding declarations of intent to be followed by unilateral reductions. Finally, like the 1987 treaty on intermediate-range nuclear missiles, any agreement on short-range nuclear forces would have to be global in application; Europe cannot be isolated from the global balance of nuclear capabilities.

Such agreements on short-range nuclear forces would preserve NATO's nuclear option, as described earlier. At the same time, the existence of such limits would provide important constraints on any tendency that might emerge in the USSR to seek to substitute greatly enhanced tactical nuclear forces for declining conventional capabilities,

thereby furthering the process of political reconciliation and avoiding the emergence of new threats to European security.

Some members of the committee believe that the United States and Soviet Union should forego formal negotiations and formal limits, with each side instead moving unilaterally to minimum deterrent postures for short-range weapons, consistent with their strategic requirements. There would be political declarations of intent and perhaps some informal ways of ensuring that the reductions had occurred. Such a process would avoid the problems of defining and verifying limits on dual-capable systems and nuclear warheads, as well as the dangers of adding another zero option on missiles and artillery. It would permit NATO to define its residual level of nuclear weapons, taking account of its strategic goals and political environment. These have very little to do with the level of Soviet short-range nuclear forces.

Negotiations also should continue on conventional armed forces in Europe. Further reductions in Soviet armed forces deployed within the USSR could make the possibility of the emergence of a new Soviet military threat even more remote and contribute to greater progress in normalizing East-West political relations. The placement in a formal treaty of limits on the size and composition of the armed forces of individual European nations, moreover, could reassure all states about additional sources of possible instability in Europe, including that of a remilitarized Germany.

Although any treaty could be torn up or ignored by an aggressive and popular national leader—there can be no iron-clad guarantee against the remilitarization of any nation—the existence of legal constraints make such radical changes in government policies more difficult, especially in democratic societies. In addition, formal treaty constraints can contribute to reinforcing common confidence in all nations' peaceful intentions, helping thwart political factions that might otherwise emerge and that, by playing on popular suspicions of other countries' intentions, might succeed in gaining power on a rearmament platform.

As was agreed at the Paris CSCE Summit, future talks on conventional armed forces and confidence-building measures (to be completed by the 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting) will take place within the 34-nation CSCE forum. Among other things, these talks might consider

- Additional means of building confidence in peaceful intentions among the European nations, especially in regions troubled by tensions between ethnic groups that cross national boundaries, such as parts of Central Europe and the Balkans.
- Deeper reductions in the size of conventional armed forces, especially in armored forces, artillery, and medium- and long-range strike aircraft; as noted above, any such limitations should be defined on the basis of individual nations. The negotiations might also include limits on the overall number of personnel in each nation's armed forces, a type of limitation that would be valuable primarily for political reasons.
- Additional limits on types of military equipment essential for offensive operations, such as bridging equipment and mobile air defenses.
- Supplementary measures to increase military transparency and stability, including additional information exchanges on military equipment located outside the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area, notifications of certain reserve call-ups, limits on military exercises and activities in border areas, and expanded on-site and aerial inspection mechanisms.

No matter how important, arms control agreements alone are not sufficient to build a stable basis for peaceful relations in Europe. There is a need, as well, to create an organization encompassing all the nations of Europe and North America that eventually can play the primary security role on the Continent. NATO cannot fulfill this purpose; NATO was created primarily to balance Soviet military power and continues to function primarily as a hedge against a reemergent Soviet or Russian military threat. Any effort to

expand NATO's role to fulfill the broader purposes of building greater security and cooperation throughout Europe can only alienate the USSR, leading it to reconsider its current policies of military cutbacks and political retrenchment. Neither can the WEU or EC play this role, as they exclude both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The CSCE is the obvious candidate for this function, and the agreement in Paris in November 1990 to create a small secretariat, a conflict prevention center (CPC), and an office for free elections are excellent first steps. The CSCE's primary purpose should be political; it should be the key political means of integrating the USSR and Eastern Europe into the European security community—supplementing the impact of closer economic ties between the USSR and Western Europe.

At first, the CSCE should play a limited role, building on the steps taken at the November Paris Summit and including the following:

- Verifying and monitoring arms control arrangements. Given the scope of the new agreements on conventional forces and on confidence- and security-building measures, this will be a major task. The CSCE's new CPC should maintain the necessary data base, such as the location and equipment of national forces permitted by the agreement, to oversee not only the implementation of confidence-building measures (as charged by the Charter of Paris), but also the verification of the CFE accord. The CPC could be the locus for reporting activities required by existing agreements, as well as for registering inquiries about possible violations or questionable behavior. When such questions occur, representatives of the nations involved could meet to discuss the incident under the CSCE's aegis. The CPC also could help to organize exchanges of observers and inspection missions, consolidating what might otherwise be cumbersome bilateral exchanges. Smaller nations might eventually choose to depend on CSCE reports, rather than bearing the cost of carrying out such monitoring missions themselves.
- The Paris declaration also charged the CPC with responsibility for establishing a communications network to support implementation of confidence-building measures. This mandate should be expanded to include the establishment of a crisis communications network among European and North American capitals. The Conflict Prevention Center provides a logical nexus for this new communications network and might also provide the best forum for the technical discussions that will be necessary to implement the agreement and to maintain the network.
- Over the longer term, the CSCE could be given mediating and peacemaking roles, seeking to resolve or at least to contain any national conflicts that emerged in Europe. These roles might be most important with respect to Central and Eastern Europe, including, perhaps, parts of what is now the USSR. Working with the authorization of relevant countries, the CSCE secretariat could maintain a watch on such trouble spots, help to bring together representatives of the disputing parties for negotiations, and organize fact-finding missions to establish an objective basis for resolving disputes. There might even be a possibility of establishing peacekeeping forces under the CSCE's aegis to monitor borders, patrol disengagement zones, or generally to help enforce whatever means of resolving conflicts had been established.
- Eventually, the CSCE might evolve into a true collective security system, providing the legal basis and tangible means of guaranteeing the security of all member states. Any such development will likely take many years to accomplish, however.

To fulfill these roles, the CSCE must eventually be given a proper legal basis in a formal treaty. Although such a step should not be taken immediately because it would raise such difficult questions as the permanence of current national boundaries in Europe, any serious effort to enhance the authority of the organization would fail without such legal basis. Establishing the conference in this formal sense would require dealing with

additional questions of organization and procedure. Among others, the possibility of giving the larger nations greater roles in the organization will have to be considered, as will the possibility of taking some technical decisions on a less-than-consensus basis. Prior to establishing the CSCE in this formal way, however, it should be possible, and would be desirable, to invest it with an adequate staff and a leadership that can command respect throughout the nations and political organizations of Europe and North America.

CONCLUSION

The approach to European security and the U.S. role in it that has been outlined in this report will disappoint many who seek rapid departures from past policies. At issue is not whether extraordinarily significant changes have transformed the existing European security equation that was created at the end of World War II—they have. At issue is whether the current direction of these changes can be sustained long enough, and within a sufficiently stable setting, to ensure the growth of democratic values and related institutions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and to permit deeper and more orderly reductions in the military capabilities still deployed on the Continent.

Every period is, by definition, a period of transition. There is no question that the transition that began with the momentous changes of 1989 is historically significant. But, as a consequence, the uncertainties it entails are especially pronounced, too. In the short run at least, these uncertainties necessitate the continuity we are still recommending. A uniting and stronger Western Europe is not the least of the many objectives fulfilled by the steady implementation of U.S. policies since the end of World War II. But under present conditions, Western Europe remains militarily weak relative to—though not threatened by—the Soviet Union whose remaining arsenal (not to mention its size and its population) clearly leaves it the largest military power on the European continent. The political future of the Soviet Union is so unpredictable as to demand that the potential for a rebirth of the Soviet threat not be dismissed fully, however unlikely it may seem to be at this time. Given the enormous strides of the past 18 months, however, we believe that the new military posture for NATO outlined in this report would enable the United States to continue to play its vital security role in Europe, with no increased risks to its security (or that of its allies), but at greatly reduced costs.

As suggested in this report, too, such caution may well cease to be necessary in the longer term, thereby reducing further, and even ending, the military burden of defending our interests in Europe. After all, the U.S. guarantee against aggression written into the North Atlantic Treaty came together with the explicit understanding, articulated by President Harry Truman in July 1949, that self-help be achieved by the allies "at the earliest possible time." We believe we are now approaching such a time. But the process leading to this ultimate objective needs to occur gradually, in consonance with changes in our former adversaries, and especially within the Soviet Union.

Even in the short term, however, caution, although necessary, would not be sufficient to ensure the creation of an ever more peaceful and democratic Europe. With and beyond NATO, therefore, a new security system can be envisioned, one whose institutional pillars are already in place and that the United States can and should continue to help strengthen.

First among these institutions is the European Community. After 40 years, 12 of our most stalwart allies have formed an increasingly integrated community of states that exerts a significant influence in Europe and in the world. Its economic strength and the political stability of its members, which are both the material foundation and the institutional justification of any such influence, are beyond question. The United States' self-confidence in welcoming new steps toward European integration should be no less than Europe's confidence in taking these steps.

Beyond the military dimension covered in this report, security in Europe will depend primarily on the performance of our political and economic systems, independently and in relation to each other. Even as they continue

to improve their own performance, EC members should seek to improve the economies of their neighbors and former adversaries. After World War II, U.S. economic assistance did just that with regard to the EC states. After the Cold War, it is now up to these states to do the same for their neighbors. Neither NATO nor the CSCE can fulfill this role.

Yet, the affluence of the EC can be neither enjoyed in full nor maintained for long without a dependable security structure. Whether the EC is yet prepared to assume a bigger role on defense issues may be debated. But what cannot be debated is that if the United States is to play a lesser role in Europe's defense, Europe will have to play a larger one. Whether such a role is assumed by the nation-states of Europe within or outside of such cooperative contexts as the Western European Union, or whether it is bestowed by the member-states on the Community, is a question that Europeans alone can answer. But it is one that should be addressed without further delay. For, indeed, it involves much more than the defense of Europe's interests in Europe; as the WEU's involvement in the Persian Gulf attests, it touches also on the defense of Europe's interests in other parts of the world that are not covered by NATO.

The other available vehicle for a broad security system that would combine the two alliance systems that formed the core of the Cold War is, of course, the CSCE. So long as neither NATO nor the EC accepts new members, CSCE remains the only organization in which membership is such as to define in a truly collective manner the terms of tomorrow's collective security arrangements. Its potential is as real as the hopes for peace now shared by the nations of Europe. And, indeed, as this potential for peace is viewed in the context of the CSCE and in light of our recollection of past conflicts, the United States can show pride in the achievements of its policies toward Europe.

Consequently, we believe that although past U.S. policies have been enormously successful, the United States has a continuing interest in helping to ensure the further growth of democratic values, deeper reductions in military forces, and the continuing evolution of closer economic and political relations throughout Europe. With the enormous strides of the past year, we believe that the United States, and NATO, can continue to play a vital role in creating an even more peaceful and democratic Europe than exists today.

PROGRAM NOTE: *The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John M. Olin Foundation has assembled a group of distinguished American legislators, retired diplomats, military officers, and civilian defense officials, and private citizens to study the future of the Atlantic Alliance in light of the revolutionary changes now sweeping Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This interim report reflects the view of the group that the pace of change currently taking place requires all Americans to think now about the future of Europe and the role of the United States in preserving its peace and stability.*

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The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) was established in 1980 as an integral part of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C., to unite the worlds of scholarship and public affairs in the search for realistic answers to contemporary problems facing the United States. The FPI is a meeting place for SAIS faculty members and students, as well as for government analysts, policymakers, diplomats, journalists, business leaders, and other specialists in international affairs.

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Senator EXON. Is there anything else before we close that either of you would like to say in conclusion?

General GALVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, no. I do not have anything else.

Admiral EDNEY. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to appear before this committee and we appreciate that opportunity and the continuing support of this committee.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much. We are adjourned.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

REDUCED OPERATIONS

Senator LEVIN. On September 18th, 1990, the Pentagon announced that it would eliminate or reduce operations at 150 foreign facilities or sites. The cutbacks were to take place over a period of years and the facilities affected ranged from supply posts to air bases.

a. Including minor properties, how many total facilities are there in Europe?

b. How many of the 150 selected sites are in Europe and where are the facilities located?

c. Has the schedule for and/or pace of the closings been affected by the Gulf War? If so, in what way?

General GALVIN. The overall criteria for force drawdowns and base closures/consolidations includes optimizing the combat capability of the residual force, retaining the ability to execute the Alliance's strategy, balancing geographic region impacts, and minimizing future facility costs. The criteria for individual installation selection parallels this overall approach. We first consider operational requirements, then seek to decrease costs and increase efficiencies. Next, we try to minimize moves and to reduce environmental impacts. We also factor in such issues as proximity to training areas, retaining quality facilities and housing, and the concerns of the host nation.

a. Total number of facilities at the time of the Pentagon announcement was 1,402.

b. Of the 150 sites announced on September 18th, 1990, 131 are in Europe. Attached listing shows locations and the associated bases (as shown in the Pentagon announcement).

c. Yes, the pace of installation actions has been impacted by the Gulf War. Some of the installations slated to begin drawdown action in fiscal year 1991 have been delayed pending return of the troops from the Gulf. The reason for this action is the families of these troops are still assigned to the installations and the personal gear of the single soldiers are also at the installations. As decisions are made on when units will be redeployed from the Gulf, we will be able to make decisions on the installations. However, we view this as only a temporary delay.

Installation	Base Associated with	Location (nearest city)
Germany		
Baker Army Airfield	Bad Toelz	Bad Toelz
Benediktenwand Trng Area	Bad Toelz	Bad Toelz
Flint Kaserne	Bad Toelz	Bad Toelz
Grotzerholz Trng Area	Bad Toelz	Bad Toelz
Heigel Trng Area	Bad Toelz	Bad Toelz
Jachenau Trng Area	Bad Toelz	Bad Toelz
Kesselkopf Trng Area	Bad Toelz	Lengries
Sachsenkamerstr Family Hosing	Bad Toelz	Bad Toelz
Hessisch Oldendorf (Main site)	Hessisch Oldendorf	Hameln
Hessisch Oldendorf Recreation Anx	Hessisch Oldendorf	Hameln
Hessisch Oldendorf Storage Anx I	Hessisch Oldendorf	Hameln
Hessisch Oldendorf Storage Anx II	Hessisch Oldendorf	Hameln
Schwelentrup Communications Anx	Hessisch Oldendorf	Lemgo
Lindsey (Main Site)	Lindsey	Wiesbaden
Schierstein Admin Anx	Lindsey	Wiesbaden
Wiesbaden Hospital (Standby)	Lindsey	Wiesbaden
Bollingen Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Ulm
Bubesheim Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Guenzburg
Burlafingen Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Ford Family Housing	Neu Ulm	Ulm
Gerlenhofen Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Guenzburg Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Guenzburg
Kleinkoetz Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Guenzburg
Leibi Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Ludwigsfeld Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Maehringen Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Ulm
Merklingen Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Ulm
Nelson Bks	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Neu Ulm Officers Club	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Neu Ulm Supply Center	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Reisenburg Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Guenzburg
Schwaighofen Storage Area	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Strass Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Thalfingen Trng Area	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Von Steuben Missile Trng Station	Neu Ulm	Illertissen
Vorfeld Family Housing	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Wiley Barracks	Neu Ulm	Neu Ulm
Hindenburg Kaserne	Ansbach	Ansbach
Aschaffenburg Army Airfield	Aschaffenburg	Aschaffenburg
Aschaffenburg Supply and Service Depot	Aschaffenburg	Aschaffenburg
Fiori Barracks	Aschaffenburg	Aschaffenburg
Graves Barracks	Aschaffenburg	Aschaffenburg

REDUCED OPERATIONS: OVERSEAS LISTING (Cont'd)

Installation	Base Associated with	Location (nearest city)
Germany (cont'd)		
Jaeger Barracks	Aschaffenburg	Aschaffenburg
Ready Barracks	Aschaffenburg	Aschaffenburg
Smith Barracks	Aschaffenburg	Aschaffenburg
Augsburg Ammo Vehicle Park	Augsburg	Augsburg
Biburg Trng Area	Augsburg	Aystetten
Derchinger Forest Trng Area	Augsburg	Derching
Deuringen Trng Area	Augsburg	Deuringen
Haunstetten Trng Area	Augsburg	Augsburg
Holzhausen Trng Area	Augsburg	Batzenhofen
Doernwasserlos Tac Def Site	Bamberg	Bamberg
Strassburg Kaserne	Baumholder	Idar Oberstein
Ernst Ludwig Kaserne	Darmstadt	Darmstadt
Camp King	Frankfurt	Oberursel
Drake Barracks	Frankfurt	Frankfurt
Edwards Barracks	Frankfurt	Frankfurt
Michael Barracks	Frankfurt	Frankfurt
Rose Airfield	Frankfurt	Frankfurt
Friedburg Heliport (Ockstadt Army Airfield)	Giessen	Friedburg
Rivers Barracks	Giessen	Giessen
Schloss Kaserne	Giessen	Butzbach
Coleman Barracks	Hanau	Gelnhausen
Forage Depot	Hanau	Hanau
Francois Kaserne	Hanau	Hanau
Grossauheim Kaserne	Hanau	Hanau
Hessen-Homburg Kaserne	Hanau	Hanau
Badenerhof Kaserne	Heilbronn	Heilbronn
Dallau Tactical Defense Sta	Heilbronn	Dallau
Heilbronn Trng Area	Heilbronn	Heilbronn
Neckarsulm QM Class III Pt	Heilbronn	Neckarsulm
Seehof Area	Karlsruhe	Ettlingen
Lee Barracks	Mainz	Mainz
Mainz RTO	Mainz	Mainz
Gendarmerie Kaserne	Mannheim	Mannheim
Chiemgaustr Bil & Admin Area	Munich	Munich
Eching Trng Area	Munich	Munich
Gruenthal Fam Hsg	Munich	Munich
Harlaching Admin Facility	Munich	Munich
Ingolstadt Autobahn Svc Fac	Munich	Ingolstadt
Landshut Lafaire Vite Fac	Munich	Landshut
McGraw Kaserne	Munich	Munich
Munich AFN Facility	Munich	Munich
Munich AYA Facilities	Munich	Munich
Perlacher Forest Fam Hsg	Munich	Munich
Saebenerstr Athletic Field	Munich	Munich
Warner Commissary	Munich	Munich
Monteith Barracks	Nuernberg	Fuerth

REDUCED OPERATIONS: OVERSEAS LISTING (Cont'd)

Installation	Base Associated with	Location (nearest city)
Germany (cont'd)		
Pinder Barracks	Nuernberg	Zirndorf
Pirmasens UG Storage Areas	Pirmasens	Pirmasens
Grevenbroich-Kapellen Site	Rheinberg	Grevenbroich
Boeblingen Maintenance Plant	Stuttgart	Boeblingen
Coffey Barracks	Stuttgart	Ludwigsburg
Funker Kaserne	Stuttgart	Esslingen
Jaegerhaus Range	Stuttgart	Esslingen
Karls Kaserne	Stuttgart	Ludwigsburg
Ludwigsburg Engr R&U Shop	Stuttgart	Ludwigsburg
Ludwigsburg QM Warhouse	Stuttgart	Ludwigsburg
Murphy Barracks	Stuttgart	Ludwigsburg
Nellingen Kaserne	Stuttgart	Nellingen
Sachsenheim Missile Sta	Stuttgart	Sachsenheim
Valdez Barracks	Stuttgart	Ludwigsburg
Emery Barracks	Wuerzburg	Wuerzburg
Faulenberg Kaserne	Wuerzburg	Wuerzburg
Hindenburg Barracks	Wuerzburg	Wuerzburg
Mainbullau Missile Sta	Wuerzburg	Miltenberg
Wanna Communications Annex		Westerwanna
Greece		
Elevsis Custodial Site		Elevsis
Elevsis Headquarters Complex		Elevsis
Lefkas Radio Relay Site		Athenia
Italy		
Decimomannu		Cagliari
Quartu St. Elena Housing Annex		Cagliari
Villasor Storage Annex		Cagliari
Agnano Compound	Naval Support Act	Naples
Spain		
Torrejon Air Base	Torrejon	Madrid
Royal Oaks (Encinarde Los Reyes)Housing	Torrejon	Madrid
Royal Oaks (Encinarde Los Reyes) School	Torrejon	Madrid
Royal Oaks (Encinarde Los Reyes) Storage Anx	Torrejon	Madrid
Sonseca Service Anx	Torrejon	Sonseca
Sonseca Seismic Site	Torrejon	Sonseca
Torrejon Storage Anx	Torrejon	Torrejon Ardoz
Torrejon Storage Anx 2	Torrejon	Torrejon Ardoz
Zaragoza (Main Site)	Zaragoza	Zaragoza
Zaragoza Radio Beacon Anx	Zaragoza	Zaragoza
Cartagena Ammunition Area		Cartagena
Cartagena Fuels Area		Cartagena
Guardamar Communication Site		Rota
United Kingdom		
Martlesham-Heath Communication Anx		Ipswich
RAF Kemble Maintenance Facility		Cirencester
RAF Sculthorpe		Norwich

NATO INFRASTRUCTURE

Senator LEVIN. In your testimony you said you expect to reduce our European forces from two corps to one and from eight tactical fighter wings to three or four. Will you proceed as planned even if the Soviets maintain their current position on CFE?

General GALVIN. Yes. The force I outlined, one corps and three or four tactical fighter wings, a CVBG and a MARG is a minimum level force which balances risk against cost. By minimum, I mean a corps is the smallest force that can be considered viable on a continental land mass. The need for adequate air and sea control forces to complement the land force is self-evident. The European continental land mass is the home of several armies, the largest of which, post-CFE or post-political change, remains the Soviet Union. Our reinforcement capability is the main counter to forces of this size. To have a credible deterrent from the outset of a crisis, the forward presence force must be capable of performing doctrinal missions until reinforcements can be brought to bear. Obviously, I would like to have more forward presence forces in order to further reduce the security risk. Realistically, the described force is all that will be supportable in view of the security requirement and cost—which must be politically acceptable to both the United States and the host nations to U.S. stationed forces.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TRENT LOTT

PERSIAN GULF

Senator LOTT. General, a large amount of material and people is going through and from Europe to the Persian Gulf. I understand a large percentage of this activity was through bases at Frankfurt, Germany; Madrid, Spain; and Moron, Spain. Military facilities at these locations are scheduled to close under current DOD planning.

What will be the effect of these closures on future operations of this nature and how will you work around these closures?

General GALVIN. Outright return of Spanish facilities could affect our ability to support movements to and through the European Command area of responsibility. However, our intent is to leave a residual force at such installations to provide an infrastructure base for supporting return or throughput of U.S. forces if that is required. During peacetime, securing that throughput capability will be handled through consultation with the host nation. Wartime support must be secured through a wartime host nation support agreement. We are committed to keeping an operational capability at Rhein Main. There are no alternatives to Rhein Main and the adverse effect of giving up an operational capability for theater throughput would be unacceptable.

STORAGE

Senator LOTT. Are you ready to recommend additional increases and dependence on forward storage and prepositioned stockage at this time or do you prefer to wait for the mobilization study recommendations?

General GALVIN. I do not recommend additional increases and dependence on forward storage and prepositioned stockage at this time. The results of the Mobility Requirements Study, along with other data, will ultimately determine the final stockage recommendation. In any event, the objectives will only be supportable if adequate procurement and O&M funding are provided.

MAINTENANCE FACILITIES

Senator LOTT. What is your recommendation for having forward overseas maintenance facilities and contracts to support U.S. deployments, either fulltime or emergency actions, such as the Persian Gulf operations?

General GALVIN. The preservation of overseas maintenance facilities and contracts/agreements to support inplace forces and deployments of forces are vital to U.S. operations and should be retained commensurate with our overseas presence and the likelihood of future contingencies. Inplace contracts/agreements are extremely useful and provide options and capabilities which might not exist in the European post-CFE environment without them. Multinational forces of the future would benefit from this type of support. Overseas depot maintenance capability is beneficial from both a logistical and operational perspective. However, overseas maintenance facilities are only cost effective and logistically smart when there is a

permanent forward deployed presence which requires such a capability and which can be augmented in time of war. Benefits of overseas basing of maintenance facilities include: reduced transportation costs, quicker turn around of critical assets, less down time for combat systems, and increased readiness rates. All services involved in operation Desert Storm benefited from forward maintenance facilities and in-place contracts/agreements.

EXCESS PROPERTY PROGRAM

Senator LOTT. The Department of Defense has been very active in donating non-lethal excess property to countries in your area of responsibility (AOR). I am aware that some of this has gone to former Warsaw Pact countries and Africa.

Could you describe for us the benefits these donations have brought to the recipient countries and the United States?

Who are the beneficiaries and how is the property used?

General GALVIN. The excess property program allows the DOD to make available to foreign recipients excess DOD property such as clothing, tents, medical equipment and supplies, and food. All donations are tasked through and coordinated by the Department of State. The excess property donated abroad brings real benefits to the United States and recipients. It alleviates human suffering, helps to stabilize social conditions, and strengthens our bilateral relations with the recipient nations.

Many Eastern European and African nations have received such assistance. The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs can provide additional details about the program, recipients, and uses of the property once donated.

RAHILL BILL

Senator LOTT. Representative Rahill's (D. W.Va.) bill, currently before the House, would transfer the DOD non-lethal excess property program to GSA.

How would you view the consequences of such a transfer as a military commander?

General GALVIN. The DOD should continue to dispose of its property through existing laws and mechanisms.

FORWARD STORAGE AND PREPOSITIONED STOCKAGE

Senator LOTT. Are you ready to recommend additional increases and dependence on forward storage and prepositioned stockage at this time or do you prefer to wait for the mobilization study recommendations?

Admiral EDNEY. The value and effectiveness of prepositioning equipment and supplies, including afloat prepositioning, was forcefully demonstrated as one of our major success stories of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The Desert Storm after action reports, together with the Mobility Requirements Study should quantify our strategic lift needs for the next decade, and allow us to analyze and define any additional requirements for forward storage and prepositioned stockage.

[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

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